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Preface to the English Translation
This book was first published in 2015 in Turkish by İletişim Publishing. 
It is the first ethnographic study written about the Kurdish Hizbullah. 
This study constitutes a sociological and historical analysis of the 35 
year-long period from Hizbullah’s emergence as an illegal underground 
organisation in 1979 until the time of writing, when Hizbullah had been 
legally active for ten years, represented by a legion of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and its affiliated political party Hüda-Par. The 
data used in the book consist of in-depth interviews and oral history 
narratives gathered in 2013–14 during the field research I carried out at 
the Department of Sociology, Selçuk University.
Hizbullah emerged with the objective of overthrowing the regime 
in Turkey – which it considered non-Islamic and thus illegitimate – 
and establishing a Sharia-based Islamic state in its place. Despite that, 
Hizbullah has not once targeted the Turkish state since its establishment 
and even positioned itself as a paramilitary force alongside the Turkish 
state in the first half of the 1990s when the fighting between the PKK 
and the Turkish state was at its most intense. Hizbullah disintegrated 
after the death of its leader and seizure of its archive as a result of a police 
operation in a villa in Beykoz, Istanbul, on 17 January 2000. 
Hüda-Par’s programme featured many elements in common with 
that of Hizbullah’s rival HDP/BDP vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
However, this was reversed as a result of the Kobanê protests in 2014, 
where Hizbullah and PKK supporters engaged in armed clashes and 
people from both parties were killed. The Şeyh Said Seriyyeleri (Sheikh 
Said Brigades), the armed wing of ‘civil’ Hizbullah, emerged during this 
period.
As an organisation that emerged as a small provincial group of 
devotees before transforming into an organization that murdered its 
Kurdish opponents and rivals by horrific methods, and finally entering 
civil society by means of hundreds of associations and a political party, 
the case of Hizbullah offers valuable information concerning waves of 
violence based on religion, identity, power, and nation in the Middle 
East. I believe this book also constitutes a good entrance point in 
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forming an understanding of the patterns of similar organisations in the 
continuously destabilising Middle East.
The analyses of visual data, which comprise the last chapter of the 
Turkish edition of the book, have not been included in the English 
translation. The rest of the book remains unaltered in the present 
edition, except for footnotes added for the benefit of people who are not 
acquainted with Turkish politics or unfamiliar with Islamic terminology. 
Although developments following the Kobanê protests in 2014 offer 
much data supporting the main arguments put forward in this book, the 
period in question has not been incorporated into this study.
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Introduction
Mehmet Kurt – You were Hizbullahçı,1 then who were we? (laughing)
Sermest – You were punks (berduş)! (laughing)
Mehmet Kurt – So why were you going to fight the punks?
Sermest – There were tensions. We had received orders. They had said 
‘tread on their dead bodies’. Even I had prepared myself. We tried to 
lure you into the school. But there was teacher X; because he was there 
you did not want to fight in the school. So the plan went like this. A 
group of us were in the schoolyard; it was only a few of us waiting 
there. Another group were in the backyard. The rest of the team were 
all in the halls. The incident was going to go down like this: those in the 
schoolyard were going to get into a fight with you. Then, pretending 
to be losing the fight, they were going to start running away toward 
the backyard of the halls. When you attacked them, the group in the 
backyard were going to come down from the top, the ones in the halls 
were going to come out and trap you at the stairs going down to the 
halls. Imagine this, they had said ‘no one can leave there alive’. Tens 
of people!2
If what Sermest told me is true, then I could have been killed in a fight in 
the late 1990s when I was a student at the boarding Mardin İmam Hatip3 
high school, the reason for which I do not recall, by students who were 
members of Hizbullah.
Turkey is a country of partial confrontations.4 Routinely experienced 
within many domains of society, such as daily life, politics, academia, and 
interpersonal relationships, these partial confrontations constitute an 
important impediment to the development of a healthy public perception 
about Turkey. Similarly, the idea of such partial confrontations in 
academia is the claim for objectivity borrowed from positivist thought. 
However, it is clear that the ideal of objectivity in the natural sciences 
cannot be achieved in the same way in the social sciences given that it 
is impossible for the individual carrying out the research to completely 
isolate himself from the influence of the history, language, and culture 
around him. Michel Foucault’s discussions (1994) of ‘subjectivity’, which 
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he positions antithetically to objectivity, and its relation to reality paved 
the way for in-depth investigations into the idea of ‘absolute truth and 
reality’ in social science research. This line of thought, which claims that 
absolute objectivity is, by its very nature, impossible to achieve in the 
social sciences, ensures that the researcher confronts his personal history 
and reveals his positionality, while recommending that potentially 
prohibitive or leading positions are excluded from analysis (Grbich, 
2004, p. 83). Following the suggestion that knowledge is produced on a 
more accurate footing if the researcher is visible, I share my own history 
and positionality with the reader. 
My confrontation with the fact that I could have been killed took place 
in the autumn of 2013 when I was carrying out fieldwork for this study. 
As an individual embedded within a family and a social environment 
marked by Islamic sensitivities, I had spent my high school years 
observing the violence unleashed by Hizbullahçı students and, on one 
or two occasions, being the target of such violence. The reasons violence 
had been turned on me on those occasions were my open dissatisfaction 
with the authoritarian and oppressive attitudes the Hizbullah students 
at school had adopted and my outspoken expression of discontent with 
practices that restricted my living environment. Life outside the school 
at the time was similarly marked by fighting between Hizbullah and 
the PKK and the climate of fear and polarisation that had developed on 
account of the frequent ‘murders by unknown perpetrators’ (faili meçhul 
cinayetler) in those years. I shared a room in the halls with someone 
whose imam5 father had been killed by Hizbullah and in a neighbouring 
room there was another student whose elder brother, I later found out, 
had been one of the ‘first martyrs’ of Hizbullah. Being the only organised 
students at school, Hizbullah had the largest representation in the halls 
that housed 350 students and I remember being amazed at how easily 
these Hizbullahçı youngsters could find reasons to beat someone up. 
Approaching the end of my high school years, I was looking forward 
to leaving behind these dark times when everyone was woken up by 
Hizbullahçı students for morning prayers and those who refused could 
have been subjected to violence; when ‘those who spoke with girls’ 
were most certainly beaten up; when the TV set which had been newly 
brought into our canteen, resembling those in Turkish military bases, 
was smashed up by Hizbullahçı students on the premise that watching 
television was haram;6 when the vice principal was attacked with iron 
rods and his arms broken by Hizbullahçı students in one of Mardin’s 
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narrow abbaras7 on account of their belief that he mistreated Hizbullahçı 
students and took disciplinary action against them; and finally, when 
a senior student aimed a Kalashnikov rifle at one of our teachers. My 
goal was to pass the university entrance exams, head off to do a course 
which would get me away from Hizbullah and help me reach my ‘secular 
aspirations’, and remove myself from the suffocating monotony of 
provincial life. But these last years in high school also coincided with a 
period in which a major confrontation took place between the Turkish 
military and the government, culminating in what is referred to as 
a post-modern coup on 28 February 1997. As a result, the Refah-Yol 
coalition government was forced to resign from power and amendments 
were made to the laws and regulations of higher education whereby 
those who graduated from occupational high schools (meslek liseleri) 
could apply for undergraduate courses only in their own area of specialty. 
These amendments were essentially to prevent graduates of İmam Hatip 
schools from applying for any course other than Religious Studies. Like 
my friends who continued at İmam Hatip high schools for the accom-
modation opportunities they offered and/or on account of the ‘decision’ 
made by their religious provincial families, I was not on either side of 
this social polarisation. Although some associations in western Turkey 
sent graduates of İmam Hatip schools abroad to study the courses they 
preferred, no one seemed concerned about students in the provincial 
İmam Hatip schools. In the end, as one of those ‘fortunate’ students who 
managed to pass the university entrance exams, I had no option but to 
apply for the Religious Studies course.
I spent my undergraduate years doing extensive reading in all areas 
of the discipline of Religious Studies and especially about religion as a 
social phenomenon. After graduation, I completed a Master’s degree in 
Sociology of Religion at Selçuk University where I focused on religion–
state relations in Turkey and European Union countries within the 
context of secularism, cultural policy, and religious institutions and 
services. I continued my education at the Konya Yüksek İhtisas Eğitim 
Merkezi8 where I received high-level religious training for three years. 
Here, I had the opportunity to study traditional religious approaches to 
contemporary issues as well as classical religious texts. Over these three 
years, my academic interests were focused on religious groups that I either 
observed in my own social surroundings or discovered through lectures, 
and the way their religious discourses were constructed. Although my 
insatiable scientific curiosity and inclination to question things led to 
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me being known as someone who at times ‘tried the lecturers’ patience’ 
or even ‘spoiled the faith’ of rather more traditional lecturers, I realised 
during this period that sociology as a discipline could provide me with 
the answers to my questions. This period of acculturation, in which I 
focused heavily on sociology and subsequently during my PhD on 
anthropology culminated in this book.
My return to high school, this time for academic research, was 
mainly motivated by curiosity to learn the mechanisms that produced 
the violence, which I found so hard to make sense of, and analyse them 
from a sociological/anthropological perspective. No analytical studies 
on Hizbullah had been carried out from such a perspective and I was 
the first to write a doctoral dissertation on the subject. I was sufficiently 
equipped to analyse religious literature from a sociological perspective. 
Lectures, workshops, and conferences attended and reading done over 
two years at Yale University’s Department of Anthropology as well 
as time spent at the Columbia Center for Oral History provided the 
necessary anthropological and ethnographic framework. The fact that I 
spoke Kurdish would make it easier for me to build rapport and dialogue 
with my informants. I could find my high school friends, whom I had 
not seen for years, and finally ask them the question ‘why’.
I had the advantages of a command of Islamic terminology and fluency 
in Kurdish. But with long hair and a goatee, not a look that members of 
Hizbullah were used to seeing in daily life, I was clearly an outsider to 
my informants (Agar, 1980). Despite my proximity to the etic perspective 
within the dichotomy of emic/etic often discussed in the literature, my 
approach was also inclusive of an emic perspective within my efforts to 
understand Hizbullah (Headland et al., 1990). For this reason, I told my 
informants that instead of considering the knowledge they shared with 
me as absolute truth, I would analyse this knowledge in a comparative 
framework as part of their discourse. As a result, I sometimes had to 
wait months to do an interview. I was initially hoping to discover the 
patterns of religious and ethnic belonging among members of Hizbullah, 
analyse the means by which it justified violence, and fill in the gaps in 
its known history while correcting misinformation therein through field 
research. However, I was provided with much more and discovered an 
area reaching far beyond my expectations. As accounts of many carrying 
out fieldwork confirm, in the field I had to reflect on what I previously 
knew and realised that the commonly shared public knowledge about 
Hizbullah was not adequate to understand the organisation. Public 
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knowledge about Hizbullah was fraught with partial considerations that 
were based on an Orientalist reading of violence. Today, with its more 
than 100,000 followers, Hizbullah is a social movement and should be 
investigated beyond a single focus on violence using the perspectives 
of sociology of religion and politics, anthropology of the state, social 
memory studies, discourse analysis, and visual anthropology.
The case of Sermest was certainly worth investigating from the 
perspectives of psychology and social psychology, sociology and 
anthropology. He said, ‘I could not even tell myself the fact that I was in 
love for five years’, adding he ‘still could not get over the negative effects 
of the past’. How could I explain the case of Azad, who after so many 
years still retained a vivid image of his 5 foot 7 inch tall, 25 year-old 
‘imaginary supervisor’, Ahmet, whom he had manufactured to tell the 
police about in case he was arrested and tortured during interrogation? 
How can we account for the fact, from the perspective of religious and 
ethnic belonging, that the same Azad told me, ‘I would like a Kurdish 
name’ in a quiet voice when I asked him what alias he would prefer me 
to use for him in my dissertation given that he still ‘makes a wide turn’ 
when he walks into a street to see whether someone is following him 
and that he observed me for the whole duration of our interview in 
hesitant silence? One might find it ironic that I named this informant 
Azad, after the Kurdish word meaning ‘free’, given the image of his 
imaginary supervisor Ahmet is still strong in Azad’s mind. What can 
we learn from the case of Mahmut, who was rebuked by the provincial 
representatives of the National Salvation Party on the grounds of being a 
nationalist after he chanted ‘Azadî 9 is in Islam’ and who said, ‘two things 
are forbidden in this country: Being Kurdish and being Muslim’? How 
can we make sense of the case of Kamuran, from the perspectives of 
gender segregation, daily life practices, and different forms of religious-
ness, who studied at two universities and was imprisoned several times, 
when he says in a regretful tone, ‘now we’ve turned 30 years old; we could 
have made healthier choices’ and the only women he interacts with are 
close relatives? How can we comparatively analyse the experiences of 
the informant who was a member of Hizbullah and stayed in the same 
room for three years for fear of getting caught and another who carried 
a gun for three years because of death threats from Hizbullah? How can 
we consider Ahmet’s statement, in terms of Hizbullah’s confrontation 
with the past, ‘I swore not to talk about this subject until on the Day of 
Judgement in the presence of Allah’ given that Ahmet used to receive 
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death threats from Hizbullah and some of his friends had been killed 
by it? What does the case of Yusuf tell us about theories of the state and 
state crime, when he responded to my enquiry about the link between 
the Turkish state and Hizbullah by saying, ‘if the state was protecting us, 
why did I suffer so much torture, spend so many years in prison?’ (Green 
and Ward, 2004)? And how can we interpret the case of the Turkish 
informant from the perspective of the relationship between religion and 
ethnicity who stated, ‘when you dig a bit below the surface of Turkish 
Islamists you find Turkish nationalism and Turkish Islamists carry the 
same venom’? 
During my fieldwork, I met more Hizbullah members than those who 
eventually agreed to be interviewed by me. Like Yiğit, who still carried 
a razor blade scar across his face after getting involved in a fight with a 
group of young drug addicts for smoking marijuana in the mosque yard, 
many preferred to meet me and listen to what I had to say, but did not 
agree to an interview. Despite this, my observations from high school 
years chimed with observations of those who refused to give me an 
interview and are presented to the reader at various points in this study. 
In order to ensure the confidentiality and safety of those who agreed to 
talk to me under the condition that their identity should not be disclosed 
under any circumstance, I chose to present certain information in this 
study without any reference to its source. The literature (Felbab-Brown, 
2014; Goldstein, 2014) shows that in the case of studies which take 
violence as a subject matter (Aras et al., 2013) such measures must be 
taken to ensure the safety of the researcher and his informants. Therefore, 
I have tried to take every precaution to ensure the safety and confiden-
tiality of the informants who contributed valuable data to this study. In 
addition to two informants who allowed me to use their real identities 
as they gave interviews in their official capacity and on behalf of the 
institutions they worked for, I should express my gratitude to all my 
anonymous informants not only for the information they imparted but 
also for sharing their life stories and hence making this study possible.
After this long introduction, I may finally ask the main question the 
study aims to answer: What is Hizbullah and how can it be analysed as a 
form of belonging?
Hizbullah in Turkey is largely populated by Sunnis compared with 
Hizbullah in Lebanon, whose followers are mainly adherents of the 
Shiite sect of Islam, more specifically by Shafi’i Kurds. Public opinion 
concerning Hizbullah in Turkey and the literature on the group, with 
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the exception of a few works, are ridden with partial confrontations and 
operate on an Orientalist simplification that presents violence as unfore-
seeable and uncontrollable, and considers Islam to be the sole mechanism 
through which Hizbullah’s violence is perpetrated. Even a quick search 
on Hizbullah in the print or visual media, on the Internet, or elsewhere 
reveals traces of these partial confrontations and social polarisation. 
Therefore, one is invariably stuck between the Hizbullah-affiliated 
media that present Hizbullah as proposing an ideal model of society and 
the majority of the rest of the media that uses the word Hizbullah almost 
synonymously with horror, atrocity, violence, and state, both of which 
display a considerable lack of analytical engagement with the subject. 
With the exceptions of Ruşen Çakır’s Derin Hizbullah (Deep Hizbullah, 
2011) and Gareth Jenkins’s Political Islam in Turkey (2008), as well as a 
few other books, articles, and reviews, an overwhelming majority of the 
literature on Hizbullah is reluctant to look at it as a social phenomenon.
Furthermore, academic research into Hizbullah is similarly limited 
and a large part of the literature produced in Turkey is written in police 
academies and predominantly from a perspective prioritising security 
issues.
The available information, especially given its disproportionate 
engagement with violence and resulting one-dimensionality, is not 
sufficient to provide an understanding of Hizbullah. Besides, as mentioned 
earlier, a considerable proportion of such studies is inclined to present 
violence simply as unmanageable, unpredictable, and purposeless instead 
of focusing on the motivations that lead to the production of violence.
I embarked upon this study with the objective of analysing the 
violence that Hizbullah was both involved in and a perpetrator of, 
from a sociological and anthropological perspective and mainly with 
a qualitative focus. It acquired new dimensions with the onset of my 
fieldwork. The need for a theoretical and methodological framework 
that would reflect these new dimensions without subscribing to the 
reductiveness of violence-centred analyses led me to adopt Grounded 
Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in this study. Grounded Theory, which is 
widely used especially in European and North American sociology, suggests 
that instead of starting fieldwork from theoretical postulations, a theoretical 
abstraction may be performed by comparing the data produced in fieldwork 
and the categories that emerge from such comparison. In the first chapter 
where I describe the theoretical and methodological framework used in this 
study, I will explain why I chose to carry out a qualitative investigation (Berg, 
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2008) in addition to Grounded Theory and why I employed ethnographic 
methods (Agar, 1985), life histories (Atkinson, 1998), and oral history 
(Dunaway, 1996) in data collection. 
No sociological phenomenon can be imagined outside the immediate 
historical conditions within which it is embedded and any study in the 
social sciences is inevitably written from a historical perspective. Therefore, 
following a brief explanation of the theoretical and methodological tools that I 
employ in this study, in the first chapter I turn to the historical and sociological 
conditions of the period, which witnessed the emergence of Hizbullah. Here 
I investigate Hizbullah’s history in a chronological fashion on the basis of 
testimonies from my informants while correcting misinformation and 
providing new information where there are gaps in knowledge. This chapter 
is a first attempt to provide a socio-historiographical approach to the texts 
written on Hizbullah and introduce the organisation to various intersecting 
literatures such as the literature on Islamism, Islamic movements in the 
Middle East, Islamism within the Turkish state, and state crime in Turkey.
The second chapter is dedicated to a Grounded Theory-based analysis 
of the interviews I conducted with individual members of Hizbullah and 
presents summaries and analyses of their narratives produced across various 
thematic areas. The common themes that emerge from these narratives are 
used to provide the reader with information and analyses concerning daily 
life practices of Hizbullah members, (in)security generated by feelings of 
group belonging, and the psycho-social consequences of ceasing to feel part 
of a group. Moreover, in this chapter I give a detailed account of the stages 
of the transformation of violence perpetrated by Hizbullah from the level of 
discourse to that of action through the testimonies of my informants. Taking 
into account that Hizbullah’s membership is predominantly Kurdish, the 
second chapter also presents an analysis of the ways in which religion and 
ethnicity are reconciled in Hizbullah as an organisation. The chapter thus 
aims to fill a lacuna in Kurdish studies and facilitate new studies on the subject.
The third chapter focuses on the role of stories and novels written by 
Hizbullah members in the construction of social memory and, through 
discourse analysis, traces common themes across these narratives, which are 
in essence non-fictional, ‘autobiographical’ accounts, with usually only the 
names of persons and places changed.
In the conclusion chapter I present a comparative summary of the data 
I examined in previous chapters and bring the findings together in an 
effort to reach general conclusions before offering suggestions for future 
research on Hizbullah.
1
Historical Overview of Hizbullah
History is what hurts.
  Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious
theory, data, and methodology
A study into Hizbullah requires a multidimensional approach, ranging 
from the history of the organisation’s name to its activities; its supporter 
base to its alleged connections with the Turkish state and the deep 
state in the 1990s; the Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs to the officially 
recognised Hüda-Par party; and from the Kutlu Doğum (Blessed Birth) 
celebration to the development of publishing activities. Despite the fact 
that Hizbullah appears in newspapers, features in political debates, and 
is relevant to both daily life and the agendas of other political organi-
sations, information about it is scarce and often contradictory. This is 
because Hizbullah remained underground and was very careful not to 
publicise its activities until 2002. Although there was some change to 
the organisation’s clandestine nature following its engagement with civil 
society (even forming a political party) Hizbullah continues to retain 
its almost secretive nature and there is reluctance by members to talk to 
outsiders about the inner workings of the organisation. 
The qualitative methodologies employed in this study aim to reveal 
hidden or implicit sociological meanings, properties, and implications, 
facilitate layered interpretations, and render unheard ‘voices’ audible 
(Have, 2004, pp. 4–5). My motivation to adopt an ethnographic 
perspective within a qualitative research paradigm relates to the 
nature of the research topic. The most important advantage of using 
the ethnographic method is that the researcher, after some time in the 
field, ‘becomes invisible’ (Berg, 2001, p. 147). What I mean by becoming 
invisible is the minimising the influence of the researcher on the 
production of data by virtue of his ‘presence’ and position in interactions. 
It is crucial that the researcher spends sufficient time in the field to allow 
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rapport to be developed between the researcher and the informants. 
Only then can informants begin to trust the researcher. 
In the search for appropriate methods for researching the secretive 
realm of Hizbullah, I realised that Grounded Theory responded well to 
my methodological considerations and challenges. The researcher uses 
Grounded Theory practises with the focused attention of a surgeon and 
runs a constant analysis of the concepts and signifiers emerging from 
the data. In studying a ‘closed’ organisation like Hizbullah it is crucial 
to provide more than just descriptive information. I wanted to move 
beyond external appearances, to grasp Hizbullah’s organisational sense 
of itself, and the motivation of its members – beyond that superficiality 
offered by the media, public opinion, and the justice system. When using 
this method, one is not required to consider every piece of data as ‘true’. 
As Ingersoll points out, researchers embark on a process of continuous 
comparison as they analyse the first field data; contrary to the other 
popularly used methodologies in social sciences, this process facilitates 
the integration of newly emerging, important information into the study 
in the ensuing phases of research. In that sense, Grounded Theory is 
in keeping with the essence of ethnography as it allows for continuous 
development of the research subject throughout fieldwork and a com-
prehensive analysis of the emergent concepts (Ingersoll and Ingersoll, 
1987, pp. 93–7).
Having discussed the theoretical and methodological tools employed 
in this study, I would like to move on to the difficulty of problematising 
the history of a political and religious movement whose structure and 
past have been the subject of much debate. This difficulty is exacerbated 
by the constant repetition in the literature of incomplete or even false 
information and its presentation as historical data.
My aim in this chapter is to reveal the different stages that Hizbullah 
has undergone since its foundation using references to Hizbullah’s 
own publications (books, theses, and other resources), the information 
published in the media on Hizbullah, and the interviews conducted with 
former or present members of the organisation who have personally 
witnessed various periods of Hizbullah’s history.
In terms of sources and data selection I must emphasise that at times 
I had to select between contradictory information with a critical eye and 
using a complicated analytical process. In addition, a number of Master’s 
theses on Hizbullah,1 mostly written by students at police academies, 
have been used as resources in this study, albeit only rarely and after 
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much deliberation. These theses tend to examine Hizbullah from a 
limited security perspective, use resources that rely on data produced 
by the same institutions in which they were written, and suffer from 
ideological bias and questionable sources.2
Another problematic body of sources is what I found in police archives. 
The most important archive on the subject, the Hizbullah Archive, was 
seized by the police after Operation Beykoz on 17 January 2000 and still 
remains closed.3 The security forces have allowed certain information to 
be released but largely for their own agenda and image-setting purposes. 
I was unable to access the police archives as a resource for this study 
because it is impossible to obtain any information other than what is 
already available to the public. However, some of the works I cite in this 
study use police archives as secondary sources.
Hizbullah members often emphasised in their public statements and 
during the series of trials following Operation Beykoz that the Hizbullah 
Archive should be opened to the general public. Being the compiler of 
the so-called Beykoz Archive, Hizbullah constitutes the only other party 
– in addition to Turkish security officials – that knows the contents of 
the archive. Thus, the information contained in the archive is available 
through Hizbullah members who participated in Hizbullah activities, 
prepared reports, or were involved in the creation of the archive. 
If Hizbullah is willing to share the archive with the general public, 
then it is puzzling that Hizbullah members do not discuss issues relating 
to the archive publicly. Security officials claim that the archive is not 
made accessible to the general public because of its potential to cause 
public indignation due to the violent nature of the visual content. It is 
clear, however, that these same officials do not act so considerately with 
other groups such as the PKK. This naturally raises the widely suspected 
Hizbullah–‘deep state’ connection as potentially the main reason behind 
the continued closure of the archive. There is little doubt that it would 
be immensely useful both for researchers and the general public if the 
archive were accessible to them. While the archive remains closed there 
is the risk that the information it contains will be revealed selectively, 
by security officials, with the intention of manipulating public opinion.
Despite the fact that the Beykoz Archive could reveal much about 
Hizbullah’s perpetration of violent acts and the possible connection 
between Hizbullah and the deep state, it is not enough to analyse 
Hizbullah only using the Beykoz Archive. After moving into the legitimate 
sphere in the 2000s, Hizbullah and its affiliated organisations have 
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been transformed into a social movement. Therefore, the information 
that has been provided by first-hand witnesses constitutes the primary 
source used in this study. The significance of this study derives from the 
fact that it is based on in-depth interviews, life stories, and oral history 
narratives of Hizbullah members and people who witnessed various 
periods of Hizbullah’s past and observations in the field. As such, this 
chapter is the first text investigating the history of Hizbullah by relying 
on social history. 
the historical and sociological conditions  
of hizbullah’s emergence
A movement cannot be investigated independently of the historical 
and sociological conditions of its emergence. It would be impossible 
to understand the mechanisms behind Hizbullah’s past, the outcomes 
of its emergence, and the phases it has undergone without taking into 
account (a) the Islamic movements and thinkers which influenced 
Hizbullah’s understanding of Islam; (b) Turkey’s relationship with Islam 
and religious groups as a secular republic during the process of mod-
ernisation and urbanisation; (c) Turkey’s approach to minorities and 
‘handling’ of the Kurdish issue; and finally (d) the unique sociological 
and historical conditions of the Kurdish area in Turkey where Hizbullah 
emerged. 
The concept of Islamism goes back as far as the formation of empires 
and the imposition of Western colonialism through the formation of 
nation-states (Kayalı, 1997). Almost all empires and states developed 
certain political reflexes as a result. Islamism can be considered to be 
one of these reflexes and was embraced as a political solution to varying 
degrees by the Ottoman Empire and many other countries (Kayalı, 
1997). In the Islamic world, colonialism had not only been perceived 
as the loss of military and political power but also the humiliation of an 
Islamic lifestyle that was seen as superior.
The two ideologies that emerged out of these sentiments were Islamic 
modernism and secular nationalism. According to Demant (2006, 
pp.  91–5), save for a few exceptional countries, secular nationalism 
is on the brink of extinction, while from the 1950s onwards Islamic 
modernism became a very popular ideology in Muslim countries. In the 
Sunni world, Abul A’la Maududi (Pakistan) and Sayyid Qutb (Egypt), 
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and in the Shia world, Khomeini are considered pioneering figures 
developing the concepts of Islamism.4
Wiktorowicz defines Islamism much more broadly in order to 
encapsulate all the activities carried out within its realm. According 
to him, Islamist activism encompasses a broad spectrum of activities 
such as expansionist movements, terrorist activities, collective action 
associated with Islamic symbols and identities, the construction of a 
state governed by Islamic law, and the promotion of Islamic spiritualism 
in society (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 2).
Demant suggests that Islamism can be investigated in three stages. 
The first stage is the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) in 
Egypt led by Sayyid Qutb. Writing in the twentieth century, according 
to Qutb, who was influenced by the ideas of Maududi, Muslim countries 
had been experiencing problems because they had moved away from 
Islam and these problems could be rectified by organising social and 
political life in accordance with Allah’s orders as prescribed in Islamic 
law. Qutb interprets the state of the society at the time as a second 
jahiliyah (period of ignorance of divine guidance) and the only solution 
he offers is the construction of a world based on Islam (Demant, 2006, pp. 
91–107). Naturally, the Muslim Brotherhood movement cannot be fully 
understood only by looking at Qutb’s writings. Many other thinkers and 
texts influenced the Muslim Brotherhood, the first and foremost being 
the movement’s founder Hassan al-Banna’s Kumpulan Risalah Dakwah.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement spearheaded many debates in the 
Islamic world, including the organisation of law and daily life in secular 
systems that they described as tağuti5; whether worship practices such as 
the congregational Friday prayer can be viably carried out in dar al-harb 
countries, that is, countries that are not governed according to Islamic 
law; or whether taxes should be paid in these countries.6 Furthermore, it 
should be emphasised that these debates have been actively carried out 
within many Islamist groups in Turkey, especially within Hizbullah, and 
that the diverging attitudes and opinions that exist with regard to these 
debates is one of the main reasons for the emergence of different Islamist 
fractions and approaches in Turkey.
According to Demant, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 marks the onset 
of the second stage of Islamism. The forced modernisation that began with 
the toppling of Mohammad Mosaddegh as a result of a CIA-supported 
coup and the reinstitution of the pro-Western Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
to power in 1953 was met with much opposition from the Shia in Iran. 
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Consequently, Ruhollah Ayatollah Khomeini led the Islamic Revolution 
supported by many groups, mullahs, and intellectuals, with ideological 
support from the Sorbonne-educated Ali Shariati. Shariati is known as 
an eclectic thinker who brought together ideas from Marxism and Shia 
mysticism in his analyses, and has exerted great influence on the Iranian 
people (Demant, 2006, pp. 110–26). 
The third phase in Islamism begins after the First Gulf War and is 
marked by the global prominence – and notoriety – of Islamist organisa-
tions (Demant, 2006, pp. 127–35). Although in some works7 Hizbullah 
is treated in the same category as those groups which emerged in this 
third phase and which may or may not have global influence, I argue that 
Hizbullah resembles and is comparable to Ikhwan or Hamas in terms of 
its organisational structure and principles. I will discuss these issues in 
more detail below. 
In order to understand Hizbullah, the second issue that calls for 
analysis is the process of modernisation in Turkey and the Turkish 
state’s approach to Kurds and Islam. Having been founded on secular 
and nationalist principles, Turkey was governed by strictly modernist 
and secularist principles until the 1950s. Gareth Jenkins examines this 
period in his book Political Islam in Turkey and offers a detailed analysis 
of how Islam moved from the periphery to the centre in Turkey through 
urban migration during this period (2008, pp. 81–182). The Milli Görüş 
(National Vision) movement emerged as a result of this process of social 
mobilisation and set the historical and sociological scene from which 
the main Islamist parties in Turkey emerged, such as Milli Nizam Partisi 
(National Order Party), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), 
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), Saadet Partisi 
(Felicity Party), and the AK Party (Justice and Development Party). 
In her book Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (2002), Jenny White 
examines this period up to the mid 1990s within the context of the local 
administration policies of parties representative of Milli Görüş politics 
and in Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (2013), she analyses the 
post-28 February 1997 period from the perspective of the prominent 
discourses of the AK Party era. In Islam and Modernity in Turkey (2011), 
Brian Silverstein focuses on how the modernist discourse, which emerged 
within the Ottoman Empire as a reaction to colonialism, transformed 
traditional Islamic discourses and understandings of Muslims in Turkey 
and, in contrast to many Muslim countries, how these discourses and 
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understandings underwent transformation through people’s interaction 
with the secular state structure.
The modernist mindset of the Turkish state had always been met 
with reactions from people who led more traditional and religious 
lives. However, between 1950 and the establishment of the Milli Nizam 
Partisi on 26 January 1970, those with Islamist outlooks tended to be 
affiliated with central-right political parties. The momentum Islamist 
politics gained at the time continued to rise after the 1980 military coup. 
Although the secular elements within the Turkish state attempted a 
post-modern coup d’état on 28 February 1997 in order to clamp down on 
the rise of Islamist politics, the coup failed and Islamist politics evolved 
into a new kind of mass movement from the time of the Refah Partisi 
(Welfare Party) to the founding of the AK Party.
The Turkish state’s modernist and nationalist policies caused similar 
reactions in the country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. Since the 
Sheikh Said uprising in 19258 (Olson, 1989), over a dozen religiously 
or ethnically motivated Kurdish uprisings have taken place against the 
state. Turkey has responded to the evident discontent by adopting even 
harsher assimilationist policies (Üngör, 2011). The PKK emerged in the 
1970s as one of a dozen Kurdish political factions (Marcus, 2007).9 In 
time, the PKK was to distance itself from the Turkish left and in doing so 
became the most powerful Kurdish political force in Turkey through the 
assimilation, weakening, or elimination of other Kurdish organisations. 
As a result of the bloody war between the PKK and the Turkish state 
which started in 1984, thousands of civilians lost their lives, millions 
of Kurds have been displaced, and the atmosphere of violence in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey has had a serious impact on the sociological 
texture of the region. While Islamism has emerged as a public resistance 
movement in Turkey and managed to reach the centre using an 
Ikhwanist, that is, Muslim Brotherhood-influenced perspective, Kurdish 
political movements continued their activities, largely on the periphery, 
and violence became a common means employed by the actors involved. 
Hizbullah was established in Batman10 prior to the military coup on 
12 September 1980, at a time when the Ikhwan influence was on the 
rise, the conservative Milli Görüş line was gaining traction, the Iranian 
Revolution had taken place, the conflict between the left and right in 
Turkey had reached a peak, and the PKK had emerged as a militant 
force. At the time of Hizbullah’s emergence there were many left-wing 
organisations of various sizes as well as Islamic organisations and 
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groups operating in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Among the Islamic 
organisations that emerged during my interviews were Partiya İslâmîya 
Kurdistan (The Islamic Party of Kurdistan), İslâmî Cemaat (Islamic 
Cemaat) and/or Hizbi İslâmî (Islamic Sect), Hareketa İslâmî11 (Islamic 
Movement), Fedaiyên Îslâmê (Guerrillas of Islam), Batman Fecir group,12 
Menzil, Tevhid, Selam,13 Vahdet, and İlim/Cemaata Ulemayên İslâmî14 
(The Community of Islamic Scholars). Although these organisations 
often had theoretical references in common, they differed in terms of 
their goals and methods. For example, while some of them adopted 
violence as a method, others organised themselves around a bookshop 
or madrasa and pursued regular tebliğ15 activities. In fact, the attitude 
towards violence stands out as the fundamental point of difference 
between these organisations. The fragmented state of Islamist politics 
in the Kurdish region of Turkey was eliminated by Hizbullah between 
1980 and 1990 through means similar to those employed by the PKK in 
dealing with other Kurdish left-wing organisations in the area.16
imagining the ummah17 from the provinces:  
the establishment of hizbullah
The story of the leader of a political movement makes a good starting 
point from which to tell the story of the movement itself. In the case of 
Hizbullah, which is inherently a leader-centred organisation, Hüseyin 
Velioğlu’s life story offers many insights into understanding the 
movement he led. In fact, the story of Hizbullah from its establishment 
until Velioğlu’s death can be best understood by studying Velioğlu’s life 
story.
According to Hizbullah’s official website, www.huseynisevda.biz, 
Velioğlu was born in 1952 in a village in Batman and lived in central 
Batman until high school. He finished high school in Mardin and 
headed to Ankara to study finance at the Faculty of Political Sciences 
in Ankara University, graduating in 1980.18 He interrupted his studies 
during his first year for unknown reasons and returned to his village. 
There he spent his time reading Said-i Nursi’s Risale-i Nur corpus in 
the mountains, where he would often go to retreat. The Hüseyni Sevda 
website talks about this period, quoting Velioğlu’s own words:
I picked up the Risale-i Nur corpus and headed to the village. For a 
whole year I read the Risale in the mountains surrounding the village. 
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When villagers saw me with my books headed to the mountains they 
would say ‘Dîsa kurê Mala Veli rahişte kitabên xwe û derket çiya’ (‘the 
son of the Veli family19 is off to the mountains with his books again’).20
Although it is not possible to know how thoroughly Velioğlu may have 
studied the Risale-i Nur, it is evident that the corpus subsequently became 
one of the fundamental ideological reference points of Hizbullah. This 
fact remains generally unacknowledged in Turkey, largely because other 
more powerful Nur cemaats,21 especially the Gülen movement, have 
avoided discussing the ideological connection between Hizbullah and 
Said-i Nursi for fear of ‘tainting’ the image of these other Nur cemaats 
given Hizbullah’s instrumental use of violence.22 When I asked what kind 
of literature would ordinarily be kept in Hizbullah houses, most of my 
informants would name Said-i Nursi’s Risale alongside works by intellec-
tuals of the Ikhwan movement. Yusuf, who is a well-respected member in 
Hizbullah circles, quoted the Risale-i Nur as Hizbullah’s main reference 
for ‘the truths about the faith and trust in God’ (iman hakikatleri ve 
tevekkül), the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 for action strategies, and 
the Ikhwan movement for mobilisation. He reported Velioğlu saying, ‘if 
the master (üstat) were still alive, he would have been the natural leader 
of the movement’.23 I will explore Hizbullah’s intellectual references in 
the coming chapters.
During his university studies, Hüseyin Velioğlu became a member of 
the Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union, MTTB). 
According to Ruşen Çakır, Velioğlu’s name appears in 1978 as the owner 
and the managing editor of an English language journal, The Ummah: An 
Independent Monthly Muslim Critique. At this time the journal was being 
published by Kayani, a follower of Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan 
(Cakir, 2011, pp. 61–3). In the same year, Hüseyin Velioğlu changed 
his last name from Durmaz to Velioğlu, meaning a member of the Veli 
family. According to the Hüseyni Sevda website, Velioğlu’s family was 
known as Mala Weli and that was why he had decided to change his last 
name. It is also claimed on the same website that the family was named 
after Velioğlu’s grandfather Weli, who died fighting in the Russian 
front.24 The fact that Velioğlu’s grandfather fought and was martyred 
in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–88 offers valuable information in 
terms of Turkish official history and the ‘our ancestors fought side by 
side’ discourse employed by nationalistic Turks and Kurds alike. The 
emphasis placed on his grandfather should, I think, be interpreted as 
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an indication of Velioğlu’s desired public image of Turkishness achieved 
through common participation in the Turkish War of Independence.
In 1979 Velioğlu ran for the presidency of Batman Petrol-İş 
Sendikası (Batman Petroleum Workers’ Union) as the candidate of the 
conservative bloc. Although he polled a thousand votes, the candidate 
of the left-wing bloc won the election by a margin of a few hundred 
votes.25 Velioğlu became increasingly popular among those involved in 
Islamic movements in Batman at the time and was respected enough to 
be nominated as a candidate for union president.
After graduating from the Mülkiye,26 in 1980 Velioğlu took the 
kaymakamlık (district governerate) test but failed (Çakır, 2011, p. 64). 
This is not discussed on the Hüseyni Sevda website, arguably because 
Velioğlu’s ambition to become a district governer (kaymakam) was 
regarded as inappropriate for the leader of a cemaat. His employment 
in a private company in Ankara in 1980, however, is discussed.27 My 
informant Mücteba, who knew Velioğlu personally, relayed information 
about this company that does not appear on the website. The company 
was owned by Şevket Kazan, who was at one time the Minister of Justice 
in the Refah Partisi government. According to Mücteba, Velioğlu worked 
as a watchman during his student years at the Ankara Yem Fabrikası 
(Ankara Feed Plant) and he was also acquainted with Necmettin 
Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist Milli Görüş movement.28
According to Ruşen Çakır, there was only one other Islamist party, 
the Islamic Party of Kurdistan (Partiya İslâmiya Kurdistan), before the 
emergence of Hizbullah (Çakır, 2011, p. 60). However, in reality, the 
groups listed earlier all existed before Hizbullah and survived until the 
1990s. Most of these groups are still active in the form of associations 
and continue organising sohbet29 groups and religious lessons.
Many authors and researchers, including Çakır, claim that the estab-
lishment of Hizbullah corresponds to the period immediately following 
the 1980 military coup (Çakır, 2011, p. 58). According to my informants, 
however, Hizbullah was founded in 1979, following negotiations 
that had begun in 1978 or even earlier. Prior to Hizbullah’s establish-
ment, Hüseyin Velioğlu had meetings with many groups, cemaats, 
seydas,30 and madrasas in the area and set the scene for the foundation 
of an Islamic cemaat. Among those identified in the literature as the 
founders of Hizbullah, only Hüseyin Velioğlu’s name corresponds to 
my findings. As maintained by my informants, Hizbullah was founded 
by three madrasa-educated seydas, an engineer in the Türkiye Petrolleri 
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Anonim Ortaklığı (Turkish Petroleum, TPAO), and the Mülkiye graduate 
Velioğlu. These five resemble the union of religious and scientific figures 
epitomised in the union of Khomeini and Shariati, which resulted in 
the Iranian Revolution. The Hüseyni Sevda website emphasises that the 
union of these two bodies, which they refer to as the school-educated and 
madrasa-educated, has been critical for the ‘cause’ and that this fact should 
not be disregarded.31 It is widely known that the Iranian Revolution came 
about as a result of the cooperation between madrasa-educated mullahs 
and professionals educated in modern schools and that Khomeini and 
Shariati, a traditional-educated ayatollah and a Sorbonne-educated 
sociologist, respectively, are the two main symbols of the revolution. 
Based on the example of the Iranian Revolution, Hizbullah argued that a 
revolution could be made only by cooperation between these two groups.
Mele Emînê Kinik, who was one of the founding seydas of Hizbullah, 
is dead.32 The Turkish Petroleum engineer mentioned above is now 
known to be İsmail Altsoy, the elder brother of İsa Altsoy,33 one of the 
leading figures in Hizbullah. During the period when Velioğlu worked in 
Ankara and when he was away doing his national service, İsmail Altsoy 
led Hizbullah and contributed to the organisation’s popularity among 
madrasa-educated imams by virtue of his personal connections and 
charisma. Despite his leading role in Hizbullah, İsmail Altsoy eventually 
distanced himself from the organisation, although he never criticised it 
‘in order not to damage Hizbullah’. In an interview Mücteba34 quoted 
İsmail Altsoy as saying, ‘We created this movement. We were going to 
create an Islamic state. We weren’t going to beat people up.’35
The Hüseyni Sevda website also confirms that İsmail Altsoy acted as 
the leader of Hizbullah when Velioğlu was not in Batman or Diyarbakır.36 
The two other founding seydas left Hizbullah in the 1980s, before the 
organisation adopted violent methods. As reported by my informants, 
these two seydas received death threats for years for speaking critically 
about Hizbullah after they left.
Before taking the name Hizbullah, the movement was known as 
Cemaata Ulemayên İslâmî (the Community of Islamic Scholars). Because 
members used the İlim Bookshop as the centre of their social activities, 
for a time it was known as the İlim group. The Hüseyni Sevda website 
reports that ‘The Union of Scholars’ (Alimler Birliği) or ‘The Union of 
Mullahs’ (Mollalar Birliği) were also debated as potential names among 
the members of the cemaat.37 I have been told by informants that at some 
point the name ‘Community of Islamic Scholars’ was actively used by 
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Hizbullah members38 and that this is why Hizbullah members refer to 
the organisation only as Cemaat.39 According to my informant Mahmut, 
the name Hizbullah was initially used by non-members to refer to the 
movement and it came from Hizbullah members chanting ‘Inshallah! 
Mashallah! Hizbullah!’40 at wedding ceremonies they attended together.41 
Even though the information provided by Mahmut is anecdotal, it should 
be emphasised that Hizbullah wedding celebrations and the dances 
performed on these occasions constitute symbols for the group. In 
Velioğlu’s biography on the Hüseyni Sevda website, Velioğlu is reported 
to have said, ‘They have given us such a beautiful name. Inshallah we will 
be deserving of it.’42
It is often stated that during the foundational period of the 
Community of Islamic Scholars, Velioğlu emphasised action rather than 
name, constitution, theory, and content.43 According to the information 
gathered in the field, Hizbullah had no written manifesto during its 
foundational period. However, a manifesto was published on the Hüseyni 
Sevda website in the 2000s.44 Considering the name of the Cemaat and its 
foundational period together with Velioğlu’s commitment to action, the 
influence of the Iranian Revolution on the organisation becomes evident. 
The Iranian Revolution was led by a union of scholars and mullahs and, 
in terms of the durability of its outcomes, provided momentum and 
motivation to many other Islamic movements that followed. Given the 
heated political atmosphere the party was founded in, it is not surprising 
that the Community of Islamic Scholars placed more emphasis on action 
rather than theory and debate; the ‘reform’ had to be implemented 
immediately. The Iranian Revolution gave hope to and provided a 
reference point for many Islamic movements. Importantly, the Iranian 
Revolution’s influence on Hizbullah was stronger in the early period of 
the party’s history, but gradually vanished in the 1990s.
After the 1980 military coup, Velioğlu left Ankara, where he had 
worked, and returned to Batman. Until he went underground in the 
early 1990s, he travelled throughout the Kurdish region in Turkey, 
village by village, and talked to madrasa teachers, seydas, sheikhs, and 
other educated people about Hizbullah. His travels encompassed nearly 
all the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey and here he came into 
contact with almost all the prominent religious figures and groups in the 
area. Some of the places he visited were madrasas and dergahs (dervish 
lodges) known to belong to the Naqshbandi order (a Sufi order of Central 
Asian origin) and during these encounters he was at times accused of 
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being anti-Sufi (anti-tasavvuf). That said, many Ikhwan-influenced 
young seydas joined his movement in the first four to five years of its 
existence. At this time, Hizbullah’s influence spread into areas such 
as Batman, Bismil, Diyarbakır, Silvan, Mardin, Nusaybin, Cizre, and 
Tatvan. The majority of the seydas who joined Hizbullah during this 
period eventually left the movement, after which both parties accused 
each other of being münafıks45 (hypocrites).46 Some were even attacked, 
wounded, or murdered for speaking negatively about Hizbullah. The 
departure of the seydas was motivated by various reasons, including a 
belief that a Mülkiye-educated person should not be leading a group by 
the name of the Community of Islamic Scholars; disapproval of violence 
as a method; and finally, as Jenkins points out, the Şura, that is, the 
movement’s main administrative unit, did not operate effectively and 
Velioğlu led the movement as he pleased (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 187–8). 
After a short period of three to four years, Hizbullah moved the centre 
of its activities from Batman to Diyarbakır. This decision was taken after 
the seydas and other groups of Hizbullah members in Batman left the 
organisation and, according to my informant Mahmut, was motivated by 
the existence of various other rival Islamic groups in Batman at the time 
and Hizbullah’s resultant failure to become organised as successfully 
as it wished. In fact, according to another of my informants, Velioğlu 
preferred Diyarbakır even before the 1980 military coup because of its 
larger population and potential for young recruits. Batman, by contrast, 
was a small town of around 20,000 people, where everyone knew 
each other. 
One misconception persistently repeated in the limited literature on 
Hizbullah is that initially it had a unified structure that encompassed 
groups such as İlim, Menzil, and Vahdet and the latter two subsequently 
broke off from Hizbullah (Jenkins, 2008, p. 186). The source of this mis-
information is, I would suggest, the hastily prepared police reports and 
public prosecutors’ indictments that were produced in the wake of the 
Hizbullah Operations. In reality, the group known as the Community 
of Islamic Scholars (later Hizbullah) in Batman and the Menzil group 
operating in Diyarbakır were separate organisations. Menzil is the name 
of an Islamist cemaat in Diyarbakır, named after the bookshop the group 
used. The Menzil group cooperated with Hizbullah for some time after 
Hizbullah moved its centre of activities from Batman to Diyarbakır in 
the early 1980s. Eventually, a conflict between the two groups emerged 
and the Menzil group lost its influence following the murder of its 
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leader. Vahdet is the name of a small Islamist group of former Hizbullah 
members organised around the Vahdet Bookshop. The Vahdet group 
subsequently yielded to pressures by Hizbullah and disbanded.
When Velioğlu decided to relocate the movement’s centre to 
Diyarbakır, he had meetings with Fidan Güngör, one of the then leaders 
of the Menzil group, via intermediaries in order to solicit his help in 
opening space up for Hizbullah’s activities. One of these intermediar-
ies, who was neither a member of Hizbullah nor Menzil but chosen 
on account of his personal connections, told me that on a visit to 
Fidan Güngör, they had vouched for Velioğlu’s group – not yet named 
Hizbullah – telling him that the group was sincere and devoted, and its 
ideas were similar to those of Menzil, perhaps with the exception of being 
somewhat sectarian (hizipçi), meaning fairly self-oriented. In the same 
way, Hizbullah members claim Fidan Güngör was himself sectarian and 
that he did not wish Hizbullah to become popular in Diyarbakır because 
of his own personal ambitions.47
My informant Mustafa explained that the developing relations with 
Iran in the 1980s brought opposing Islamic groups closer and, in that 
context, the Menzil group and an Islamist organisation called the Selam 
group merged into the İlim group, later to become Hizbullah. Based 
in Batman, the Selam group ceased all their activities when Hizbullah 
gained power in the early 1990s. Mustafa further stated that, in time, the 
İlim group separated from the others as a result of what he termed their 
‘self-opinionated disposition’ and that part of the Menzil membership 
and their field of activities were also carried over into the İlim group. 
Although Velioğlu relocated the base of the group’s operations to 
Diyarbakır in either 1980 or 1981, he continued living in Ankara because 
of his employment at the Ankara Feed Plant and then resided in Manisa 
until 1983 to finish his national service. Nevertheless, throughout 
this time he regularly visited the Kurdish region of Turkey in order to 
supervise the group’s activities. From the early 1980s until the opening 
of the İlim Kitabevi (İlim Bookshop) in the autumn of 1983, the İlim and 
Menzil groups cooperated with each other in running student houses, 
organising sohbets and activities in mosques, and becoming organised 
in universities.48 After Velioğlu opened the İlim Bookshop, however, the 
two groups separated from each other.49
It is not surprising that supporters of Hizbullah organised around 
mosques and worked to fulfil their ‘ideals’ through their activities in 
mosques. Mosques and mosque-centred activities have always been at 
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the centre of the agendas of many Islamist organisations, especially for 
the purposes of achieving social mobilisation, recruiting new members, 
and bringing about social transformation. The main historical reference 
for this is the use of the Madinah Masjid50 for multiple purposes, such as 
the centre of governance and education. Furthermore, the use of places 
of worship for social purposes is not unique to Islam. In countries or 
regions such as the USA, Latin America, Burma, Australia, Canada, and 
so on churches have taken on various roles in human rights activities 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 10). In that sense, the use of mosques by Hizbullah 
and other Islamist groups as the centre of their activities should be seen 
as an extension of the parallelisms in the ideological orientation and 
action principles of Islamist ideologies. The founding ideologues of the 
Turkish Republic were also well aware of the importance of mosques 
in social mobilisation. Therefore, in order to ensure control over the 
operation of mosques, the state established Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
(Presidency of Religious Affairs) just a few months after the proclamation 
of the Republic and designated it as the sole authority to govern places 
of worship.
Although the details of the cooperation between Hizbullah and the 
Menzil group are not well known, it may not be a coincidence that this 
period coincided with Velioğlu’s absences in Ankara and Manisa. It is 
clear that the period of autonomy for Hizbullah began after Velioğlu 
returned to Diyarbakır and took full control of the organisation. After 
Hizbullah parted ways with the Menzil group and set up the İlim 
Kitabevi (İlim Bookshop) in 1983, the movement focused its organisa-
tional efforts around the bookshop.
It was quite common in this period in Turkey for Islamic groups 
to become organised around bookshops and publishing houses. For 
example, Menzil Kitabevi (Menzil Bookshop), around which the Menzil 
group subsequently formed, was established in 1978. Ercüment Özkan, 
a prominent figure in Turkish Islamist circles, named the bookshop 
himself.51 This was a period when Islamist organisations in Kurdish 
cities still had relations with Turkish organisations such as the Milli Türk 
Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union, MTTB), Milli Gençlik 
Vakfı (National Youth Foundation, MGV), Akıncılar (Raiders), and 
Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP). These organisa-
tions had, on the one hand, maintained relations with each other due 
to the influence of Iran, and were, on the other hand, still connected 
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with the Islamist organisations and parties operating in the western part 
of Turkey.52
İlim Bookshop gained popularity as a bookshop where one could find 
many of the key texts on Islamist ideology both in their original Arabic 
and in Turkish translation. The group that was organised around the 
bookshop ultimately acquired the name İlim (science). In Turkey it is 
common practice to refer to Islamic groups after the bookshops around 
which they have been organised.53
According to the information in the police archives quoted in many 
of the works on Hizbullah, the first record of the İlim group dates back 
to this period. While expecting to stay off the state’s radar within the 
cosmopolitan confines of Diyarbakır, as opposed to the small provincial 
town of Batman, it must have quickly attracted the attention of the police 
and the intelligence service. 
Diyarbakır effectively became Hizbullah’s centre of operations between 
1983 and 1991, after Velioğlu took up residency there. During this 
eight-year period Hizbullah organised in high schools and universities 
and its membership increased to an unprecedented level. By recruiting 
members from all sections of the society, the organisation reached a high 
level of representative capacity. Aiding Hizbullah’s efforts to become 
organised in mosques, the chaotic atmosphere of forced migration in 
the area during these years also facilitated the rapid expansion in the 
organisation’s membership.54
Hizbullah had begun its recruitment activities in a handful of mosques, 
however, by the mid 1990s it was active in almost all the mosques in 
Diyarbakır.55 Those imams who did not allow Hizbullah to recruit in 
their mosques were routinely threatened and subjected to violence. Such 
incidents created an atmosphere of fear among mosque officials and as 
a result they remained quiet and showed little resistance to Hizbullah’s 
recruitment efforts. The emergence of the notorious Hizbullah violence, 
which eventually became the key characteristic of Hizbullah’s public 
image, dates back to these years.
As reported by my informant Mustafa, Hizbullah had no tolerance 
for lengthy theoretical debates such as those taking place among seydas 
and other groups at the time, and instead focused on action, such as 
overthrowing the secular regime and establishing a Sharia-based state.56 
In this respect Hizbullah resembles some left-wing groups that similarly 
prioritise action over theory. This approach facilitated Hizbullah’s 
recruitment efforts and motivated a large number of uneducated or 
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poorly educated young people to join the organisation.57 Hizbullah’s 
recruitment of young people, who were previously members of other 
Islamist groups, caused upset among these groups, especially the Menzil 
group, and many incidents of verbal and physical confrontation took 
place as a result, particularly in high schools and mosques. In time 
these confrontations took the form of violent machete fights and thus 
Hizbullah shifted its focus to eliminating these groups.58
It is widely known that in this period, the core members of Hizbullah 
received political and military training in Iran, and developed their plans 
to overthrow the existing regime and create a state based on Islamic law 
(Çakır, 2011, pp. 154–81). According to my informant Ahmet, there were 
three groups in the area with connections to Iran at the time: the Menzil 
group was connected with Iranian intelligence, the İlim group – later to be 
known as Hizbullah – with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a 
third group associated with the Revolutionary Guards. Ahmet described 
Iran’s relationship with these groups as ‘a dirty relationship’ (elaqayek 
gemar).59 As Jenkins pointed out, the Menzil group’s relationship with 
Iran revolved around what the Islamic state model ought to be, while the 
İlim group retained their Ikhwanist principles on this matter (Jenkins, 
2008, p. 187) but took Khomeini’s personal qualities and methods and 
the Iranian Revolution as a model that needed adapting to this specific 
context. 
The proximity of the Menzil group to Iran meant some of its members 
changing their denomination from Sunni Islam to Shia Islam. One 
informant, Mücahit, who knew the Menzil group closely, claimed that 
even today there are people in Diyarbakır who became Ja’fari60 but still 
keep it a secret.61 This has parallels with Ahmet’s previous description 
of Iran’s relationship with these groups as ‘a dirty relationship’. Ahmet, 
who is very knowledgeable about the issue, further explained that in 
interacting with these groups, Iran saw an opportunity to convert them 
to the Shia denomination and export the Iranian regime, rather than 
instruct these groups in the principles of revolution. In fact, Iran would 
insist that these groups convert to the Shia denomination and declare 
tekfir62 against the Saudi regime.63 Hence, my informant Yusuf, who is a 
Hizbullah member, reported that ‘although Iran raised many important 
people such as Khomeini, they were sectarian and that caused Hizbullah 
to distance themselves from Iran’.64
The disputes between Islamist groups concerning Iran go back to 
1982 when Iran gave support to Hafez al-Assad when he carried out a 
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massacre against Ikhwan supporters and other civilians in the largely 
Ikhwanist city of Hama in Syria. While some groups considered this 
course of action by Iran to be motivated by political obligation, others 
interpreted it as a sectarian reflex. Ultimately, however, for those groups 
who had become acquainted with the Ikhwan movement largely through 
Said Hawwa in Syria65 and the Kurdish Ikhwanists in Iraq, the Hama 
massacre initiated a turning point.66
Organisations linked to Iran were closely monitored in Turkey in 
this period. The Egyptian Ikhwan, however, refrained from becoming 
organised in Turkey because they considered the National Vision 
movement an extension of Ikhwanist principles.67 Therefore, while 
Hizbullah’s relations with Iran came under heavy scrutiny, its Ikhwanist 
character was ignored by the police and the intelligence service. The 
relations Velioğlu developed with Iran are well known now in the media. 
A photograph of him at Karbala attending a commemorative event, 
known in Persian as taziyeh, was published in the Hürriyet newspaper.68 
Hizbullah retained its close relations with Iran until the end of the 1980s. 
During this period Iran first tried to bring Islamist groups under one 
roof and, having failed to achieve this, due to fundamentally ideological 
differences, increased its support for those groups who showed allegiance 
to Iran, reducing relations with the rest to a minimum.
It is widely claimed that two main factors led to the emergence of the 
conflict between Hizbullah and the Menzil group: disputes over sharing 
the financial aid sent by Iran and the rivalry that unfolded between the 
two groups. Taking into account the two groups’ common expansionist 
character, it may be argued that a conflict between the two groups was at 
any rate inevitable.
From the 1990s onwards, İlim’s accusations evolved into the claim 
that the Menzil group were supporting the PKK. Some individuals and 
Islamic groups,69 who realised that the tensions and physical confron-
tations were about to lead to a full-on conflict between the two groups, 
attempted to mediate the situation and held meetings with each party. 
Some of these groups even appealed to Iran to act as mediator. What 
evidence exists suggests that it was the İlim group who made the first 
attacks and that the Menzil group decided to retaliate by relying on Iran’s 
support.70
The Hizbullah-Menzil conflict began in the first half of the 1990s 
when the conflict between Hizbullah and the PKK had already escalated. 
What is popularly known today as ‘murders by unknown perpetrators’ 
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(faili meçhul cinayetler) had become common occurrences in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey. The Menzil group dissolved in 1994 after Fidan Güngör 
was kidnapped and subsequently murdered.71 Following his death, part 
of the group’s membership joined Hizbullah. Molla Mansur Güzelsoy, 
the other leader of the Menzil group, died in Iran while being treated for 
cancer. During the conflict with Menzil, around 200 people from both 
sides were killed. Thus, as Ruşen Çakır points out, Hizbullah, whose 
ultimate goal was to overthrow the existing regime and establish an 
Islamic state in its place, never in fact took any action against the state but 
instead focused on eliminating a rival organisation (2011, pp. 66–77). The 
Hizbullah officials whom I asked about this matter through the Hüseyni 
Sevda website either refrained from discussing the subject or justified 
Hizbullah’s actions as self-defence. Even though these justifications may 
be considered valid, Hizbullah’s shift towards violence is not necessarily 
in contradiction with the organisation’s fundamental principles.
As mentioned previously, Hizbullah’s raison d’être was to initiate 
an Islamic revolution. To this end, members built a relationship with 
Iran, received military training, and constructed a discourse that 
justified violence via the use of religious terminology and employed 
it in their sohbets and lectures in mosques as well as other platforms. 
Moreover, they had incorporated the discourse of jihad and martyrdom 
(shahada), and the secretiveness of the Dar al-Arqam72 into their daily 
life practices. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that these under-
standings and discourses could lead Hizbullah to nothing other than 
violence. Hizbullah has, in fact, been very successful in creating a feeling 
of group belonging and instilling the notion of the pursuit of a high ideal 
among the less well-educated, socio-economically disadvantaged and 
dispossessed youth. 
The profile of the young man who joins Hizbullah and devotes his 
life to a sacred cause has been described and sanctified in Hizbullah’s 
recorded music series, such as the Şehitler Kervanı (‘Train of Martyrs’) 
(see below). After joining Hizbullah, these youths started committing 
violent acts on their own accord. The form their violence took ranged 
from beating up other youths from the neighbourhood with whom 
they once smoked marijuana, to throwing acid on women from their 
neighbourhood or strangling them because they dressed incorrectly or 
were thought to engage in ‘prostitution’. These acts of violence were the 
products of a specific mindset, organisationally driven and not simply 
individual acts of violence.73
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 I now turn to the largely misconceived Vahdet group and their relation 
to Hizbullah. In addition to relevant information about the organisation 
that came up in various interviews, my main informant is Mücahit, who 
held a senior position in the Vahdet group. Mücahit had joined Hizbullah 
in the early 1980s and left in 1987 when he and a group of others decided 
to open the Vahdet Kitabevi (Vahdet Bookshop). According to Mücahit, 
there were bigger differences between the Vahdet and İlim groups than 
between Menzil and İlim. Despite this, the conflict between Vahdet and 
İlim, which began a few months after the Vahdet group broke away from 
İlim, largely took the form of fights between high school students and 
did not go any further than a few cases of physical injuries. 
The Vahdet group wielded far less influence and power than the İlim 
group as an organisation.74 Hizbullah may never have regarded the 
Vahdet group as a threat, which may explain why the conflict never took 
the form of reciprocal assassinations. Nevertheless, as Mücahit pointed 
out, Vahdet eventually decided to cease their activities. After Vahdet 
disappeared, some of their members joined Hizbullah.75
In this period, the membership of Islamist groups in the area was 
very fluid. This becomes especially clear in Ömer’s statement: ‘İlim was 
founded on the capital offered by the seydas. Many who had left the 
Cemaat could never retrieve their share in the bookshop’76 or Mahmut’s 
claim that ‘in many places Hizbullah took over our student organisa-
tions and the houses that we rented and furnished’.77 This level of fluidity 
shows that these groups shared largely similar ideological bases, despite 
the discourse of difference they emphasised in reference to each other. 
Hizbullah’s aggressive and violent approach eventually led to the 
assimilation of most other Islamist groups within the organisation 
either voluntarily or by means of tebliğ or varying degrees of violence. 
Naturally, this also led to an antipathy towards Hizbullah among those 
who refused to be assimilated. Although the Hizbullah members I 
interviewed emphasised that Hizbullah embraces itidal (moderation) 
and is not a tekfiri78 organisation, Hizbullah’s response to the frag-
mentation among Islamist groups was one of maligning its rivals. For 
instance, it has been claimed that Hizbullah referred to the Menzil 
group as münafık (hypocrite) and the Vahdet group as Rabıtacı (Rabıta 
supporters). Furthermore, according to Dilgeş, Hizbullah used the 
Vahdet group’s ideological proximity to Wahhabism as propaganda 
material against them on the grounds that the founder of the Wahhabist 
movement, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was allegedly a British 
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agent, according to widespread rumours among Islamists. In fact, Dilgeş 
reported that Hizbullah frequently used an analogy in which the Vahdet 
group was  associated  with Rabıta, and Rabıta with Wahhabism and 
being British agents.79
Rabıta is the abbreviation for the Saudi Arabia-based Rābit.at al-’Ālam 
al-Islāmī (Muslim World League), which is the organisation believed to 
have financed many Sunni and Wahhabist Islamic groups after the Iranian 
Revolution in order to counter the rise of Shia Islam. These claims were 
the subject of popular debate in the late 1980s and the Turkish investiga-
tive journalist Uğur Mumcu wrote the book Rabıta (2007). Mumcu was 
subsequently assassinated and although the identity of those behind his 
murder remains unknown, there have been claims that his assassination 
was organised by an Islamist organisation. I have also come across similar 
claims about Rabıta in the discourses of the Iranian-influenced Islamist 
groups. According to my informant Mücahit, the Vahdet group had no 
connection with Rabıta and these allegations were intended purely to 
defame the group.80 Nevertheless, Mücahit’s previous involvement in the 
Vahdet group should be borne in mind when evaluating the credibility 
of this statement.
The expansion of the İlim group and the increase in acts of violence 
involving bodily harm continued until 1991 when Velioğlu moved 
Hizbullah’s operational base from Diyarbakır to Mardin.81 As Ruşen 
Çakır points out, referring to the book Hizbullah in Its Own Words82 
(Kendi Dilinden Hizbullah), it is claimed that the first phase of Hizbullah’s 
history ended in 1991. According to Bagasi, Hizbullah was not involved 
in any violence in this period and had close and amicable relations 
with other Islamic groups (Bagasi, n.d., p. 35). But it is known that 
Hizbullah resorted to violence in the second half of the 1980s. Perhaps 
his claim is based on the fact that the incidents involving violence did 
not result in any deaths. However, violence resulting in death should be 
considered only one potential outcome of violence. Ömer reported in 
our interview that representatives from various Islamic groups in Turkey 
with connections to Iran had arranged a meeting with Iranian officials 
in 1989 and complained about Hizbullah, saying ‘they are oppressing 
Muslims’.83 Widely reported fights with machetes and knives, which 
were very common in the second half of the 1980s, are clear proof of the 
existence of violence at the time.
In addition to being the year when Hizbullah’s operational base was 
relocated to Mardin, the year 1991 also marks the beginning of the 
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conflict between Hizbullah and the PKK. At the time, many attempts 
were being made to end the tensions between the PKK and Hizbullah. 
As claimed in Hizbullah in Its Own Words and further confirmed in 
my interviews, Hizbullah sought mediation by various individuals in 
order to resolve the issues it had with the PKK and at least two meetings 
between Hizbullah and the PKK were held for that purpose. The first of 
these meetings was arranged through a divided family, one son was in 
Hizbullah and the other in the PKK. However, this meeting did not yield 
any results. The second meeting took place in Idil where, according to 
Hizbullah in Its Own Words, the PKK put forward two possible solutions: 
Hizbullah should join the PKK and they should fight the Turkish state 
together, or Hizbullah should cease all activities in the area and move 
away. If it did neither, the PKK would destroy Hizbullah (Bagasi, n.d., 
pp. 81–92). Although it was not possible to guage the credibility of this 
account, it is widely known that the PKK regarded Hizbullah as ‘a sub-
contractor and collaborator of the Turkish state and an organisation 
which provoked children in the name of religion and set them against 
the Kurdish Movement’ (Çakır, 2011, pp. 67–70). This is made clear in 
the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Çakır, 2011, pp. 
67–70), although it is not clear whether this discourse emerged before 
or after the onset of the Hizbullah-PKK conflict. Nevertheless, what is 
certain is that both organisations eliminated various cohabiting groups 
using similar means and exhibited little tolerance for each other.
According to Ömer, it was not only Hizbullah that was trying to 
prevent a potential escalation in the conflict with the PKK. A committee 
of prominent seydas from the area attempted to mediate as tensions rose 
when the PKK levied high ‘taxes’ on a village located in the mountainous 
area between Mardin and Batman in which half the residents were 
Hizbullah and half PKK supporters. After a few unsuccessful attempts, 
the seydas decided to approach Sheikh Osman, the leader of Hareketa 
Islamî (Islamic Movement), via the Kurdistan Regional Government, 
which was then based in the Kurdistan Province of Iran. Because Sheikh 
Osman was in London at the time, they instead had a meeting with his 
assistant Sheikh Ali and asked that their messages be delivered to the PKK 
based in Qandil. Afterwards they visited the cities of Qom and Tehran 
and met the chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Ali Meshkini, and 
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi. The purpose of their visit was to convince 
Iran to intervene in Hizbullah and prevent a conflict from emerging. The 
members of the committee in question were not Hizbullah members. 
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After returning to Turkey, the committee began to prepare for a visit 
to the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon,84 but they had to abandon their plans 
after the first fatal incident took place between the PKK and Hizbullah 
in May 1991.
ten years of violence
Hizbullah was ‘just a couple of sofîks’85 to the PKK until 17 May 1991 
when the PKK murdered Sabri and Hayriye Karaaslan, the parents of 
a Hizbullah member, in the town of Idil, Şırnak. Hizbullah used their 
funeral to make a show of force and on 3 December 1991 retaliated by 
assassinating Mikail Bayro, an Assyrian (Süryani) Christian man who 
was a high-ranking regional officer of the PKK. Muhammed Ata Zengin, 
one of Bayro’s assassins, was killed in a gun fight with the police following 
the assassination. In less than a month, 13 people had been killed from 
both sides (Çakır, 2011, pp. 67–9). 
Between 1991 and 1995, over 700 hundred people were killed. 
According to official records, 500 were PKK members or sympathisers 
while the rest were from Hizbullah (Çakır, 2011, p. 70). According to 
my informants, however, the accurate number should rather be in the 
thousands. Hizbullah also operated as a subcontractor to the JITEM 
(Turkey’s Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-terror Organisation) in the 
1990s and carried out a considerable number of the estimated 17,000 
‘murders by unknown perpetrators’ (faili meçhul cinayetler).86
Hizbullah’s alleged connection with elements of the deep state, 
such as JITEM, will be discussed in depth, however, first I would like 
to offer a tentative analysis of the potential motivations behind these 
murders. According to my informant Aziz, the discourse of martyrdom 
(shahada) was very strong in the Cemaat and all Hizbullah members 
aspired to be martyrs. Because, as often stated by Hizbullah members, 
death is martyrdom, being wounded is to become a gazi (war veteran), 
and prison is Medrese-i Yusufiye (The School of Joseph).87 In fact the 
holiness of martyrdom and Hizbullah’s model ‘martyrs’ constitute the 
themes most commonly handled in the Şehitler Kervanı (‘Train of 
Martyrs’) and Seyfullah88 recorded music series. For example, below are 
the lyrics of the song Şehid Ata (‘Ata the Martyr’) about the killing of 
Muhammed Ata, the Hizbullah member who assassinated Mihail Bayro, 
by security forces.
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Music tapes constitute one of the most important means of propaganda 
for Hizbullah. According to Aziz, who himself decided to join Hizbullah 
after listening to these tapes, the Mizgin and Seyfullah recorded music 
series addressed ‘the intellectuals’ within Hizbullah and did not promote 
a discourse of violence as much as the ensuing Şehitler Kervanı and 
Şehit (‘Train of Martyrs’). In the tapes published during the period of 
violence, however, dead Hizbullah members are presented and exalted 
as role models. The intensity of the discourse of violence increased as 
Cry, oh my heart, cry
It is time to cry
Be silent you strange nightingale
You have turned to ash because of your 
troubles
Ata, Ata oh Ata the martyr
This will not be left to the tağut
Don’t bloom blooded roses
It is time for you to wither
Withered, the hyacinths will not 
bloom 
Mouths utter laments
Ata, Ata oh Ata the martyr
This will not be left to the tağut
You are a Hizbullahi [pro-Hizbullah] 
hero
Muhammed Ata the martyr
You were a bullet’s wrath
You permeated deeply
Ata, Ata oh Ata the martyr
This will not be left to the tağut
There is one remedy for the heathen
It is the Hizbullah’s bullet
Running away from it is a dream
May Rüştü be an example for you
Ata, Ata oh Ata the martyr
This will not be left to the tağut
Ağla ağla ey gönül
Ağlamanın vaktidir
Sus ya ey garip bülbül
Dertten yandın oldun kül
Ata, Ata ey şehid Ata





Ata, Ata ey şehid Ata





Ata, Ata ey şehid Ata
Kalmaz bunlar asla tağuta




Ata, Ata ey şehid Ata
Kalmaz bunlar asla tağuta89
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the violence increased, In the tapes published after the death of Hüseyin 
Velioğlu in Operation Beykoz in 2000, the content of the lyrics turned 
into an explicit expression of anger and desire for revenge.90 Martyrdom 
constitutes the main theme of the songs in the Şehitler Kervanı and 
Hizbullah’s other recorded music series. The ideas that underlie 
martyrdom are those of losing one’s life for the ‘cause’ and ‘having the 
honour of being God’s beloved subject’. As the song says, running away 
from Hizbullah’s bullet is a dream. The two other themes that stand out 
in these songs are inviting one to be a martyr and that victory is near. The 
latter belief is evident in my informant Sermest’s words:
Sermest: We used to say ‘it’s not long now; Sharia is coming’.
Mehmet Kurt: Did you really believe it?
Sermest: I am telling you I used to say ‘it’s soon now; it’s coming’ and 
you are still asking me whether I believed it?
Sermest had thought Sharia was imminent but after some time he 
could no longer cope and left Hizbullah, fleeing to the city of Antalya in 
south Turkey. In Antalya, he realised how ‘remote’ people’s actual lives 
were to Sharia.91 My informant Musab apparently had the same feeling 
of astonishment when he first went to Istanbul and realised how far from 
reality the Islamic revolution was.92
On 25 June 1992, the PKK raided a mosque in the Yolaç (in Kurdish 
Susa) village of Silvan, Diyarbakır, and killed ten Hizbullah members. 
Hizbullah considered this incident a turning point (Jenkins, 2008, p. 190) 
and, according to Çakır, decided to make it a rule to retaliate ‘threefold’ 
for each murdered Hizbullah member (2011, p. 70). Hizbullah’s justi-
fication for its own fatal attacks was that they were solely employed as 
a means of self-defence. But, as Aslı Elitsoy points out, the imbalance 
between the numbers93 killed by Hizbullah and by the PKK is an 
indication of the violent attitude of Hizbullah during this period (Elitsoy, 
2013, p. 90). Moreover, the Islamic interpretations of these murders, 
supposedly committed for reasons of self-defence, often employ the idea 
of kısas (retaliation in kind). 
This inbalance between the numbers of murdered Hizbullah members 
and those killed by Hizbullah in acts of retaliation was interpreted by 
one informant, Aziz, in terms of war: Hizbullah was at war with the 
PKK and, according to Islamic law, in the event of war these kinds of 
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actions are considered legitimate.94 However, those who were killed in 
the 1990s by Hizbullah were not only PKK members; among them were 
prominent imams, leaders and intellectuals of Islamist cemaats, people 
who were deemed to have strayed into a non-Islamic life, journalists and 
politicians, women who it was claimed engaged in prostitution, and even 
two boys who happened to stray onto the roof of a Hizbullah cell while 
looking for their birds. Musab explained: 
I didn’t know about the cells. There were rumours that the bodies were 
men the Cemaat killed and removed. These rumours became more 
prevalent at some point … What bothered me the most was this: In all 
organised structures, the people who betray are punished. I consider 
that normal. For instance, I consider it normal that Iran can execute 
one of their men. Or the PKK … But if they do it undeservedly, then 
it hurts me. For instance, there were the bodies of two bird fanciers 
there. Do you know the owner of the X? … 13 bodies were found in 
his house. How do we answer for that as Muslims? I wonder how we 
will answer for that to Allah. For instance, Menzil may have made 
many mistakes and they ought to be punished for what they have 
done wrong. But you can’t kill an innocent person. It was cruel what 
they did to Muslims. That was our only problem. If you go and kill 
an ordinary policeman, a night-watchman, we can’t answer for that 
to Allah. In the verse Allah says the death of an innocent person is 
like the death of the universe. If this is what your creator tells you 
and you still go and kill an innocent person, then that is problematic. 
Let’s say [the murders of] the night-watchman and the policeman are 
justifiable to some extent. But the two bird fanciers? For Allah’s sake! 
What do they have to do with anything? They are just children. Their 
birds escape and they come to get their birds back. I think they see 
them on the rooftop and come and collect them. And they [Hizbullah 
members] see them. There is no name for this … There were good 
men in Menzil. For instance, X … He’d always talk of mercy … There 
was that childish thing [that we’d say] ‘there are things we don’t know; 
they know better’ or ‘you don’t know, but I do!’. That’s what the Cemaat 
would say. I mean, we didn’t question them. But when you get a bit 
older and start seeing things for what they are … What is there that I 
can’t understand! Your imam tells you that you wouldn’t understand. 
A person dies there! Time is necessary for certain things to sink in.95
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The feeling that becomes evident in Musab’s statements is his surprise 
at how easily the Cemaat he tirelessly worked for could decide someone’s 
death. This became evident after Operation Beykoz and it had a shocking 
effect on many Hizbullah members, including Musab. In fact, Musab, who 
joined Hizbullah in the 1990s at a very young age, left the organisation 
in 2003 or 2004 after Operation Beykoz because information and video 
footage concerning the murders committed by Hizbullah were released 
to the media. This was the first time many people realised the scale of 
Hizbullah’s violence. The largest number of defections from Hizbullah 
occurred at this time.
Another issue that calls for investigation is whether there are other 
– possibly hidden – motivations behind these murders. If, as Anselm 
Strauss suggests, ‘all is data’, then almost everyone I spoke with said at least 
a few words about Hizbullah’s acts of violence and the ‘deep connections’ 
behind them. In fact, this was such a widely shared sentiment that 
even many PKK sympathisers and powerful people expressed fear and 
reluctance at discussing Hizbullah. These feelings partly stemmed from 
popular rumours or the actual experience of the 1990s, and partly from 
the media. For instance, Gülay, who identifies herself as someone ‘close 
to the Kurdish movement’, told me that on her first day in high school 
she witnessed an argument in the school canteen. According to Gülay, 
the argument quickly turned into a fight and was then carried on outside 
the school. There someone known to be a Hizbullah member chased 
after another person with a machete and when he caught up with this 
person, he struck so hard with the machete that the blade came out from 
the man’s chest. Gülay could not erase this image from her mind for years 
and the only explanation she could think of as to how Hizbullah could 
murder someone on one of the city’s busiest streets in broad daylight was 
that the state must have been supporting them. During this period, there 
was a union of interests between the Turkish state and Hizbullah, and 
therefore the Turkish state turned a blind eye to Hizbullah’s operations 
against PKK members and sympathisers. It is no coincidence that this 
period also features the most intense fighting between the Turkish state 
and the PKK. While the Turkish state used Hizbullah in their fight 
against the PKK, Hizbullah used its tacit impunity for its own agenda. 
Gülay also told me of another incident where she saw hundreds of 
brand new machetes stacked up in an official prayer room on the bottom 
floor of the building where she worked. Upon seeing the machetes, 
she contacted her relatives, who in turn informed the police. However, 
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according to Gülay, the police did nothing about the machetes until 
someone was killed in the same building. When the police finally arrived, 
the machetes had been removed from the prayer room.96
What is the truth about the alleged links between Hizbullah and the 
Turkish state that have been the subject of so much debate? Hizbullah 
officials, whom I contacted through the Hüseyni Sevda website, 
refrained from answering my question as to why Hizbullah ‘had never 
targeted the state despite its agenda to topple the regime’ and instead 
referred me to the article series entitled, ‘The Subversive Methods of 
the Police and the JITEM’. Comprising 26 articles by 2 June 2014, this 
series is almost like tutorial material instructing Hizbullah members to 
be wary of the activities of the intelligence service. It is well known that 
the military wing of Hizbullah used similar interrogation and ‘torture 
tapes’ as tutorial material in the past.
The article series features extensive quotes by alleged informers under 
interrogation, and also possibly under ‘torture’, providing information 
regarding Hizbullah’s recruitment methods. When considered within 
the context of the question I posed earlier, however, it becomes evident 
that this series also implicitly comprises a confession. It is almost as if 
through these articles Hizbullah is making the statement: ‘We did not 
kill them, the agents who infiltrated us did.’97 The Cemaat (Hizbullah) 
carried out internal executions in the period between the second half 
of the 1990s, when the conflicts with the PKK and Menzil came to an 
end, and the death of Velioğlu in Operation Beykoz on 17 January 2000. 
Although exact numbers are unknown, Hizbullah executed hundreds of 
its own members during this period. 
It is widely known that Hizbullah never admitted to cooperating with 
the Turkish state. I attempted to raise this issue with my informants, 
as much as it was permitted, by the direction our interviews took. 
In these interviews, no one ever accepted these allegations. When I 
asked Hizbullah officials through Hüseyni Sevda about Hizbullah’s 
connections with the state and whether they had benefited as a result, 
their reply was: ‘We are not aware of any substantial claims concerning 
a relationship of interest with the state. Forward evidence to us if you 
possess any tangible information in this regard.’98 Similarly, when asked 
about the existence of any written or verbal proof, the informants who 
had claimed Hizbullah had cooperated with the deep state could only 
offer a few personal testimonies as evidence. One of my informants even 
thought my search for evidence was ridiculous and declared, ‘there is no 
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evidence of bribery!’.99 He offered me this dictum popular in political 
circles in Turkey as counter evidence for the claim that Hizbullah had 
connections with the Turkish state, but naturally there was no document 
to prove it.
Only two of my informants could offer accounts of incriminating 
incidents regarding Hizbullah’s alleged connections with underground 
state structures. However, in both cases my informants (Muhammed 
and Osman for simplicity’s sake) were only indirect witnesses. One of 
Muhammed’s friends, who was a Hizbullah member, told him that earlier 
that day he had been approached by a high-ranking Turkish military 
officer on duty in the area. The military officer had said to him, ‘we are 
enabling you at every instance. Why don’t you carry out an operation 
here? You be cool and we’ll give you support.’ Apparently Muhammed’s 
friend was so worried that he quickly sold his business and fled the city. 
The second incident concerned a businessman friend of Osman, who 
had been relatively good friends with the then Chief of Police in Mardin. 
Long after the 1990s, Osman enquired about Hizbullah–state relations 
from his friend. The Chief of Police told Osman that they had in fact 
given support to Hizbullah members but the members were ‘so stupid’ 
that, despite repeated warnings, they made little effort to hide their 
connections with the police.
Apart from the testimonies of these two indirect witnesses, I could 
not obtain any direct information on Hizbullah–state relations during 
my fieldwork. However, as I have established, for most people in the 
area Hizbullah’s connection with the Turkish state is beyond question 
although the extremely clandestine nature of that relationship makes it 
difficult to prove.
Comments by former politicians, military and intelligence officers, 
and bureaucrats on this subject can be found in various sources (Doğan, 
2011). However, it is clear that certain state-affiliated organisations used 
the conflict between the PKK and Hizbullah to their advantage. This 
issue is discussed in the book Hizbullah in Its Own Words and confirmed 
by my informants. Admittedly, the various actors involved have their 
own arguments on the matter. According to my informant Yusuf, 
who had been imprisoned for being a member of Hizbullah, security 
forces had been monitoring Hizbullah since the early 1990s and some 
Hizbullah members had been imprisoned then. He further reported 
that he himself was subjected to human rights violations and torture in 
prison and expressed surprise at claims of a Hizbullah–state alliance, 
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arguing that if this were the case, would he not know about it and have 
benefited personally from such a connection? Yusuf ’s statements may 
specifically concern the period following the 2000s because the Turkish 
state stopped tolerating Hizbullah and it very quickly collapsed. During 
the previous decade, however, there are hundreds of testimonies that 
prove the relationship between Hizbullah and the Turkish state. Yusuf 
told me about a newspaper with links to the Kurdish movement that had 
published an article about two Hizbullah members who were allowed 
to walk outside the prison and ‘could enter the police station through 
the front door and leave through the back’. Yusuf knew the prisoners in 
question, one of whom was in reality bed bound. Yusuf had even discussed 
this issue with the PKK officials in the same prison. Thus, according to 
Yusuf, the claims about Hizbullah collaborating with the Turkish state 
were part of a disinformation strategy concocted by the PKK.100
Continuing the issue of the connections between Hizbullah and the 
Turkish state, I would like to quote Ruşen Çakır’s analysis based on 
the official figures he gathered from Anadolu Ajansı (Anatolian News 
Agency, AA). According to these figures, 1550 Hizbullah members were 
arrested during the four-year period between 1992 and 1996, when the 
most intense conflicts involving Hizbullah took place. This figure then 
increased to more than 6000 between 1997 and 2000. Çakır concludes 
that these figures strongly suggest that the Turkish state did not interfere 
with Hizbullah when it was in conflict with the PKK and other groups, 
and only expanded operations against Hizbullah when it started to 
reorganise. Çakır’s analysis indicates that even though the Turkish state 
may not have actively collaborated with Hizbullah, they clearly permitted 
Hizbullah’s acts of violence as long as they were in the state’s interest 
(2011, pp. 86–90).
As mentioned earlier, the years 1995–2000 may be described as the 
‘years of internal executions’ for Hizbullah. In 1995, Velioğlu left Mardin 
for Adana and lived there until 1997. Then he made Konya his home 
for another two years until 1999. After that he moved to Istanbul, the 
last stop on his journey before he was killed by the police on 17 January 
2000 during Operation Beykoz, launched after a tip-off.101 Almost as 
if following the stages of Velioğlu’s life in reverse order, mass graves, 
torture chambers, and Islamist cells were discovered in Konya, Adana, 
Diyarbakır, and many other places.
In 1995, Hizbullah started to kidnap members suspected of spying and 
interrogated them in cells, sometimes torturing them to death. Velioğlu 
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also began to order certain Hizbullah members to be sent to the military 
to do their national service. What I have gathered from the testimonies 
of Hizbullah members is that Hizbullah operated as meticulously as a 
professional intelligence service from the start and Hizbullah members 
were tasked with sketching the plans for state buildings, especially 
military stations and bases, where they worked. According to one 
informant, Velioğlu one day put his hand on the fairly thick dossier of 
Hizbullah’s building plans and said, ‘now, it is your turn [to overthrow]!’. 
It is not certain whether Velioğlu actually said this, but it is clear that no 
steps were taken as a result.
On the basis of the information the security forces gathered from the 
Hizbullah Archive seized in Operation Beykoz, thousands of Hizbullah 
members were arrested and imprisoned.102 Hizbullah’s acts of violence 
caused a public outcry after being publicised in the media. Following 
Operation Beykoz, Hizbullah went into a period of disintegration during 
which many members left the organisation. Some were arrested and 
imprisoned for being Hizbullah members when the police came across 
their names in the seized documents despite having left Hizbullah long 
before.
Public interest in Hizbullah dissipated but it had not disappeared. In 
the next section I will discuss the period in which Hizbullah reappeared 
on the public stage in the form of NGOs and a political party. Hizbullah 
had transformed itself into a social movement.
hizbullah’s ‘transformation’ from  
armed organisation to social movement
Following the seizure of the Hizbullah Archive, security forces carried out 
large-scale operations and hundreds of people were arrested on charges 
of murder, and thousands on charges of membership in Hizbullah. The 
majority of those detained or arrested at the time received sentences of 
between four to ten years, with a minimum term of four years. Of these, 
950 were subsequently released following an amnesty issued for PKK 
members in 2003 (Uslu, 2007, p. 128).103 According to Necat Özdemir, 
one of the lawyers involved in the Hizbullah trials, only around 300 
Hizbullah members who received life sentences are still in prison.104
Several informants reported that Hizbullah members went into 
hiding in large numbers during this period. The general opinion among 
Hizbullah members about the operations leading to the mass arrests 
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is that those whose short biographies105 were found in the Beykoz 
Archive were arrested and imprisoned. However, Çakır claims that 
the security forces had no intention of dissolving Hizbullah’s organi-
sational base and most of those members detailed in the archive were 
not even detained and that the security forces focused all their efforts 
to fight the PKK (2011, p. 247). Jenkins’s analysis concurs. Among the 
20,000 people whose short biographies were found in the Hizbullah 
Archive, a mere 4000 were eventually arrested. Jenkins thus claims that 
the Turkish state’s main goal was to capture high-ranking Hizbullah 
officials, halt its mosque activities, and identify Hizbullah members who 
held state positions and terminate their employment (2008, p. 195). The 
information I gathered in my interviews confirms that Hizbullah held 
lectures in almost all the mosques in Diyarbakır prior to the operations 
and all mosque activities subsequently came to a halt following Beykoz. 
Moreover, some informants recalled that because of the atmosphere of 
panic surrounding the operations, many Hizbullah officials had gone 
underground, leaving the ordinary Hizbullah membership uninformed 
about developments.
According to Musab, who had stayed in hiding for a year, the Hizbullah 
Operations were a reflection of the ‘classic state tradition’ in Turkey 
and thousands were given prison sentences just for ‘giving lectures in a 
mosque’.106 Azad also told me that he left his house very rarely and with 
much caution during this period and that one of the methods he used to 
avoid ID checks by the police was to carry a pocket-size copy of Said-i 
Nursi’s Risale-i Nurs.107 Another informant, Kamuran, told me that 
the uncertainty became so unbearable that in order to know whether 
the police were looking for him, he checked into a hotel and waited to 
see if they would come to the hotel to arrest him. Although Kamuran 
was relieved to see that the police did not appear, he was subsequently 
detained when his short biography was discovered among some newly 
seized documents in the early 2000s and he was imprisoned for a number 
of years.108
In this period, an unprecedentedly high number of people left 
Hizbullah. Many members, who had only heard about the cells, the 
methods of torture and execution through ‘hearsay’, were shocked to 
discover this side of Hizbullah when it was publicised in the media. 
Although the question of why they had not previously given any credit 
to the ‘rumours’ and the extent of those rumours cannot be ignored. 
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According to Uslu, hundreds of senior Hizbullah officials fled to 
Europe, Syria, and Iraq in this period (Uslu, 2007, p. 128). Kamuran 
states, however, that those who illegally left Turkey were usually the ones 
given long prison sentences. Kamuran himself chose not to flee in order 
not to ‘become a permanent fugitive’.109
By the early 2000s popular opinion held that Hizbullah had ceased 
to exist. The reality was, however, that Hizbullah began to organise 
again in 2003 and many former Hizbullah members were contacted by 
high-ranking Hizbullah officials to send out the message that Hizbullah 
was reactivating. My informant Musab, for example, told me that he was 
asked to submit a short biography again in 2003 by a mid-level Hizbullah 
official, whom he ‘did not like personally and found too carefree’. Musab 
reported that he had thought at first, ‘I will oblige if it is the Cemaat 
asking’ but then he discovered from his friends that nobody else had 
been asked to submit such a biography and thus decided not to do so. 
Musab left the Cemaat (Hisbullah) shortly after.110
Operation Beykoz and the developments that followed surprised not 
only those outside Hizbullah but also most Hizbullah members who 
were equally shocked by what was being reported in the media. When 
Hizbullah started reorganising, it was Hizbullah members themselves 
who showed reluctance to re-join the return of Hizbullah as an 
underground organisation – an organisation now tainted with its violent 
past. Furthermore, as became evident in many interviews, Hizbullah 
could never again operate as a complete underground organisation 
following the confiscation of its archive by the police.111 
It was in this atmosphere in 2004 that Mustazaflarla Dayanışma 
Derneği112 (Association for Solidarity with the Oppressed), the first 
legitimate organisation connected to Hizbullah, was founded.113 It is well 
known that the establishment of Mustazaflar caused upset and sparked 
debates among some Hizbullah members, especially those in prison. 
At the centre of the debates was the anti-state stance, which had been 
debated in Ikhwanist and Salafi ideology since the establishment of 
Hizbullah. Operating in a state governed by a regime regarded as ‘tağuti, 
thus rendering Turkey dar al-harb,114 there has always been much debate 
around such issues as whether the congregational Friday prayer is viable 
in Turkey or whether tax should be paid to the Turkish state. Although in 
Hizbullah’s discourse a strict Salafist attitude, such as the one associated 
with Daesh (ISIS), cannot be observed, a similar kind of radicalism can 
be observed in the structure of Hizbullah and its various practices.
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Mustazaf is an Arabic word meaning ‘the oppressed’.115 In the Islamic 
literature, it is used to refer to people impoverished under the heel of 
an oppressive ruler and is opposite in meaning to müstakbar (haughty) 
(Gürbüz, 2013, p. 169). The word has been integrated into the Marxist 
lexicon via its use by Ali Shariati, who uses the word mustazaf to refer 
to the proletariat and müstakbar to refer to the bourgeoisie (Taheri, 
2008, p. 217). Given that the Iranian Revolution was considered to 
be the revolution of the mustazafs against the müstakbars, we can 
plausibly argue for the continuing influence of the Iranian Revolution on 
Hizbullah, at least on a discursive level.
To avoid arousing unnecessary suspicion from the Turkish state, 
Mustazaflar was established by people who had not been involved 
in the Hizbullah Operations and the ensuing trials or had at no point 
appeared on the state’s radar.116 The association has been involved in a 
number of activities ranging from offering lectures on various subjects, 
delivering door to door food aid assistance, and providing legal help to 
those who have been subjected to rights violations. When required, it 
cooperates with international institutions, mediates personal conflicts, 
and arranges funerals.117 Since its foundation, Mustazaflar has organised 
eight conferences in Diyarbakır between 2004 and 2006 (Jenkins, 2008, 
p. 195). The event that drew the public’s attention to the association, 
however, was the Peygambere Saygı (Respect for the Prophet) rally in 
Diyarbakır, which Mustazaflar organised as a response to the cartoon 
controversy in Denmark in 2006.118 Over 100,000 people attended the 
rally (Çakır, 2007, p. 13). Two months after the rally, in April 2006, 
Mustazaflar hosted an outdoor Kutlu Doğum (Blessed Birth) event 
entitled Peygamber Sevdalıları (The Lovers of the Prophet), this time 
with tens of thousands of attendees119 (Jenkins, 2008, p. 195). These 
activities showed the new direction Hizbullah was taking in moving into 
legitimate operation.120 It was trying to create legitimacy through widely 
accepted, and thus uncontested, themes such as respect for the Prophet. 
It was delivering a new message, through Mustazaflar, and a new Islamist 
discourse to the Turkish public. 
Mustazaflar quickly expanded, branching out into cities in southeastern 
Turkey as well as western cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Konya. 
However, approximately one year after the events hosted by Mustazaflar 
in 2006, in February 2007, the police raided the Istanbul, Diyarbakır, 
and Batman branches of the association and arrested eight members on 
suspicion of Hizbullah membership (Jenkins, 2008, p. 195). Mustazaflar 
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itself remained active until it was closed down in 2012 on the grounds 
that it was furthering Hizbullah’s agenda.121
Hizbullah took advantage of the opportunities offered by legitimate 
activity and in only a few years increased its public presence through 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated radio stations, publishing houses (Dua 
Yayıncılık), television stations (Rehber TV), newspapers (Doğru Haber 
Gazetesi), news agencies (İlk-Ha Haber Ajansı), Kurdish and Turkish 
language magazines/journals (İnzar, Kelha Amed), by organising rallies 
and demonstrations, by operating kuran kursus,122 in student halls 
and housing, and by investing in revenue-generating businesses such 
as running dershanes.123 These venues have been commonly used by 
Islamist movements as a means to expand their bases and transform into 
a social movement. 
Mustazaflar has also attracted public attention by organising or par-
ticipating in protests in favour of the right of girls in primary education 
to wear headscarves (hijab).124 The founders of Mustazaflar established 
various other associations in the following years. The great majority 
of these associations operated on the local level and hosted events in 
order to recruit new members and facilitate mobilisation among their 
membership, while the rest were involved in humanitarian help and 
human rights, and thus covered a range of activities. This may be 
construed as an indication of Hizbullah’s foresight in believing that 
Mustazaflar would eventually be shut down and these associations 
were clear preparation to replace it. As Wiktorowicz states, such use of 
civil society is more common in politically closed systems and is often 
employed as a means to escape state pressure (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 12).
Following the closure of Mustazaflar, Hizbullah’s efforts to form a 
political party gained momentum despite ongoing internal debates and 
strong opposition, especially from Hizbullah members in prison. As 
Yusuf put it, ‘the baby that was due is born’.125
These debates resulted in an internal rupture not unlike that which 
took place in the 2000s, and as a result, some members with Salafi 
inclinations left Hizbullah in and after 2012.126 Musab claims that some 
of those who left had Shia inclinations and some had even converted to 
the Ja’fari school of Shia Islam. Another claim is that a group of former 
Hizbullah members were joined by Salafi-inclined individuals and 
went to Syria to fight alongside the Al-Nusra Front or ISIS.127 In fact, 
many young ‘mujahideen’ from eastern and southeastern Turkey have 
gone to Syria for ‘jihad’ and some of these youngsters have encountered 
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other Kurds in battle and have either killed or been killed by them. My 
interviews revealed that even in a small area like Bingöl, over 30 people 
had died fighting in Syria by the of 2014.128 Using Bingöl as an example, we 
may be able to extrapolate the total number of southeastern ‘mujahideen’ 
fighting in Syria. On the basis of the evidence presented here, as well as 
Hizbullah gaining more prominence and power in legitimate operations, 
it becomes inevitable that groups which split from it start cooperating 
with more marginal groups. At a time when there is a high level of 
fluidity between the membership of Islamist groups, as in the 1970s and 
1980s, those who are dissatisfied with Hizbullah’s activities join other 
groups or fractions. Debates within social movements over the framing 
of principles and methods may result in the sharpening of differences 
between groups and may even cause ruptures and splits within groups. 
In this sense, the way a group or a social movement frames its methods 
and principles constitutes crucial information in understanding that 
group (Wiktorowicz, 2004, pp. 17–19).
Hizbullah’s transformation into a political party sparked debates not 
only among those who left Hizbullah but also between its members. 
Hizbullah members who spent time in prison viewed this transfor-
mation as a deviation from the ideals they fought for. Perhaps for that 
reason it is often emphasised that Hüda-Par, the political party alleged 
to be Hizbullah’s political arm, is a means of facilitating the goal of 
‘promoting the Islamic cause and do tebliğ’.129 This emerged both in 
personal conversation with informants and in the words of Zekeriya 
Yapıcıoğlu, the leader of the newly born Hizbullah-affiliated political 
party, Hüda-Par, in December 2012, who expressed the same idea in the 
party’s election campaign rally in Bingöl on 27 March 2014.
Hizbullah approaches the question of whether its fundamental 
principles have changed along with its new organisational structure 
and engagement in different fields of activities very cautiously, given 
that thousands were put on trial for Hizbullah membership and many 
members are still in prison. Therefore, in official speeches by Hizbullah 
officials or representatives of Hizbullah-affiliated associations, it is often 
stressed that Hizbullah has not changed and the only difference is that 
it is now operating according to the current socio-political conditions, 
where the former methods have become obsolete and the adoption 
of new ones indispensable. The motivation behind this assertion is 
to show those ‘who paid a price’ that this was not in vain and that the 
legitimate activities, which the movement once harshly rejected, are in 
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fact a continuation of Hizbullah’s organisational philosophy. In personal 
conversation, though, Hizbullah members often stress how much 
Hizbullah has changed in reality.130
Due to the early closure of the Mustazaflar Association, Hüda-Par 
had to be launched much sooner than initially planned in 2012 – or 
picking up on Yusuf ’s baby metaphor, the baby was born prematurely. 
Issues such as removing the obstacles to freedom of faith and worship, 
tackling non-spirituality and moral corruption in society, providing a 
solution to the Kurdish problem, and preventing the Kurdish issue from 
being used for political self-interest were listed in the party programme. 
In Hüda-Par’s programme a whole section was dedicated to the Kurdish 
issue, whereby the issue was described as emerging from the secularist and 
Turkish-nationalist policies of the İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee 
of Union and Progress), which the party claimed have destroyed the 
harmonious relationship between the Muslim nations of the Ottoman 
Empire. In this respect, Hüda-Par suggests that it is not only Kurds 
but also Muslim Turks who have been suffering from Turkish secular 
nationalism. The many rebellions, most significantly the Sheikh Said 
uprising, are, according to the Hüda-Par programme, testimony against 
the policies of the Turkish state. According to the party programme, in 
solving the Kurdish issue, the state must issue an apology to the Kurds, 
constitutionally recognise the existence of the Kurds, acknowledge both 
Kurds and Turks as the founding nations of the country, declare Kurdish 
an official language in Turkey, and reinstate the original names of places 
that have been given Turkish names.131
Being Hüda-Par’s most comprehensive statement on the Kurdish issue 
as well as its only official declaration of its stance vis-à-vis the issue, it is 
worthwhile citing the entire section of the party programme dedicated to 
Hüda-Par’s recommendations for a solution to the Kurdish issue:
In order to achieve normalisation and for social peace to be instituted;
1. First of all, the state should issue a public apology for its acts of 
oppression, and pay compensation to the victims of oppression.
2. The official recognition of every person who is a citizen of the 
Turkish Republic as a Turk should be abandoned; the existence of 
Kurds in Turkey should be constitutionally recognised; and Turks 
and Kurds should be declared the principal founding nations of 
the country.
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3. Kurdish should be recognised alongside Turkish as the second 
official language of Turkey and be adopted as an official language of 
education. In case of sufficient demand by citizens speaking other 
mother tongues, the opportunity for them to receive education in 
their mother tongue should be facilitated.
4. The practice of having students in primary education recite texts, 
such as the racist-laden ‘Andımız’ (Our Oath), should be abolished. 
Inscriptions such as ‘happy is he who calls himself a Turk’ should be 
removed and racist dictums such as ‘one Turk is worth all the world’ 
should be abandoned.132 
5. The schools, military bases, roads, streets, and other places which 
are named after historical people known for their oppressive and dis-
criminatory practices should immediately be given new names.
6. The exclusive and discriminatory discourse of Turkishness, which 
forms the basis of the definition of citizenship as well as the constitution 
and the official literature of the system in Turkey should be abandoned.
7. The former names of places, which have been given Turkish names, 
should be reinstated.
8. The village guard system, which has been causing wide-ranging 
problems in the area, should immediately be abolished, however 
without creating new victims or causing more suffering.133 
9. The whereabouts of the thousands of missing people should be 
disclosed; investigations into murders with unknown perpetrators 
(faili meçhul cinayetler) should be run with serious concern and those 
responsible should be held accountable.
10. The burning down of villages and forced migration should be 
accounted for. The injustices committed by organisations such as 
Ergenekon and JITEM should be thoroughly investigated.134 
11. The oppression of Kurdish scholars, particularly Sheikh Said, whom 
Kurds remember today with great respect, should be acknowledged 
and an official apology to their living relatives and the whole nation 
should be issued.
12. The graves of personalities such as Said-i Nursi, Sheikh Said, and 
Seyid Riza should be disclosed and the archives containing documents 
on İstiklal Mahkemeleri (Independence Tribunals) should be made 
accessible to the general public.135 
13. Madrasas should be improved, their essential functions should 
be restored, and the qualification provided by madrasas should be 
recognised officially.
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14. Investment should be made in the Kurdish region of Turkey, which 
has been left underdeveloped for years, so that the area reaches a 
welfare level comparable to that of the western part of Turkey. Positive 
discrimination should be done in this regard.
15. Regarding naturalisation procedures, Kurds of non-Turkish 
citizenship should be given the same facilities and privileges that 
people of Turkish origin from places such as western Thrace enjoy. 
Amnesty should be issued so that those who had to flee the country 
on account of legal proceedings or prison sentences against them for 
political reasons can return to their country and those who have been 
in prison for their political views can return to social life.
16. The strictly centrist approach to governance should be abandoned, 
local governments should be strengthened, and all local governors 
should be elected by the people.136
It is evident that some of these recommendations, particularly those 
relating to the Kurdish issue, are more progressive in nature than those 
offered by other conservative parties in Turkey. Issues such as mother 
tongue education and constitutional recognition, which are often 
understated because of public pressure and various political concerns, 
have found a place in Hüda-Par’s programme. Hüda-Par’s understand-
ing of the Kurdish issue and its recommendations for a solution are not 
very different from those expressed today by the PKK or the People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP). This is quite striking given the history of 
violent conflict between the two movements. Although the PKK and 
their affiliated political parties have long expressed these views and 
made similar recommendations, it is Hizbullah which has come a long 
way. As Azad points out, Hizbullah was averse to the idea of Kurdishness 
to the extent that even the mention of the word Kurd or Kurdish would 
immediately be labelled nationalistic.137 But how could Hizbullah, an 
organisation allegedly committing murders on behalf of JITEM, find 
discursive common ground with the PKK, or in Hizbullah’s description, 
‘the apostate (mürtet) organisation and its followers’? In my opinion, it is 
the movement’s experience of realpolitik which has had a transformative 
effect on Hüda-Par’s discourses. Just as the HDP has been constricting 
the discursive field for Hizbullah-affiliated organisations by hosting 
Kutlu Doğum (Blessed Birth) events, Hüda-Par is formulating policies 
to the same effect. Moreover, one of the main patterns to emerge from 
my interviews is the attitude of Hizbullah’s political base towards the 
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Kurdish language. The Hizbullah base uses Kurdish almost exclusively 
in daily life and the music records that have been produced and 
published by Hizbullah are in Kurdish. Despite that, making reference 
to Kurdishness or discussing the Kurdish issue were considered a sign 
of nationalist sentiment and hence avoided in Hizbullah for many years. 
The remnants of this attitude can still be observed today as references to 
Kurdishness are acceptable if accompanied by religious references. As 
a result, the recommendations made in the party programme have not 
been emphasised to the same extent in the official Hüda-Par discourse 
and detailed policies addressing these recommendations have not been 
formulated. For example, Hüda-Par circles routinely hold street protests 
over incidents in Egypt and Palestine. However, when the victims are 
Kurdish, these circles do little more than issue a press statement or 
remain completely silent.
In 2014, Hüda-Par participated in local elections for the first time. 
Despite Hüda-Par’s high expectations, the election results were disap-
pointing. Nevertheless, the 92,000 votes they received demonstrated 
that Hizbullah still commanded a social base in cities such as Batman, 
Diyarbakır, and Bingöl that could be mobilised. According to Necat 
Özdemir, the former vice-chairman of Hüda-Par, the unexpectedly low 
number of votes they received was as much about it being their first 
election138 as a result of the incidents of political conflict and tension 
popularly known as the 17–25 December operations.139 As Özdemir 
claimed, it is likely that Hüda-Par’s voter base shifted in part to the AK 
Party as a reaction to the 17 December operation.140 Other informants 
mentioned a shift, particularly in Hüda-par’s female voter base towards 
the AK Party. Nevertheless, Hüda-Par’s statements may well be 
considered a reflection of an implicit anti-women sentiment. 
I observed the Hüda-Par rallies held in Bingöl on 16 and 27 March 
2014. These rallies were attended by Hizbullah followers in almost every 
city in the Kurdish region of Turkey and were a show of force highly 
reminiscent of Hizbullah weddings in the 1990s. My most immediate 
observation was that the party’s discourse on approaching the Kurdish 
issue and formulating a solution was not featured as prominently in the 
campaign speeches as in the party programme. Although it may have 
been a result of the local nature of the elections, the 2014 elections were 
in fact no different in nature to general elections. The frequent references 
to the history of Islam and Islamic principles in the campaign speeches 
made it clear that these elections were not about municipal matters only. 
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The absence of the Kurdish issue from these speeches, however, can be 
explained by Hizbullah’s lack of substantial critical engagement with its 
inherent Islamist impulses and hence inability to engage the masses on 
the issue.
Numerous factors point to the existence of a ‘historical bloc’ (in the 
Gramscian sense) in Hizbullah’s discourse (Crehan, 2002). These include 
the fact that Hüda-Par rallies featured Quranic recitation followed by 
speeches in the Kurmanji and Zazaki dialects of Kurdish; the occasion 
when Hüda-Par leader Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu described the party’s cause as 
the continuation of that of Sheikh Said; that Hüda-Par uses the Turkish 
word hür (free) in the party’s name as opposed to the Kurdish words azad 
(free) and azadî (freedom) favoured by the Kurdish movement; and, 
finally, that Hüda-Par uses the old-fashioned Arabic inkılap (revolution) 
as opposed to the Turkish word devrim (revolution), extremely popular 
in left-wing circles.
It is clear, however, that sharing the same discourse on the Kurdish 
issue has not brought Hüda-Par or the PKK and the BDP/HDP141 closer 
or helped establish harmonious relations between them. On the contrary, 
as the Mustazaflar Association organised more events, renewed tensions 
emerged between Hizbullah and the PKK, both of which continued to 
refer to each other, respectively, as apostate (mürtet) or Partiya Kâfirên 
Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Heathens Party), and Hizbulkontra.142 The tensions 
were realised in a range of incidents from the occasional stoning of each 
other’s association and party offices to kidnapping, assault, and murder. 
The incidents that escalated the conflict to an alarming level were the 
murder of a Hüda-Par affiliate in Dargeçit, Mardin and the kidnapping 
of Hüda-Par’s Dicle/Diyarbakır district president, during the 2014 local 
elections. The kidnapped district president was released after Hüda-Par 
leader Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu made a statement referring to the incident 
as a declaration of war143 and when eight NGOs, including the İnsan 
Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association, İHD) and Mazlum-Der, 
issued a call for his release.
Although the conflict was prevented from escalating by diligent 
conduct from both parties, it became apparent just how easily the old 
conflict could rekindle. Hence, during the Kobanê protests144 on 6–8 
October 2014, a group alleged to be members of the Yurtsever Devrimci 
Gençlik Hareketi (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement, YDG-H), 
reputed to be a unit under the KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, the Union 
of Kurdish Communities), raided the Hizbullah-affiliated KöyDer asso-
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ciation’s office in the Bağlar neighbourhood of Diyarbakır and murdered 
three KöyDer members. Between 28 September and 22 October 2014, 
other offices of Hüda-Par and related associations came under attack 
and finally, following a call made on Hüda-Par Diyarbakır office’s 
Twitter account, many armed Hizbullah members went out onto the 
streets seeking retaliation. The gun fights between members of the two 
groups in Batman and the towns of Kızıltepe and Mazıdağı in Mardin 
resulted in over 20 deaths on each side. These clashes sparked great 
anxiety in the area and various NGOs attempted to mediate. The BDP 
MP and the Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress) 
co-president Hatip Dicle’s efforts, in particular, succeeded in calming the 
situation. However, Hizbullah issued a statement on the Hüseyni Sevda 
website warning that it would retaliate against any future attack. In fact, 
by not setting up taziye145 tents for the Hüda-Par members killed in the 
attacks, Hizbullah was already sending the message that vengeance was 
being sought.146
The murders of the Hüda-Par members Cengiz Tiryaki in Karlıova,147 
Bingöl on 9 October 2014 and Fethi Yalçın on 21 October 2014 do not 
bear any resemblance to the murders committed during the incidents 
of 6–7 October and thus raise suspicion that these murders may have 
been committed by people outside the two groups and intended to 
provocatively escalate the conflict. In a written statement published on 
the day of Fethi Yalçın’s murder, Hatip Dicle expressed his condolences 
to the family of the deceased man and reported that Abdullah Öcalan 
was disturbed by the situation and that the PKK/KCK did not consider 
Hizbullah and ISIS to be the same.148
Although comparison of Hizbullah with ISIS emerged during the time 
of the Kobanê protests, it cannot be considered outside the historical 
dynamics of the PKK-Hizbullah conflict. The frequency and form of the 
murders committed by Hizbullah in the 1990s caused widespread outrage 
amongst the PKK base. Since then, Hizbullah has been largely viewed as 
a JITEM/deep state-led organisation. The polarisation between the two 
groups becomes especially evident in times of crisis, thus making these 
situations vulnerable to external provocation and interference. Given the 
present sensitive political atmosphere due to the ongoing peace process 
between the PKK and the Turkish state, concrete steps must be taken 
to prevent external tampering. It does not make sense that the PKK 
would knowingly jeopardise the peace process by rekindling the conflict 
with Hizbullah after initiating peace negotiations with the Turkish state, 
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against whom they have been fighting for years. Moreover, it serves no 
practical purpose for the PKK not to recognise Hizbullah as a legitimate 
movement today, unlike in the 1990s, with a considerable following in 
the area.
Moving into legitimate operations has created significant oppor-
tunities for Hizbullah. As a result, it has a much larger following than 
ever before. This became possible only within a social and historical 
context in which it refrained from violence and instead prioritised 
legitimate activities. Hizbullah’s discourse of justifying violence as 
a means of self-defence cannot now mobilise the Hizbullah base as it 
used to. Violent conflicts would likely cause further polarisation and 
hostility between Hizbullah and the PKK, as well as result in the flight of 
members who joined Hizbullah during its legitimate period and do not 
condone violence as a method. A re-escalation of the conflict might also 
lead to the violence-endorsing elements within Hizbullah to join more 
radical groups and/or encourage Hizbullah’s return to the underground. 
In contrast to the 1990s, Hizbullah’s base today is much more visible 
through legitimate associations and activities, and thus vulnerable to 
acts of violence. In fact, in the case of a conflict situation, these people 
will be first to be harmed. Therefore, it appears that a state of violence is 
no longer practically useful for Hizbullah as it might nullify the ‘trans-
formation’ the movement has undergone since 2004.
State officials must take precautions against the risk of an increase in 
radicalisation. Moreover, they recognise that a permanent state of peace 
in Turkey can only be achieved by attaining a permanent state of peace 
between different Kurdish groups and that the Turkish state must take 
the initiative in this regard. A prospective plan as part of the Kurdish 
peace process was to bring all groups to the negotiating table, preferably 
as elements within the Yüzleşme ve Hakikat Komisyonları (Reconcilia-
tion and Truth Commissions). However, after the failure of the peace 
process, there is no chance of these commissions being established. 
Although it is common knowledge that the conflict between Hizbullah 
and the PKK ended in the 1990s, there has been only a de facto ceasefire 
since that time. In fact, the de facto ceasefire has become quite fragile as 
a result of the failure of the peace process between the Turkish state and 
the PKK, the atmosphere of violence that has been prevalent since then, 
and the political polarisation caused by the attempted military coup on 
15 July 2016.149 It is certainly possible that existing tensions may develop 
into a full-blown conflict again. 
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Today, Hizbullah can be regarded as a social movement. What is meant 
by social movement here relates to networks formed by meanings shared, 
in a broad sense, through close personal relationships (Yavuz, 2003, 
p. 271). Although there are various theoretical approaches to understand-
ing social movements, my preference is for an approach that prioritises 
functionality. This approach focuses on the psychological and structural 
consequences of mass mobilisation and defines a social movement, in 
its most basic sense, as the totality of the collective reactions delivered as 
a result of psychological discontent stemming from structural tensions. 
These tensions may spring from various sources such as industrialisation, 
modernisation, financial crises, social life, and external interference with 
one’s general daily routines. The resultant feeling of discontent paves the 
way for the emergence of a social movement (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 6). 
These kinds of ideologies are evident in Hizbullah discourses concerning 
events in places such as Palestine, Egypt, Chechnya, and Iraq. However, 
it is not only religio-ideological arguments and an anti-Western attitude 
that facilitate the emergence of movements such as Hizbullah. It is widely 
understood that socio-economic circumstances and social change have 
been conducive to the emergence of Islamic resistance movements, waves 
of violence, and social movements around the world. Some of these 
movements are treated in the category of neo-fundamentalist movements 
and their emergence has largely been a reaction to the various aspects 
of the process of secularisation. For example, the Dakwah movement 
in Thailand, which shares much in common with Hizbullah, emerged 
as a result of such a process of secularisation (Scupin, 1987, pp. 84–5). 
Likewise, the processes of secularisation and modernisation in Turkey 
and Iran were met with various forms of resistance from Islamist groups 
(Karasipahi, 2009, p. 93) and in the case of Hizbullah this resistance, as we 
have seen, took the form of violence until the 2000s. Naturally, it cannot 
be claimed that Hizbullah emerged solely as a reaction to secularisation 
and modernisation. On the contrary, with its instrumental adoption of 
violence, Hizbullah is the result of its own historical and sociological 
circumstances. Thus, conceptualising Hizbullah solely as a state-led 
organisation, a movement with connections to Iran, or a manifestation 
of the state exploiting its power and committing crimes against PKK 
members and sympathisers would be an incomplete assessment of the 
organisation. Without minimising the influence of Hizbullah violence in 
the 1990s, a singular focus on that violence will result in the neglect of 
other crucial characteristics of Hizbullah.
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Figure 1.1 Levels of Hizbullah Affiliation
I would suggest that Hizbullah and its affiliates may be represented as 
shown in Figure 1.1 in terms of organisational structure, base, and social 
movement. My preference for concentric circles instead of a hierarchical 
diagram stems from the fluidity between these circles on various 
levels and the potential of different circles to influence each other in 
decision-making processes. However, there is an undeniable hierarchy 
between the first two circles. The possibility of mobilisation across these 
circles is determined by the internal conditions and circumstances of 
the period in question in the cases of structural change, however, sharp 
shifts between these circles may take place.
The circle at the centre of the diagram represents both the leading 
cadre of Hizbullah and those who have been active members since the 
1980s or 1990s. Within this circle there is a strict hierarchical relationship 
and decision-making is governed by internal power relations. This circle 
4. Various Islamist 
groups and individuals
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comprises the leading cadre of the organisation, members in prison, and 
people who once held administrative positions such as district or city rep-
resentatives of Hizbullah. Although it is not possible to supply an exact 
number of these people, an educated estimate would range between 1000 
to just over 2000; this is based on the number of high-ranking Hizbullah 
members who were arrested and imprisoned after Operation Beykoz.
The second circle consists of associations and individuals affiliated with 
Hizbullah, including various NGOs, Hüda-Par, educational institutions, 
and broadcasting and publishing groups. Although the people within 
this circle do not have much say in general decision-making processes, 
they are nonetheless in a closer relationship with the public operations 
given their active involvement in daily life and legitimate activities. 
Consequently, the second circle constitutes the mechanism whereby 
solutions to day-to-day life issues are often found. Although there is a 
hierarchical structure within the second circle, it is not nearly as strict as 
in the first circle. 
The top cadre of the second circle comprises people who developed 
relations with Hizbullah in the 1980s and 1990s. However, as opposed to 
the first circle, they were much less involved in illegal activities and have 
little experience of arrest or prosecution. Some informants emphasised 
that to avoid potential run-ins with the state, individuals with clean 
records handled the legal procedures when associations were being 
established. These associations within the second circle have played an 
important role in Hizbullah becoming a legitimate social movement and 
in that regard they may be considered the public face of Hizbullah.
There is not much difference between the first and second circles in 
terms of ideology and mindset and they approach many issues in more 
or less the same way. Nevertheless, although the second circle seems 
wholly to embrace the discourse of the first circle, in personal dialogue 
those in the second circle are distinguished by their personal opinions 
and self-criticism on topics such as violence, connections with the state, 
and political disagreements. These personal ideas and self-criticisms are 
not expressed publicly in order to preserve the authority and charisma 
of those in the first circle. I believe a small number in the second circle 
simultaneously belong to the first circle. The estimated number of people 
in the second circle is around 10,000 or somewhat higher.150
Hizbullah becomes a social movement with the third circle. Within 
this circle differences become more pronounced and the control and 
influence of the leading cadre becomes minimal. Although the third 
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circle constitutes a proper base for Hizbullah, the membership of this 
circle (unlike those in the first or second circles) does not embrace 
Hizbullah’s discourse in its entirety. In fact, my interviews revealed that 
the vast majority of those in the third circle express regret over Hizbullah 
violence. Considering that the allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated Hüda-Par 
won around 92,000 votes in the 2014 local elections, the number of those 
within the third circle is likely to exceed 200,000. My estimation of this 
figure is based on the consideration of those under voting age as well 
as those who did not cast their votes or for various reasons voted for 
another party. 
Although the third circle has no influence on Hizbullah ideology, 
strategy, or administration, members’ social lives are shaped in accordance 
with the discourses produced by the first two circles. Moreover, on this 
level, belonging to Hizbullah extends beyond sharing common religious, 
conservative, and Islamist understandings and constitutes rather a 
network of relations that can be considered within the framework 
of political economy. Therefore, within the third circle, we can talk 
about the existence of financial capital and networks forming around 
it. I believe it is the capital formed by the allegedly Hizbullah-related 
legitimate organisations that gave way to this new form of mobilisation. 
Hizbullah constitutes a politico-economic reality through the thousands 
of business associations, and educational and aid institutions which are 
affiliated with it, and those in the third circle can take advantage of this 
economic field.
The move from the third circle to the second constitutes, to some 
extent, a reward mechanism for individuals who prioritise group identity 
and belonging. However, it is very unlikely for individuals in the third 
circle to move over into the first one. Even so, one can talk about the 
indirect influence of the third circle on the first as the general attitude 
of the third circle is taken into consideration in the decision-making 
processes of the leading cadre.
The fourth and widest circle on the diagram consists of various 
Islamist groups and individuals. Those in this circle have no organic 
or intellectual links with Hizbullah or related organisations, but they 
regularly attend events such as Blessed Birth, conferences, and charity 
sales organised by Hizbullah-affiliated organisations. The most intense 
criticism against Hizbullah is formulated within this circle. The fourth 
circle has no influence on Hizbullah’s decision-making processes, 
nevertheless, it is clear that Hizbullah prefers to pull those in this circle 
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into the third. In that sense, if the third circle is the direct recipient of the 
discourses constructed by the first and second circles, then the fourth 
circle constitutes the indirect recipient of these discourses. What I mean 
here is that those in the third circle have a relatively closer relationship 
with Hizbullah. Those in the fourth circle, however, relate to Hizbullah 
through participation in certain events and hence cannot be considered 
core members of Hizbullah. 
In conclusion, the most significant shift in Hizbullah membership 
takes place between the third and fourth circles via break-offs and 
mergers on these levels. To a lesser degree, shifts in membership from 
the second circle into the first must also take place from time to time. 
Nevertheless, the first circle is the least fluid circle of Hizbullah affiliation 
in terms of membership. Although forms of horizontal mobility such 
as certain transformations and exchange of tasks may take place within 
the second circle, I believe this occurs to a much lesser degree within 
the first.
In Figure 1.1 all four circles are predominantly populated by ethnic 
Kurds. However, it is very difficult to talk about the existence of a strong 
ethnicity-based discourse within any of these circles. The majority of the 
people in these four circles can be described as indifferent to issues of 
ethnic identity. For example, the events that these individuals organise 
or attend often display Islamist characteristics. Another common feature 
between these circles is their shared opposition to the PKK. Especially 
within the first three circles, the PKK is seen as anti-Islamic, insincere, 
and sometimes even heathen (kâfir) or apostate (mürtet).
2
The ‘Grounded’ Dimensions of 
Hizbullah as Islamist Organisation  
and Social Movement
In this chapter, I outline major themes that emerge from my research data 
and situate the data within a theoretical framework. The ethnographic 
data consist mainly of audio recorded interviews and fieldnote 
observations. The chapter is organised around thematic categories 
alongside historical and theoretical analysis. In the concluding remarks, 
I bring together the overall findings of the chapter to develop theoretical 
abstractions.
hizbullah, the individual, and daily life
The first category to emerge from the Grounded Theory-based analysis 
concerns the socio-psychological profile and daily life practices of 
Hizbullah members. The main themes investigated in this section are 
the personal backgrounds of individual Hizbullah members, their life 
stories, motivations for joining Hizbullah, experience in Hizbullah, and, 
if they have left the organisation, their reasons for and experiences of 
leaving. 
The informants whose life stories animate this chapter are meaningful 
only insofar as one considers their life trajectories, what brought them 
to join this underground organisation and the burdens they carry as a 
result. In addition to a sociological analysis of Hizbullah, this study is also 
the first to allow the voices to be heard of those who have been members 
of or in direct contact with the organisation. The member profiles 
described below are hidden to conceal the identities of the interviewees 
and protect their privacy. My goal is to provide a sociological description 
of the informants’ place in society and so their profiles are not presented 
in their entirety, only selections are described based on their capacity to 
represent a general trend or experience.
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Joining Hizbullah and the profiles of new recruits
The interviews I conducted indicate that in the period between the 
establishment of Hizbullah in 1979 up until the early 2000s, new recruits 
were predominantly under 18 years of age. Although it is impossible to 
confirm these estimates statistically, in this period it is mostly 13 to 18 
year olds who joined Hizbullah in the cities of Diyarbakır, Batman, and 
Mardin. Additionally, a considerable number of middle-aged men (ages 
40 to 60) joined Hizbullah until 1991 when it started being involved 
in lethal violence. Hizbullah membership is comprised predominantly 
of men. Although women’s participation does occur, women members 
often join the organisation as an extension of their role in the family. 
Indeed, involvement in Hizbullah on the part of whole families appears 
to be the primary context for women’s involvement as it is rare for 
women to join without a male relative as the primary entrance point. 
Mosque-centred activities carried out until the 2000s played a primary 
role in the recruitment of men into the organisation.
a. The poet and the Sufi: Sermest’s journey from Sharia to truth (hakikat) 
The story goes that a pupil of Rumi asks about the four doors (şeriat,1 
tarikat,2 marifet,3 and hakikat4) often emphasised in Sufi thought. 
Rumi tells his pupil to slap each of the four people leaning over their 
wooden lecterns in the opposite madrasa on the back of their heads. 
The pupil does as he is told. He hits the first man, and receives a harder 
blow in return. The second person makes a move to hit the pupil back 
but changes his mind at the last minute. The third person turns around 
and looks at the person who hit him but does nothing. The fourth 
person does not even turn around to look. Rumi thereupon explains 
that the first person is yet at the door of şeriat (Sharia) and returned 
the slap on the basis of ‘tit-for-tat’. The second person is at the door 
of tarikat and decides not to hit back after remembering the principle 
‘respond kindly even to those who harm you’. The third person is at 
the door of marifet and knows that both good and evil originate from 
the creator himself. But he is curious about whom the creator has put 
on the path of evil and for that reason he turns around and looks at 
him. The fourth person is at the door of hakikat and he both knows 
the source behind good and evil and has no curiosity to know who is 
an instrument to them. (Mewlana Jalaluddin Rumi)
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Sermest’s family moved from a village to the city in the early 1990s due 
to forced migration5 and started living on the periphery of the city. In 
the village, they made their living as agriculturalists and from livestock. 
They experienced serious poverty when they first moved to the city. 
Before the move, Sermest’s elder brother had been the first person to 
study outside the village and became involved in Hizbullah during this 
period. After the family moved to the city, they too became acquainted 
with Hizbullah through him. According to Sermest, his elder brother 
‘does not really want his family to be involved with Hizbullah and tries 
to prevent that in his own way’. Despite his efforts, with the exception of 
his father and two brothers, everyone else in the family quickly became 
active in Hizbullah’s mosque and community activities. Sermest, who 
looked up to his elder brother, followed in his footsteps and joined 
Hizbullah during his secondary school years.*
Hizbullah became Sermest’s whole life and he remained devoted to 
it until he left the organisation just before starting high school. Sermest 
had not had relationships with anyone except Hizbullah members until 
that time. In fact, he realised he did not know anyone outside Hizbullah 
after he announced his departure from the organisation and found no 
Hizbullah member would talk to him anymore. My acquaintance with 
Sermest coincided with the time right after he left Hizbullah. Sermest 
and a friend of his had decided to publish a literary journal and I got 
to know him through my involvement in the project after a personal 
request by one of my teachers. Like many other such projects, the journal 
was never published. Shortly after meeting Sermest, he dropped out of 
school and fled ‘far away’. As I found out later, the journal project was 
a scheme to ‘get the bus fare from the teachers and flee’. Apparently, he 
fled to Malatya ‘for no apparent reason’ and afterwards went to Antalya, 
where he saw the sea for the first time. As İsmet Özel, one of Sermest’s 
favourite poets put it, ‘he puts his tongue in the sea before his feet’. 
I saw Sermest again 14 years after he fled the insular community he 
was so committed to. We met in the small town where he worked as an 
imam. I was surprised that there was little semblance of the high school 
kid I had encountered over a decade before; instead, I found a devout Sufi 
in his thirties. Sermest had done a few different jobs before eventually 
settling into his role as a respected imam and husband. He became a Sufi 
by submitting6 (biat etmek) to a Naqshbandi sheikh. I learned the story 
* Secondary school (orta okul) in Turkey is the three-year period of education 
following five years at primary school and preceding three years in high school.
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of how he became a Sufi when he took me to the mountain village where 
he had become a ‘devotee’ (adanmış) to visit the Naqshbandi sheikh who 
served as his spiritual guide into Naqshbandiyah teachings and practices. 
Sermest walked backwards on his knees when leaving the room to avoid 
turning his back to the sheikh and he spoke about feeling great peace 
when he kissed the hands of his sheikh, who was his age.
As I struggled with Sermest’s subtly phrased yet persistent requests for 
me to submit to his sheikh, I managed to deflect them by asking whether 
he was feeling peaceful. His response was that he had finally found 
haqiqa7 and proceeded to tell me the Rumi story recounted above. As far 
as I could observe, Sermest looked much happier than I had remembered 
him from years before. 
When we sat down to catch up on his past 14 years on the evening we 
visited his sheikh, Sermest’s first sentences were:
First, let me tell you this. The fact that this topic has come up again 
today still upsets me. I haven’t quite gotten over these negative feelings 
yet and I’m still struggling to get rid of them.
b. The prison and the madrasa: the story of Yusuf 
Like many of his peers, Yusuf joined Hizbullah at the age of 16. Since then 
he considered himself, as he puts it, a member of ‘this Cemaat’. His first 
contact with Hizbullah took place at his local mosque where he attended 
lectures organised by it. His involvement in Hizbullah continued as a 
university student and he worked in Hizbullah’s university homes. He 
witnessed the first ‘encounters’ between Hizbullah and the Menzil group. 
In comparison with other Hizbullah members that I know, Yusuf is 
better educated. In fact, knowing that he was well suited for intellectual 
endeavours Yusuf offered me guidance during my fieldwork. He helped 
me arrange interviews and shared his knowledge about Hizbullah in our 
detailed interviews. 
Yusuf was detained by the police a few times on account of 
Hizbullah-related activities but he was never prosecuted. He was arrested 
shortly after his university graduation and sentenced to a few years in 
prison. My knowledge of Hizbullah’s prison operations comes largely 
from interviews with Yusuf and Kamuran. Their prison testimonies, 
sometimes diametrically opposed to each other, reflect the divergent 
observations and feelings of two people. One, Yusuf, is still a Hizbullah 
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member while the other, Kamuran, left Hizbullah two years before his 
imprisonment.
The first in-depth interview I conducted with Yusuf took place in 
my house on 23 May 2014. After what I sensed to be him pondering 
over what he ought to talk about, the first thing Yusuf said was ‘people 
make mistakes’. He added that personal mistakes cannot be attributed 
to institutions or cemaats and that even the Prophet’s companions 
(sahabah) made mistakes but they were never attributed to Islam.
According to Yusuf, everything that was done in the name of Hizbullah 
was done for the sake of Allah. He explained to me by means of extensive 
references to the history of Islam and Islamic literature that there is no 
religious accountability for actions that are performed for the sake of 
Allah but miss the mark. By making reference to a Hadith on içtihat,8 
which states that if one hits the mark he gets two sevaps (blessings) 
while the one who misses gets one, Yusuf claimed that Hizbullah’s acts of 
violence in the past were all carried out for the purpose of self-defence. 
According to him, Hizbullah was under siege from three sides – by the 
state, the PKK, and the ‘Rabıtacılar’ (Rabıta supporters) – but despite 
that, Hizbullah did not carry out any mass killings and only killed people 
after thorough investigations had taken place and after ensuring those 
executed were ‘murderers and guilty’. 
As Yusuf told me these things, my cats were meowing for attention 
and thus not allowing us to talk in peace. The cats scratched my hands 
drawing blood as I picked them up to take them out of the room. 
Thereupon Yusuf explained that the cats knew me, knew that I am the 
one who gives them food and water; however, they could still scratch me 
when I annoyed them. For him, Hizbullah had resorted to violence for 
the same reason my cats scratched me: it had been pushed into a corner 
and eventually paid the price.
After talking for a few hours, just before we ended our interview, I 
asked him whether he preferred any particular pseudonym for himself. 
His response was a quiet ‘Yusuf ’. I could not help but compare his life 
to that of the Prophet Yusuf, whose life had started in a family home, 
continued in the slave markets and dungeons of Egypt, and progressed to 
the top of the state. Similarly, Yusuf had spent his early years in the home 
of his provincial family, then he was imprisoned for some years, suffering 
physical and psychological torture. Now he was standing before me, 
with a better-than-average education and better prospects for the future 
unlike most others in his position.
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c. Anger, tranquillity, and surprise: the stories of Musab, Kamuran, Azad, 
and Ahmet 
Musab is the oldest and most idiosyncratic Hizbullah member I have 
ever met. He is unique in that he openly discusses his participation in 
acts of violence orchestrated by Hizbullah. Like many others, he joined 
Hizbullah as a high school student in the 1990s. Before he joined, he had 
either dropped out of or been expelled from various high schools due to 
non-Hizbullah-related political issues. He was introduced to Hizbullah 
at the last high school he went to and became actively involved in its 
mosque operations for years. 
The profiles of my informants are largely similar: quiet, modest, and 
introverted. They often did not like speaking about their own experiences. 
Instead, they would speak as if they were addressing an imaginary 
audience and responding to their accusations. With most of them, one 
could easily sense some anger towards the state and the PKK. The same 
anger was palpable also when discussing the image of Hizbullah created 
by the media. But when it came to their own experiences in Hizbullah they 
would become relatively quiet. The ones who had left Hizbullah would 
usually express their criticism in a tone of quiet resentment. Musab is the 
exception to this. Musab had sworn vengeance after Velioğlu was killed in 
Operation Beykoz on 17 January 2000. However, he left Hizbullah upon 
realising he had too many unanswered questions and could not find a 
satisfactory explanation on ‘how to answer for’ Hizbullah’s acts of violence.
Unlike other former Hizbullah members, who would discuss leaving 
the organisation using sophisticated and relatively theoretical criticism, 
Musab spoke with unconcealed anger. For a few years in high school 
I shared halls with several Hizbullah members and in their eyes I was 
a member of an insignificant and often despised ‘minority’ in front of 
which they did not hide their code names,9 which were ordinarily kept 
confidential. This informant reminded me of a former İmam Hatip high 
school classmate, also a Hizbullah member, called Musab. This classmate 
was violent to me several times. A clear image of Musab came to mind 
whenever I encountered the informant and, hence, I assigned him the 
same name as a pseudonym. 
In contrast to Musab, Kamuran is one of the quietest people I have 
known. He joined Hizbullah at the age of 16 or 17 and remained involved 
in mosque operations until leaving the organisation in the early 2000s. 
He was detained several times during his membership in Hizbullah and 
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spent a few years in prison in the 2000s on account of an investigation that 
had begun in the 1990s. Kamuran has apparently done serious reading 
in Islamism, social issues, and philosophy and thus his explanation for 
leaving Hizbullah was based on a criticism of structural issues rather 
than his personal experiences. His refusal to discuss personal matters 
emerged as one of the common themes of our interviews. The limited 
information he provided about his personal story subsequently became 
crucial for this study.
Azad had dropped out of primary school as a first-grader. A relative 
of his taught him how to perform the five-time daily prayers (namaz) 
before sending him for Quran lessons in a Hizbullah-affiliated mosque, 
where he was first introduced to Hizbullah. He joined the organisation 
afterwards and remained involved in its mosque operations until the 
early 2000s. Azad never went back to formal education. He learned to 
read and write in Hizbullah-led mosques and homes, and thus became 
acquainted with a large selection of Islamist literature available in 
Turkish. For Azad, Hizbullah was not only an organisation, it constituted 
his school and a social network. At the age of 15, when his parents moved 
to another city, Azad did not go with them and instead chose to stay 
in Hizbullah-run homes as ‘advised’ by the organisation. Azad never 
refrained from discussing the Kurdish issue or Kurds in our interviews 
and when I asked him whether there is a particular pseudonym he would 
like me to use for him, he said ‘I prefer a Kurdish name.’
Ahmet is considerably older than the other informants. Although 
his membership in Hizbullah lasted only a short time, he personally 
witnessed its important phases, albeit at times as a victim. Upon leaving, 
he started receiving threats and suffered much hardship as a result. At 
the end of our long conversation, I asked him whether he had forgiven 
Hizbullah or not. His reply was ‘this file won’t be reopened in this life, 
after [the death of] X and thousands of others … This file won’t be 
reopened until Judgement Day.’10
d. İsmail and the knife: the sons of the Cemaat 
The membership profiles described above were chosen because of their 
representative potential from within a larger body of informants. As far 
as I am aware, none of my informants belonged to the military wing 
of Hizbullah, which is commonly described as ‘the sons of the Cemaat’. 
When asked whether they knew anyone from Hizbullah’s military wing, 
the answer was usually negative. Often I could sense a general reluctance 
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to talk about the armed fighters, but it seemed that most had some idea 
about these people ‘they did not know’. According to Aziz, the people in the 
armed wing were specially selected who would not question Hizbullah’s 
authority and do as they were told.11 A question that I regularly asked the 
informants was whether they thought there were noticeable differences 
between them and the people from the military wing. I gathered from 
their answers that they considered themselves better educated and more 
fortunate in their upbringing because their families were better informed 
about general matters. According to the informants, most members of 
the military wing came from uneducated families and had inadequate 
knowledge about religion. Some emphasised, however, that this general-
isation was valid only for Hizbullah’s early period and as the organisation 
became stronger, relatively better educated members started moving into 
the military wing. 
Yusuf and Kamuran are the only informants acquainted with prominent 
members of Hizbullah’s military wing while in prison. According to 
Yusuf, who still considers himself ‘a member of the Cemaat’, life in prison 
is as organised and disciplined for Hizbullah members as described in 
Hizbullah-affiliated novels, which I will investigate in the next chapter. 
Kamuran, however, pointed to a general and serious lack of morale, severe 
depression and schizophrenia especially among the Hizbullah members 
with long prison sentences. One of my informants reported a Hizbullah 
member in prison on a life sentence saying his family had left him, he 
had no hopes, and he had no one to turn to but the Cemaat anymore. 
Another informant told me that members of Hizbullah’s military wing 
sometimes did not leave the same house or room for months or even years 
and that a friend of his had remained in the same house for three years. 
According to this informant, people from Hizbullah’s armed wing, which 
he described as ‘those in a sensitive situation’, had to make this ‘sacrifice’ 
because they could put so many others in jeopardy should they leave the 
house and risk getting caught. When in hiding they would not even open 
the curtains for security reasons and their basic needs were provided by 
one or two people under strict security measures. For members of the 
armed wing, Hizbullah’s authority stands above all else. An informant of 
the armed wing, who had shot 30 people, was asked whether he had any 
regrets, to which he replied, ‘no, we did it for the cause. The Cemaat asked 
me and I did it. I’d do it again if I were asked.’ Contrary to this statement, 
Kamuran told me a great majority of the armed wing expressed regret 
over their past actions. 
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Hizbullah has complete control over the daily life of the fighters; it 
decides where fighters go, the things they do, or where they will hide 
following an ‘operation’. To conceal their identities, fighters are not 
permitted to come face-to-face with other Hizbullah members. 
Security concerns are paramount in every aspect of the fighters’ lives. 
For instance, the request to take a trip for family reasons needs to be 
approved by a strict hierarchical chain of command. Many informants 
told me that anyone who approached Hizbullah fighters was suspected 
of being a police officer, spy, or PKK member and that the organisation 
continously stressed this possibility. Because I have not had any contact 
with Hizbullah fighters during my fieldwork, I cannot give a general 
description of their profile. Nevertheless, judging from the statements 
of the informants, it is clear that Hizbullah fighters are considered to be 
‘making a great sacrifice’ comparable to that of the Prophet Abraham 
(Ibrahim) in contemplating the sacrifice of his son, Ismail. 
The daily life practices of Hizbullah members and family relations  
in Hizbullah membership
You are what you do! C.G. Jung
An analysis of the daily life practices of Hizbullah members arose out of 
the need to observe how the ‘idealist’ nature of my informants’ narratives 
is realised in such everyday practices.
The practices I investigate here constitute essential elements of daily 
life, particularly when mosques were at the centre of Hizbullah’s activities. 
For instance, members assigned responsibility for a particular group of 
members, mosque, or mosques had duties far beyond teaching lessons 
in the Quran and the history of Islam and included, among others, 
monitoring mosque-goers’ lecture attendance, investigating their reasons 
for absence and resolving any issues causing the absence, observing their 
families and social relations, as well as monitoring people in nearby 
shops and houses in the mosque neighbourhood. These members 
provided weekly reports about mosque activities to their superiors. Daily 
life might also involve attending periodic meetings where members are 
given directives, and other occasions where the ‘affairs of the Cemaat’ are 
discussed, religious and ideological training is given, security matters are 
reviewed, and training is given in the course of action to be taken when 
under threat. 
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The same practices and duties apply to those active in school operations. 
The main duty of Hizbullah members in school operations is to look 
after people referred to as alaka.12 This consists of helping the alaka with 
any problems and isolating them from their social environment so they 
have no other social contacts beyond the Hizbullah circle they recently 
joined. After a certain period, when deemed ready, they are offered an 
‘invitation’ and should they accept, are asked to provide a short biography 
and a photo ‘taken in the last six months’.
Leaving aside the question of whether the requirement to submit a 
photo taken in the last six months is in fact true and, if so, the irony 
of the presence of bureaucracy in an illegal organisation, Hizbullah’s 
school operations were carried out within a framework that closely 
controlled Hizbullah members and their social environment. In the short 
biographies, new recruits are requested not only to provide their life 
story but also give detailed information about their family and friends, 
and the political views of family members and other relatives. Another 
important routine is the weekly report written on pelure paper where 
Hizbullah members are expected to describe the incidents of the week. 
These reports are reviewed very carefully by higher Hizbullah members 
and if found to be inadequate returned to the reporter for revision. Other 
than the routine reports, additional reports concerning specific people 
or incidents may also be requested ‘if found necessary’. What is meant 
by ‘necessary’ here is the request for comprehensive information on the 
particular person being investigated. Musab told me the following when 
I asked him about the reports he wrote:
Musab – We would write about what we were asked about, what took 
our attention … even about our accommodation situation. Other than 
that, the neighbourhood where the mosque was located … There was 
a small shop. They were from X. The kid there was called Mervan. The 
name Mervan is not often found in Sunni [circles]. I believe they were 
Alevi.13 The name of another one of their kids was Nazım. I was on 
good terms with them. We’d have tea together, I’d chat with them. I’d 
even tell them ‘if we have a run-in with each other, I don’t know you 
and you don’t know me’.14 Apart from that I have been criticised. I have 
been given a slap on the wrist by the Cemaat. 
Mehmet Kurt – In general, what kind of information was it [that was 
requested]?
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Musab – Their opinions, what they are, how they view us. I didn’t give 
a damn, really. I mean, I wouldn’t give them detailed information.15
Prior to the 2000s, Hizbullah typically used every member as an 
intelligence agent and regularly asked them to gather information on 
people it was suspicious about. This practice had to be abandoned after 
Operation Beykoz when Hizbullah’s archive was confiscated and it went 
into a period of disintegration. 
An important aspect of daily life in Hizbullah concerns security and 
confidentiality. Hizbullah prioritises security above all else. All members 
are constantly reminded to be vigilant and alert to whether they are being 
followed, and they are taught certain security measures to be used in 
daily life. Examples of such measures include placing a flower pot in the 
window to signal whether a Hizbullah safe house is secure or not; taking 
a wide turn into a street to see whether one is being followed; and if one 
is to meet another Hizbullah member and he does not show up, routinely 
coming back and checking the rendezvous; then, after establishing that 
he is not coming, informing higher Hizbullah authorities about the 
situation and evacuating the houses he knew about or destroying the 
Hizbullah-related materials in these houses on the assumption that he 
has been caught.
When a member has been detained or arrested, or is being interrogated, 
all the houses that he knows about are evacuated and all the people he 
has been in contact with go into hiding for an indefinite period. For the 
Hizbullah member under interrogation, the main goal is not to talk and 
not to inform on his friends and group. For that reason, each Hizbullah 
member memorises the profile of an imaginary supervisor to give the 
police during interrogation. For example, Azad, who had left Hizbullah 
over ten years earlier, could still describe the profile of his imaginary 
supervisor in great detail and in a single breath. These precautionary 
measures became crucial for Hizbullah members to hide from the police 
especially after 1999 when the police increased their operations against it.
As evident, security and confidentiality are of vital importance in 
the daily lives of Hizbullah members. Hizbullah members are routinely 
warned that even the most ordinary person they come into contact with 
may easily be a member of the PKK, the security forces, the JITEM, or an 
intelligence officer, and as a result, members learn not to trust anyone but 
Hizbullah officials. It is not difficult to guess the feelings of fear, anxiety, 
and suspicion the permanent state of alertness must have engendered 
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in Hizbullah members. It is almost as if the fake profile manufactured 
for the police turns into an authority in charge of the daily life of the 
member. Taking into consideration the permanent state of alertness, one 
may even claim that this profile is almost real, or perhaps more effective 
than reality. The fact that Azad still retains a vivid image of his imaginary 
supervisor and that he unwittingly continues to take a wide turn into 
any street to see whether he is being followed support this claim. Azad 
changed the location and time of our meeting twice and ultimately 
preferred to meet me at a tea-house facing the street and with several 
points of exit. 
In the 1990s, despite heavy security measures, it was still relatively 
easy to identify a Hizbullah member by their characteristic aesthetic 
choices of clothing such as şalvar16-type baggy trousers, and particular 
religious practices such as putting weight on one foot during namaz and 
joining the hands below the heart instead of on the abdomen.17
Family life among Hizbullah members offers valuable information 
in the analysis of their daily life practices. Individual members often 
experience tensions with their families and in some cases have been 
subjected to physical violence. A notable example is Ali, a 14 year-old 
boy, who was killed by his allegedly PKK-supporting father for being a 
Hizbullah member. Ali’s murder occupies an important place in the social 
memory of Hizbullah in a way that strongly informs group belonging. 
The incident became the subject of a song in the seventh album of the 
recorded music series Şehitler Kervanı. The following are the lyrics to 
this song, sung to the accompaniment of gunshot noises:
My little Ali has not come today, my 
roses are in despair
Dark-eyes where are you, your mother 
is in tears
Will our eyes shine in another spring 
Will our hearts see a father’s bullet
My rose-cheeked boy is 14, spring will 
come again
You will see the good tidings (müjdeler) 
martyrdom (şehadet) will bring
In the soil you gave your life, how 
many roses,
Küçük Alim gelmedi bugün güllerim 
yaslı
Kara gözlüm nerdesin annenin gözü 
yaşlı 
Bir başka baharda mı gülecek gözlerimiz
Bir baba mermisi mi görecek yüreğimiz
On dördünde gül yüzlüm yine bahar 
gelecek
Göreceksin şehadet ne müjdeler verecek
Can verdiğin toprakta kim bilir ne 
kadar gül
Nice Fuat, Hanifi, Aliler can verecek
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Although intra-family tensions are a common phenomenon among 
individual Hizbullah members, only a small number of these cases result 
in such tragic incidents. Among the reasons why families are averse to 
the idea of their children being Hizbullah members are concern for their 
children’s safety, political reasons, and the belief that Hizbullah is a Shia 
organisation. Hizbullah justifies these tensions and conflicts by making 
reference to the life of the Prophet and his companions, especially Yasir 
ibn Amir, Ammar ibn Yasir, and Mus’ab bin Umeyr. These three figures 
were selected because of their shared experience of pressure, torture, 
and destitution due to their faith. Focusing on these figures is meant 
to increase one’s motivation for self-sacrifice and to endure hardships. 
Dilgeş summarises Hizbullah’s stance on the matter as 
we experience these in the name of Islam, therefore we will resist, we 
will not capitulate. If there is an uprising against Allah (hak), then 
there is no obedience to [his] subjects (kul). We heed to the words 
of our mothers and fathers in worldly matters, but with regard to the 
Cemaat, we will not seek permission from our fathers. Their consent 
does not matter to us. The curses, the insults, and the beating only 
return to us as blessings.19 
I have heard many stories during fieldwork about Hizbullah members 
who left the family home to live in Hizbullah homes because their 
families were opposed to them being Hizbullah members. Situated in the 
How many Fuats, Hanifis, and Alis will 
bloom
Will our eyes shine another spring
Will our hearts see a father’s bullet
Your troubles are another, you can’t say, 
my Ali 
My hands are in war, my rage does not 
dwindle, my Ali
Toward death for Islam with a father’s 
bullet
Greetings my little martyr, damned be 
cruelty
Will our eyes shine in another spring
Will our hearts see a father’s bullet?18
Bir başka baharda mı gülecek gözlerimiz
Bir baba mermisi mi görecek yüreğimiz
Senin derdin başkadır dilin dönmüyor 
Alim 
Ellerim savaştadır öfkem dinmiyor Alim 
Bir baba mermisiyle İslâm için ölüme
Selam küçük şehidim lanet olsun 
zulüme
Bir başka baharda mı gülecek gözlerimiz
Bir baba mermisi mi görecek yüreğimiz
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back streets or on the periphery of the city, these safe homes were often 
sparsely furnished, allowing prompt evacuation in the case of a security 
breach. They were operated under a strict security protocol, including 
the collection of information about the neighbours by maintaining good 
relations with them.
According to Dilgeş, family membership in Hizbullah is rare. However, 
his observations mainly concern the period up to the early 1990s and 
family membership may have become more common in the ensuing 
period. Sermest’s family is an example of an entire family who joined 
Hizbullah. According to Sermest, a typical Hizbullah family would 
always offer lodging to other Hizbullah members, allowing their houses 
to be used as a safe house for members under investigation or with an 
arrest warrant on their names. The Hizbullah member who goes into 
hiding in the house of a Hizbullah family would pretend to be a relative 
of the family and act according to a pre-prepared scenario in the case 
of a police raid. Sermest reported that at times up to 20–30 Hizbullah 
members would be staying in the family house. 
In periods of increased violence and when Hizbullah was at the centre 
of police attention, members would carefully monitor daily life around 
the house and keep watch at all times. Mehmet Baran talks about rituals 
of keeping watch in his book Yaşanmışların Hikâyesi (The Story of the 
Past, 2007). Even when all the family are Hizbullah members, they do 
not discuss matters concerning Hizbullah for security reasons. In that 
sense, responsibilities and loyalty to the organisation come before family 
and sometimes group belonging may require action against one’s own 
family members, such as writing a report informing on another family 
member. Depending on the level of confidentiality and importance, the 
reports may be sent to Hizbullah’s city administration.20 These reports 
are not to be seen by anyone without the right authority and should be 
destroyed after being read.
As my interviews made evident, the daily life of a Hizbullah member 
is governed by a strict hierarchy and division of labour, where security 
and confidentiality concerns are central. The security and confiden-
tiality measures in operation may – and often do – result in intense 
auto-control among family members whereby they abide by Hizbullah 
principles without the supervision of an external authority. In this sense, 
the hierarchical structure of Hizbullah resembles small underground and 
criminal organisations described in prominent sociological literature 
(Boyd, 1991; Gastil, 1993).
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Disengaging from Hizbullah: divergent motivations  
and the trauma of leaving
The last concept investigated under the category of the profiles and 
daily life practices of Hizbullah members is the disengagement of 
members from the organisation. Members leave Hizbullah individually 
or in groups, and these two types of disengagement produce different 
outcomes. The cases of disengagement of individual members before 
and after Operation Beykoz differ from each other widely in terms of 
motivational bases and outcomes. Another factor that affects the process 
of disengagement is the position of the individual within Hizbullah. 
Individual disengagement from Hizbullah is not immediate, often 
taking place over time. For example, in the case of Dilgeş, full disengage-
ment took about a year and even then people he knew during the time 
he was a Hizbullah member enquired about his reasons for leaving and 
pressured him to re-join. According to Dilgeş, the reason for disengaging 
in stages is for self-protection and not to seem to be ‘quickly adopting 
an adverse attitude’. Dilgeş left Hizbullah because he disapproved of its 
use of violence as early as the beginning of the 1990s, when the violence 
increased in intensity, and because of its anti-Kurdish discourse centred 
around the PKK. He did not experience any issues after leaving. Dilgeş’s 
disengagement from Hizbullah may be summarised as a confluence of 
two factors: his concerns with the organisational structure and inability 
to shut off his critical thinking. 
Structural and critical differences played a similarly prominent role in 
the disengagement of Sermest from Hizbullah. The process of Sermest’s 
disengagement had begun when he started suspecting the sincerity of 
some people within Hizbullah – his reports were not delivered to the right 
authorities; the intermediaries pretended to deliver his reports and even 
manufactured fake responses to them. Moreover, Sermest was rebuked 
for not taking care of the alakas he was responsible for and reading classic 
novels, which the Cemaat did not approve of. Again, the intensification 
of violence made Sermest question his involvement in the organisation. 
I have previously mentioned when discussing Sermest’s profile that he 
remembers his time in Hizbullah with regret; the negative psychological 
consequences remain with him still. In Sermest’s case, disengagement 
from Hizbullah has been relatively more difficult in comparison with 
Dilgeş because Sermest’s family is still involved in Hizbullah and 
Sermest left the organisation despite objections from them. What he did 
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not know at the time, however, was that his brother who encouraged 
his involvement in Hizbullah had already left the organisation with no 
one knowing about it. His brother had been pretending to be an active 
member until he graduated from school. That the two brothers did not 
tell each other about their respective disengagement from Hizbullah is 
evidence that disengagement and security concerns are closely related. 
The following extract is taken from an interview with Sermest, where he 
explains his leaving.
I told X that this didn’t work for me anymore, that I’d like to quit. He 
said stuff like ‘Look, if you do something like that, you will be dead 
to us.’ I said it’s over for me. They said, ‘you’ll face the consequences’ 
and I said, ‘don’t hold anything back’. It was a Friday. We left. When I 
came back on Monday and greeted them, no one greeted me back. I 
looked around and realised I did not know anyone in school, anyone 
at all! (laughing). Anyone at all, not even a single person. And they do 
not greet me back. Let alone greet me back, they turned their faces 
away. They turn away [when they saw me]. Wow! I had endeavoured 
so much, put so much effort in [Hizbullah] … I realised that they are 
cross [with me]. As if we’d never met before. I went outside and lit up a 
cigarette. All on my own, of course! It turns out I didn’t know anyone!
…
We were involved in this. I mean, until the second year of high school, 
I don’t think I had anything else in my life. It was at the centre. Friends 
were ready-made, it was all ready-made. Imagine, it’s your first day in 
school and you already have friends in all grades! On the one hand it 
is an advantage, but on the other it has its drawbacks. I remember, for 
example, I had not listened to a single song until my second year in 
high school. Let alone a song, I had not even listened to a folk song 
(türkü). I fell in love and for five years I could not even tell myself 
the fact that I was in love. I thought falling in love was a betrayal 
of the cause. I suffered a lot from a bad conscience. Because it was 
ready-made, everything was ready-made!
…
My leaving Hizbullah shook the whole school. No one expected it. All 
the alakas they had made contact with turned into a fiasco. Everyone 
they looked after up to a certain point had left. And no one came near 
me. We had no relations with the others anyway. Then one of them 
started rumours about me. He claimed that I provoked the teacher 
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against them. I went up to him and said, ‘what the hell are you talking 
about?’. I realised that he hadn’t just turned against me, he was actually 
looking to spill my blood. I said, ‘no way, who the hell are you? You 
go and let your master come’ (he is getting upset). Anyway, X sent 
another order (sipariş), he said, ‘let’s have a talk’. We went somewhere 
outside the city. We talked. He said, ‘you’re doing [unspecific verb] 
to our boys’ and I said, ‘I’ve left your Cemaat, not Islam. Who are 
you? What are you? I mind my own business, you mind yours too.’ 
I said, ‘I wouldn’t do the smallest thing against you and I wouldn’t 
let anyone do anything [to me]’. I said, ‘you don’t know me’. He said, 
‘Well, I don’t know. Cut your coat according to your cloth.’ I said, ‘don’t 
hold anything back. Some coats are longer than the cloth.’ He said ‘it’s 
your call’. Then I left. The school started boring me. I didn’t take them 
seriously either. Because I knew what they were all like. 
…
Anyway, then, the school became boring. Then X came. Then you 
came. You said something like ‘you write poetry then?’. That’s why 
you’d come. And we didn’t take you seriously!
Mehmet Kurt – Why not? (laughing)
Sermest – We were in so much trouble and all you talked about was 
poetry. We were making plans to flee. We’d had enough; we weren’t 
going to go to school anymore! There was nothing attractive about 
school anymore. Anyway, then we dropped out and left.
Mehmet Kurt – Where were you going to go?
Sermest – I don’t know why, but I went to Malatya. 
Mehmet Kurt – How did you go there?
Sermest – I booked a ticket and left. I said I was going home that 
night and instead I went there. Ah! (surprised expression). This is 
very important; we ripped people off. The money thing ... We ripped 
people off. We said we are going to publish a school newspaper, a 
school magazine.
Mehmet Kurt – And you wrote poetry!
Sermest – And we wrote poetry (laughing). Anyway, a bit of money 
from one teacher, a bit from another … There were many people. Even 
from some shopkeepers. We’d told them [the same story] too. They 
supported us too. Then we thought we’ve got money now, let’s go!
Mehmet Kurt – It was all planned then!
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Sermest – Yes, of course it was planned! (laughing)
Mehmet Kurt – Why did X run away with you by the way?
Sermest – We were bored! We needed a change. X told me ‘you go, 
I’ll join you later’ and I left. I stayed one night in Malatya and realised 
there was nothing going on there. Then someone said I could find 
work in Kemer, Antalya. So I went to Antalya. I saw the sea for the first 
time. I tasted seawater; I learnt that it was salty. I said, ‘damn it, this 
water is not drinkable!’
Mehmet Kurt – There is so much of it and it can’t be drunk!
Sermest – Yes, I thought it was ridiculous (laughing). I mean we had 
not seen the world. So I ended up in Kemer, a holiday place. We’re 
working and we see that nobody has any faith (iman) or prudence 
(izan). They had no shame, you know! People take their trousers off 
in the middle of the road. I was shocked. They had no shame! I said 
tourists are really non-Muslim (gavur). Anyway, I stayed there for a 
month or so and then my brother came and took me back to school. 
So we started going to school again. This time I needed to come up 
with an excuse. We can’t just say we got bored and ran away. Then I 
blamed it all on Hizbullah. I said they did it. My brother gave them 
all a mouthful. He said, ‘he’s coming back to this school. If anything 
happens to him, I’ll come after you. Who do you think you are? You’re 
just born yesterday.’
Sermest’s account is indicative of how powerful the idea of loyalty and 
the sense of group belonging is among Hizbullah members. It further 
exemplifies the degree of social alienation that can be imposed on 
former members. Although Sermest says, ‘we blamed it all on Hizbullah’, 
the feeling of social alienation and loneliness that he experienced at 
school was also an important reason in his decision to run away. In 
addition, Sermest’s experiences in Antalya and his reactions to them are 
ridden with indications of his psycho-social state, especially his feeling 
of strangeness in an alien cultural environment, describing his class 
belonging and background as someone ‘not from around here’. He was 
shocked by this ‘new world’ that was completely different from the social 
environment of Hizbullah. The feelings of isolation and alienation after 
leaving Hizbullah are reflections of Sermest’s disengagement and trauma.
The same kind of trauma applies to other former Hizbullah 
members that I interviewed. As discussed in the previous chapter, Azad 
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experienced a similar shock when he first went to Istanbul and realised 
that the country they were devoted to bringing Sharia to was in fact very 
different from what they had imagined. Musab explains his experience 
of disengagement:
Mehmet Kurt – So, what was your reason for leaving?
Musab – There are many. It wouldn’t be right to put it down to one 
reason. For instance, we were going to make a revolution. I mean that 
was our dream. Then I went to Istanbul and had the first disappoint-
ment when I saw the Tayyip-supporters.21 I said to myself, ‘oh, what 
are we doing?’ What Islam? What revolution? What are you talking 
about? I am really annoyed by these Islamists. Most of them are 
ideological pricks (laughing). Again though, we thought the Cemaat 
had impunity. I mean, they’d won the war with the PKK. That’s what 
we thought at the time. But I don’t think that way anymore. At the 
time, it felt like victory to us. Then the second impact came in Beykoz. 
I mean the ordinary man is wise enough not to make such a mistake 
and you’re making it as the leader of an organisation.22 Hundreds of 
things like that. Of course we were shocked when that happened. 
Friends and I sat down. First, we swore to take revenge. We were like, 
‘we’ll do this, we’ll do that’. What was that? It fizzled out like a deflated 
balloon.23
Many like Musab left Hizbullah in the years following Operation 
Beykoz. Mass disengagement from Hizbullah caused serious rifts 
within the social fabric of certain sub-groups and the ensuing trauma 
experienced by those who decided to leave Hizbullah went beyond 
social and psychological alienation. Unlike individual disengagement, 
in the case of mass disengagement it brought about the death of one’s 
leader, security operations and large-scale arrests, and media coverage of 
executions carried out by Hizbullah. Kamuran talks about the shock and 
‘psychological harm’ that many experienced during this period.
I experienced a great … a great difficulty, psychologically. They are 
your social circle; you’ve had all your hopes tied up to that; you’ve 
taken a lot of risks for them. It is not easy to disengage yourself. It 
initially caused me great psychological harm. And I could only get 
over it by … I mean, by sharing it with my friends. I mean we had that 
… we had that opportunity. We had people around us who thought 
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like us, who had once been with them but broke off from them later. 
It actually motivates you to share those emotions with others. You 
realise you’re not alone; that there are others like you; and you find 
support there. Then you create your own personal thing anyway. You 
develop a certain self-confidence. But it’s not the same with everyone. 
I mean, I know many who gave up their Islamic life. They became 
atheists. They became corrupt. Some started using drugs. Some gave 
up namaz. Some became ulusalcı (secular nationalist).
Mehmet Kurt – Turkish ulusalcı?
Kamuran – No, no! Kurdish ulusalcı. There were some like that.
Mehmet Kurt – Do you know other similar examples? A friend of 
mine, for instance, says he saw two former Hizbullah members singing 
in the Protestant Church choir.
Kamuran – No, I haven’t seen anything like that, but I saw many who 
became corrupt. 
Mehmet Kurt – Do you ever say, ‘I wish I had never got involved with 
them’ or …
Kamuran – Of course I do. I do say I wish I had never got involved. 
Why? Because you experience a great … I mean, you are in your 
thirties and you feel old. You are worn out. I mean you are experiencing 
serious issues inside. You realise you can have a more sound, decent, 
and healthy social environment. You realise you can make better 
choices. I mean, one who cannot realise this hasn’t learnt their lesson. 
Therefore I think it is not reasonable to still think ‘for what it’s worth, 
it was nice, it was good!’.24
Kamuran was one of many who left Hizbullah after Operation Beykoz 
and therefore he did not experience social isolation as Sermest had. After 
going through a period of recovery in the years following Operation 
Beykoz, Hizbullah was no longer powerful enough to use pressure on 
former members.
According to Yusuf, not many who left Hizbullah experienced any 
issues resulting from their disengagement and those who did were 
subjected to interrogation and torture, or were identified as spies 
and betrayers. Yusuf claims that should the archives be opened to the 
public, it will be clear that these incidents underlie Hizbullah’s internal 
executions. Yusuf is very confident about his opinion and claims many 
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people will start hating loved ones should the archive be opened. Yusuf 
admits to the shock experienced by many members after Operation 
Beykoz, saying many might not recover from it. What made it easier for 
Yusuf to recover from the shock was his realisation based on personal 
observation that Hizbullah’s claims were partly true. Likewise, during 
the Hizbullah-Menzil conflict, Yusuf had a dream that convinced him 
that Hizbullah was right. In his dream, Yusuf sees a fire burning on the 
plain of Diyarbakır and feels great distress. The plain is brightly lit in the 
dead of the night by burning fires. Someone ‘competent’, whom Yusuf 
consults about his dream, tells him that his dream is an answer to the 
distress he has been experiencing. Yusuf says it is not right to act based 
on a dream, but the dream was a relief to him and cleared his doubts 
about Hizbullah.25
Despite Yusuf ’s claim that no ex-Hizbullah member experienced any 
issues after their disengagement, my research refutes his claims. In my 
opinion, although leaving Hizbullah may not cause any problems per se, 
this depends to a great extent on the position of the individual within 
Hizbullah and whether they speak out against it after their disengage-
ment. For instance, a high-ranking Hizbullah official, who harshly 
criticised Hizbullah after leaving, received threats for years and eventually 
had a death warrant put out on him. There have been numerous others, 
especially seydas, who had to flee on account of threats from Hizbullah, 
or were subjected to violence, or murdered for speaking against it.
To summarise, individual disengagement from Hizbullah leads to 
social alienation and related psychological trauma. This is regarded 
as a matter of security for the organisation only if the individual has 
a high-ranking position within Hizbullah or if they express criticism 
about Hizbullah after their disengagement. Although I have mostly 
looked at cases of individual disengagement up to this point, there have 
been cases of mass disengagement from Hizbullah since the time of its 
establishment. 
social segregation, minimal homogeneities,  
and the language of violence
The concept of segregation is used in the social sciences to refer to 
the state of inequality favouring certain groups over others. The strat-
ification of groups is determined by which group has more power 
to oppress or ghettoise ‘other’ groups. The concept is popularly used 
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in the political context of the USA to describe states of inequality 
between Black, Hispanic, and White Americans. However, beyond its 
use to refer to the unequal distribution of power or overall inequality 
between ethnic groups, the term is also used to refer to the general 
phenomena of inequality, in which one group is in a disadvantaged 
position in comparison to another group or groups (Jackson, 2001, pp. 
1–17). Segregation is also used to refer to the social process describing 
separation, indicating the lack of interaction between certain individuals 
or groups (Marshall, 2009, p. 50). In this study, I employ the concept 
of segregation to refer specifically to the separation between Hizbullah 
and individuals or groups who are not necessarily separated racially but 
rather socially and politically based on religious affiliation and networks 
of protection. I examine how affiliation with Hizbullah, or lack thereof, 
leads to a disparity of power due to various factors including numerical 
advantage and protection in relation to the use of violence. The concept 
of segregation is also useful insofar as it describes the separation between 
Hizbullah and other cohabitant organisations, groups, and social 
movements. I believe, in the case of Hizbullah, segregation takes place on 
the level of space and ideology and leads to movement of membership 
between groups and social mobilisation.
Social segregation and mobilisation among Islamic groups
In Chapter 1, I discussed the conflicts that emerged between Hizbullah 
and other groups, especially Menzil, starting in the mid 1980s. In 
this section I will analyse the perception of these ‘confrontations’ by 
Hizbullah members, how the conflicting parties describe themselves and 
each other.
First, it must be emphasised that Hizbullah and other organisations 
and movements in Turkey are perfect examples of separation and 
segregation in terms of their establishment and expansion. The most 
obvious example is the fact that the leaders and leading members of 
Islamist movements in the Kurdish region of Turkey were acculturated 
in organisations such as Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish 
Student Union, MTTB), political parties affiliated with the Milli Görüş 
(National Vision) movement, and Akıncılar (Raiders). In this sense, 
the first instances of separation took place between Turkish and some 
Kurdish Islamist groups, albeit the separation was due to differences of 
opinion based on a pan-Islamist (ümmetçi) discourse rather than ethnic 
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differences. Although the ethnic element in these cases of separation 
often goes unacknowledged, we can certainly talk about the implicit 
role ethnic differences play in separating certain groups from others. 
For instance, one of my informants reported Velioğlu saying to him, 
‘We can’t expect anything from the Islamism of these Turks, of Erbakan 
or the Selamet [meaning the National Salvation Party]. We, as Kurds, 
need to unite under Islam and establish a state.’ Considering that a 
Kurdish-centred political discourse had barely been present within 
Hizbullah before Hüseyin Velioğlu’s death, the separation from Turkish 
Islamism was arguably not only motivated by ethnic concerns but more 
so by cultural differences and the two groups’ divergent ideological 
approaches to Islamism. There have been various cases of separation 
between Kurdish and Turkish Islamist groups at different points in time 
and, I would argue, this is indicative of the existence of a fundamental 
discord in these pan-Islamist groups’ conceptualisation of ummah.
In the previous chapter, I noted the existence of many Islamist groups 
and movements in the Kurdish region of Turkey at the time of Hizbullah’s 
establishment and during its expansion. A Grounded Theory-based 
analysis of the data collected from former or current members of groups 
such as Menzil, Vahdet, Zehra, and two others26 reveals similarities in the 
ideological approach of these groups but also differences in the strategic 
bases of their methods.
With the exception of Zehra,27 the groups listed above all make regular 
reference to prominent authors of Islamist thought, such as Sayyid Qutb, 
Hassan al-Banna, and Said Hawwa. These authors describe the influence 
of the Syrian and Iraqi branches of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on 
these groups. Another important influence these Islamist groups have in 
common is the Iranian Revolution and the leading figures involved in 
the revolution, such as Khomeini and Ali Shariati. One could argue that 
the first incidence of separation between the Islamist groups in question 
took place in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution whereby disagree-
ments were around Iran’s ‘Shia conversionist policies’ and the support 
given to the Hafez al-Assad-led Baath regime in Syria during the Syrian 
military’s offensive against the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1982. In this incident, widely known as the Hama Massacre, thousands 
of people died.28 Iran’s support for Assad had stirred up much debate 
among Islamist groups in the Kurdish region of Turkey. While some 
groups endorsed Iran by justifying their action as a strategic move that 
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any state would have made, others took a position against Iran, blaming 
them for sectarian bigotry.29 
The opposing positions taken by Islamist groups in the Kurdish 
region of Turkey led to a sharpening of the differences between them 
and, as a result, places such as tea-houses where members of these 
groups socialised became increasingly segregated and some were closed 
down to prevent clashes taking place.30 The debates around the Hama 
Massacre may be claimed to have sped up the process of segregation 
between Islamist groups in the period after 1982. Hizbullah took a 
position in favour of Iran vis-à-vis these debates and started working to 
foster relations with them.
Another reason for increased segregation between Islamist groups in 
the Kurdish region of Turkey was tensions over organisational activities. 
A struggle for power between these groups emerged out of rivalry over 
which group was the ‘official’ representative of Iran in the area and this 
struggle led to conflict between them. For instance, Hizbullah and the 
Menzil group were parties to this power struggle and after disputes 
arose over organisational activities, these disputes turned into incidents 
of violent disengagement and separation. The disagreement led to 
various groups disengaging from Hizbullah and eventually joining ranks 
with Menzil.31 In a similar vein, Hizbullah’s organisational ‘success’ in 
Diyarbakır and the involvement in Hizbullah of a considerable section 
of the Islamist youth in the area caused upset among the Menzil group 
and led to mutual accusations and insults.32 Despite the emphasis the two 
groups place on their differences, rapid shifts in membership between 
them point to the fact that each is not, in fact, so different from the other 
in principle. However, fluidity in membership, in this case, only involves 
Islamist groups. A movement of members from an Islamist group to the 
PKK, or vice versa, scarcely ever happens.
The Hizbullah-PKK conflict brought about new shifts between the 
memberships of different Islamist groups. While Hizbullah’s violence 
towards oppositional seydas and groups, particularly Menzil and 
Vahdet, created an anti-Hizbullah atmosphere and pushed many groups 
away from Hizbullah, the conflict with the PKK led to a new kind of 
polarisation, which shifted the balance in favour of Hizbullah. Groups 
siding with the PKK, however, were those which had been subjected 
to violence by Hizbullah either before or during the conflict between 
Hizbullah and the PKK.33 Thus, the conflict with the PKK led opposing 
Islamist groups to adopt new positions, albeit without this necessarily 
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being reflected in their organisational activities. Most of the Islamic 
groups, which already had an anti-PKK discourse, were satisfied with 
Hizbullah becoming a significant actor in the balance of power in the 
area and thus took its side against the PKK. The groups which took 
the side of the PKK in the conflict, despite ideologically being closer 
to Hizbullah, included Menzil and Vahdet that had been subjected to 
violence by Hizbullah.
Although the leading cadres of Islamist groups in the area have a 
background in Turkish Islamism, during the Hizbullah-PKK conflict 
they chose to ally with Kurdish pan-Islamists (ümmetçi) instead of 
moving towards Turkish Islamists. I believe this is an indication of 
the ongoing separation of Turkish and Kurdish Islamism at the time. 
The following extract from an interview with Mücahit, who was with 
the Vahdet group during the PKK-Hizbullah conflict, is informative 
regarding the development of the ethnic and/or Islamist discourse in the 
1990s.
We were Kurdistanî.34 Of course, our being Kurdistanî led to their 
[Hizbullah] claiming we were PKK supporters. I mean, they started 
doing that. Of course . . . the truth is . . . we wanted the PKK to win the 
war. Our hearts wanted that, we wished that, you know? Because their 
violence . . . we thought ‘it doesn’t matter who beats them [Hizbullah]’. 
But we didn’t become PKK supporters. It was impossible for us [to 
become PKK supporters] anyway. We aimed to be Kurdistanî. Then 
there was ‘are we supposed to be Kurdistanî or Ikhwanist?’ This thing, 
this conflict between them … caused much debate. And as a result we 
left Vahdet.35
Mücahit’s ‘we were Kurdistanî’ discourse concerns a fraction within the 
Vahdet group and not the whole movement. However, the Vahdet group’s 
general anti-Hizbullah attitude might be better understood considering 
Vahdet dissolved and ceased all activities as a result of the conflict with 
Hizbullah. The conflict with the PKK may have made the Kurdistanî 
discourse more popular among some Islamist groups and individuals. It 
is possible that various cases of disengagement from Hizbullah stemmed 
from Hizbullah’s understanding of the Kurdish issue and its anti-PKK 
discourse. Nevertheless, Mücahit’s following statement may point to 
Hizbullah acting as a buffer ‘against the PKK’s anti-Islamic discourse’:
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I sometimes think, ‘Thank Allah, if they [Hizbullah] didn’t exist 
perhaps they [the PKK] would have come into mosques and banned 
Islam.’ I mean, they are that cruel. During these elections, I thought, 
‘Thank Allah the Hizbullah-supporters had machetes.’36
Mücahit, who had wished that the PKK would be victorious over 
Hizbullah in the 1990s, was impressed by Hüda-Par for not using violent 
methods in the conflict with the PKK/HDP and as a result moved closer 
to the Hüda-Par line. 
The emergence of the conflict with the Menzil group while the 
Hizbullah-PKK conflict was underway initiated a new process of 
separation within Hizbullah. Although Hizbullah had the support of 
many Islamist groups and parties in Turkey in its fight against the PKK, 
the conflict with Menzil resulted in these groups distancing themselves 
from Hizbullah, thus isolating it.37 Hizbullah, in turn, responded to its 
marginalisation and isolation by prohibiting the sale of some popular 
Islamist journals from Diyarbakır in western Turkey and forcing the 
groups to cease their activities completely. Hizbullah’s boycott became 
so successful that some of the Islamist journals were subsequently 
discontinued.38 
The period of conflict and increased (in)security between 1991 and 
the early 2000s resulted in the complete separation of Hizbullah from 
other groups. Mediation attempts, traditionally made at the early stages 
of a conflict, proved futile and, in time, these groups became spatially 
segregated from each other. The mutual accusations and allegations 
during the conflict caused a complete separation.39
Hizbullah’s relations with other groups was initially marked by 
ethnically based disintegration and in time evolved into ideological 
dissociation. This was followed by further dissociation and conflict 
because of differences in the methodologies and organisational strategies 
of these groups. During this process, incidents of dissociation, which I 
refer to as ‘the emergence of minimal homogeneities’,40 took place. In 
fact, the period between the emergence of these conflicts and the 2000s 
can be considered the period of minimal homogeneities and dissociation 
between Islamist groups in the Kurdish region of Turkey. These minimal 
homogeneities are not stable or fixed and have the potential to shift due 
to division and integration as a result of outside influences. 
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The transformation of Hizbullah’s methodology  
and further disengagement from Hizbullah
I have discussed the numerous cases of mass disengagement from 
Hizbullah in the years following Operation Beykoz. Hizbullah established 
the Mustazaflar Association in 2003 during a period of reorganisation 
with the aim of social transformation by becoming active legitimately. 
As reported by Kamuran, the decision to operate legitimately had been 
a subject of debate among Hizbullah members in prison and the plan 
was realised following the release of certain members. Naturally, such 
a transformation did not take place without dispute or tension. For 
example, a fraction within Hizbullah with Salafi inclinations opposed 
the idea of operating legitimately on the grounds that it is not right from 
the viewpoint of Islam to take advantage of the institutions and operate 
within a tağuti41 state.42
The criticism voiced by Hizbullah members in prison against the 
transformation of the organisation’s methods did not result in any 
incidents of mass disengagement. However, those members who had 
previously been sent to Arab countries, especially Egypt, to study Arabic 
and Islamic theology, and came under the influence of Salafi movements 
there, began to disengage from Hizbullah as a result. Eventually, others 
joined them and they collectively separated from Hizbullah to form a 
radical Salafi group. The group’s separation became apparent when the 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated associations started operating legitimately 
and was complete by the time Hüda-Par was established. 
Another reason that played a role in the separation was the civil war in 
Syria. Because Hizbullah supported neither side in the Syrian war, some 
individuals and small groups with Salafi inclinations within Hizbullah 
declared tekfir against Hizbullah and left. According to two informants,43 
these Salafi splinter groups merged with other individuals and groups 
with Salafi tendencies and joined the fight in Syria alongside organisations 
such as the Al-Nusra Front, ISIS, and others. One informant exemplified 
the radical and tefkirist attitude of these groups by an anecdote where 
he says to one such individual, ‘you are interfering with Hizbullah, 
they’ll give you a good scolding’ and the Salafi individual responds, ‘they 
better not piss us off or we’ll set off a bomb at the Blessed Birth events’. 
This statement is significant in that it shows how the violence of this 
new brand of Islamism can result in declaring tekfir against a radical 
Islamist organisation such as Hizbullah and a bomb being set off at an 
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event attended by hundreds of thousands of religious Muslim Kurds as 
a viable action.
One informant claimed that these groups bring weapons from Syria 
into Turkey. The possibility of these weapons being used in violent acts 
in the future demonstrates the sensitivity of the situation. The invasion 
of the city of Mosul by ISIS and many other areas, the kidnapping of 
dozens of Turkish citizens including personnel in the Turkish Embassy of 
Mosul in 2014, and the presence of many Turkish citizens in ISIS signal 
the potential outcome of the emergence of religiously based violence in 
Turkey in the future. 
According to another informant, it was not only groups with 
Salafi tendencies that left Hizbullah, there were also people with Shia 
inclinations who left to join other sympathetic groups.44
It is clear that the change in Hizbullah’s methods led to disengage-
ment and the formation of new alliances. At times, this change became 
apparent in legal activities and politics and, at others, traditional Islamist 
methods were preferred. For example, the following extract is the 
explanation offered by one of my informants of the method adopted by a 
group that converted to Shia Islam:
For example, let’s imagine that some of them are Ja’fari. Well, then 
come out and say it. Say you are Ja’fari! Say ‘I believe what will take 
people to Allah’s heaven is the Ja’fari denomination and Imam Ja’far’. 
Why don’t you do it then? They think, ‘you never know what’ll happen, 
we might go back to the old days’. There’s that fear. I mean, we couldn’t 
get over that fear. For instance, the Islamic movements here, we are 
still experiencing the Cold War. That person, for instance, is still living 
those years, still living those fears. He hides himself. He runs lectures 
in private places; three-four people come together. Why do you do 
this? I mean, there is still that. I say to them ‘what do you teach there?’. 
What you teach there is taught by imams to a cemaat in mosques. You 
don’t need to hide that!
Operating legitimately is a new method for allegedly Hizbullah-
affiliated organisations. Even though the method may be different, my 
informants who describe themselves as Hizbullah members often stress 
that there has been no change in the movement’s ideological structure 
and goals. For instance, I asked Necat Özdemir, the former vice chairman 
of Hüda-Par, what kind of a change led to the establishment of Hüda-Par 
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and his response was Hüda-Par operates according to Islamic principles 
and the party’s approach and views can be seen in the party programme.45 
Yusuf claimed that the process of organising in associations and political 
parties is not a new development and Hizbullah had not engaged in 
legal activities in the past because of various pressures and security 
operations by the Turkish state between 1992 and 2004. According 
to Yusuf, Hizbullah had operated in the public domain prior to 1992 
through weddings, bookshops, and picnics, and the lack of engagement 
in this domain may be accounted for by the absence of NGOs at the time. 
The political atmosphere today is more favourable for running these 
operations and opportunities ought to be seized to reach people as long 
as the means used do not contradict the Quran or the Sunna. According 
to Yusuf, as a movement that can mobilise hundreds of thousands of 
people, it would have been a mistake if Hizbullah had not created a legal 
political umbrella organisation to bring its supporters together. NGOs 
can only make recommendations, but when they form a political party, 
they can reach more people and achieve their goals.46
Yusuf ’s first argument is that the political atmosphere was more 
favourable for Hizbullah to operate legally. The significant increase in 
the number of NGOs in recent years confirms this. His second argument 
is that Hizbullah views NGO activities as political. Although NGOs 
essentially operate in the fields of humanitarian help and education, 
political groups in Turkey commonly use NGOs for political purposes. 
Another theme that emerged out of my interviews is that Hizbullah 
attributes a negative meaning to the concept of change and views 
embarking on change as synonymous with amending a past mistake. It 
becomes evident from my observations and interviews that Hizbullah 
considers non-change to be a sign of stability. If what is meant by change 
is the ideological transformation of Hizbullah, such a transformation 
has not taken place. But Hizbullah has certainly changed in terms of its 
methodology. Since its establishment, it has had a pragmatic but also 
aggressive attitude as an organisation. Such pragmatism has allowed it to 
rearrange its alliances according to strategic goals rather than view them 
as based on permanent structural principles. In that sense, Hizbullah’s 
pragmatism may be explained by Laclau’s concepts of articulation 
and hegemony.
The concept of articulation, which addresses the encounter between 
two different entities and the resultant emergence of another entity in 
favour of the hegemony and power of the stronger entity, necessitates 
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change for both parties, although this change may be of an asymmetrical 
nature. In this formulation, the indicator of power is the ability to 
transform the encountered group’s discourse into one’s own (Smith, 
1998, pp. 84–97). Seen from this perspective, it is clear that Hizbullah 
has been in constant transformation since its establishment, confirming 
Laclau’s theory of articulation.
Hizbullah at times transformed around a more powerful hegemonic 
centre, such as in its relationship with Iran, and at other times transformed 
the methodology of smaller groups and eventually subsumed them. For 
example, Hizbullah’s initial goal of starting an Islamic revolution with 
the cooperation of the traditional ulema (Muslim scholars) and people 
with modern education is clear evidence of the influence of the Iranian 
Revolution on it. As discussed earlier, the Iranian Revolution came 
about with the collaboration of ayatollahs and intellectuals. Hizbullah’s 
similarly eclectic approach, featuring divergent references, discourses, 
and methods, can be seen in the ‘changes’ it has gone through. When we 
look at Hizbullah’s publications during the illegal versus legal periods in 
its history, it becomes clear that the vision it proposed is closely linked 
to the political circumstances of the time and it developed opposing or 
conflicting ideas and attitudes in order to adapt to the changing times. 
This state of eclecticism and the contradictions contained therein are 
often justified through the concept of içtihat. In fact, Hizbullah’s strategic 
repositioning of itself constitutes the main reason for its periodic trans-
formation as an organisation.
Another feature of Hizbullah that confirms Laclau’s theory of 
articulation is the hegemonic presence of violence. Factors such as the 
Turkish state’s use of violence as a method in their approach to the 
Kurdish issue, the influence of the Iranian Revolution, and the fact that 
Hizbullah and the PKK operated in the same area made violence the 
inevitable outcome. In this regard, violence has been used by Hizbullah 
according to its sociological and historical circumstances and its 
supporter base.
Hizbullah’s pragmatic attitude is often articulated by its members with 
an emphasis on Hüseyin Velioğlu’s ‘opportunistic’ nature. According 
to Mücahit, Velioğlu took advantage of every opportunity to enable 
Hizbullah to achieve its goals. In Velioğlu’s biography on the Hüseyni 
Sevda website, he is presented as prioritising action over theoretical 
debates.47 According to Kamuran, however, these shifts stem from lack 
of method on the part of Hizbullah:
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Lack of method … I mean it is because they did not give their 
members any substantial religious education. I mean, they don’t offer 
any substantial, systematic training. I mean, it is a system that has 
been compiled from here and there, and it only emphasises certain 
issues. I mean a lack of method is evident. Of course, politically, this 
drives one to some confusion as to when they are supposed to take 
sides and whose side to take, or with whom they should cooperate. 
This was obvious with them. With the Iranian Revolution, it started to 
… it started to affect this area. I mean, it stems from their cooperation 
with Iran and somewhat from their ‘we accept everyone’, ‘we can 
incorporate anyone’ kind of attitude. Yet they couldn’t keep themselves 
away from the state. Their cooperation with intelligence organisations 
there and here, and with other organisations stems from a lack of 
method rather than from pragmatism. I mean there was confusion 
regarding politics, Islam, and the faith (itikat).
Mehmet Kurt – Do you see this as one of the reasons for their shift 
into violence?
Kamuran – Yes. Lack of method in terms of politics itself leads to 
pragmatism. I mean, the immediate benefits and risks of your circum-
stances become significant. The context of the 1990s was somewhat 
related to this. I mean, if you don’t have any substantial projects for the 
future, if you have not devised a method of politics or if unlawfulness 
is your method … Because organised movements at large have this 
issue. When they have that secret dimension to their organisation, 
it allows for misconduct. I mean, the political calculations of those 
on the top may lead to cooperation with some others without the 
knowledge of the base. This may be a state or another organisation.
Mehmet Kurt – In your opinion, what kind of a relationship was 
developed in the 1990s with the state?
Kamuran – My personal opinion is that they thought they could use 
the state. To expand, to get more powerful. And the state tried to use 
them in some way.48
Kamuran’s statements contain important data concerning Hizbullah’s 
eclectic structure. The impression I gained from my observations and 
interviews is that this feature about Hizbullah is evident both in its 
Islamic references and methods. In conjunction with its attitude to 
prioritise action, Hizbullah’s eclectic nature as an organisation and social 
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movement seems inevitable. In parallel with Kamuran’s statements, 
for most Hizbullah members the organisation’s simultaneous use of 
divergent references should be seen as a reflection of its unbiased and 
egalitarian attitude.49 Mehmet Göktaş, the chief editor of the allegedly 
Hizbullah-affiliated newspaper Doğru Haber, confirmed this under-
standing in an interview in the following words:
In no Islamic organisation today, Said-i Nursi and Khomeini are 
simultaneously studied. But Hizbullah does it. They read these and 
also Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna together. One time I was talking 
to a Turkish Islamist. He talked about Sayyid Qutb with hatred. Today 
after Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), after Erbakan Hoca, there is a 
widespread hatred of the AKP. But Hüda-Par does not do that. Even if 
their votes were below what they expected, they are still pleased about 
the AKP’s success.50
Hizbullah is clearly a pragmatic and eclectic organisation. As a result, 
it can make strategically based transformations to achieve its goals and 
mobilise its base to that end. As witnessed following Operation Beykoz, 
the groups within Hizbullah which show resistance to transformation 
eventually leave the organisation, allowing Hizbullah to turn inwards 
and for minimal homogeneities to emerge. What I refer to as minimal 
homogeneity here is Hizbullah’s homogenisation as a result of the disen-
gagement of groups within it or accession of external groups to it and the 
resultant feeling of sameness, which leads to increased action potential. 
Although Hizbullah claims it has always acted in accordance with the 
same set of principles, its constantly changing, eclectic nature is easily 
recognisable from its past.
But what does violence mean to Hizbullah? How and under what 
circumstances is violence justified in its discourse? How did the other 
groups, which came face-to-face with Hizbullah, construct their 
oppositional discourses?
The discourse and justification of violence
In his book Dinin Meşrulaştırma Gücü (The Justificatory Power of 
Religion), Okumuş (2005) talks about the active role religion plays in 
various domains ranging from politics to the justification of social 
injustices. For the study at hand, a process of justification, in the sense 
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that Okumuş argues for, may be said to have preceded Hizbullah violence. 
The category of violence may be investigated within the context of the 
formation of the conflict domain, disengagement and new encounters, 
the construction of a discourse justifying violence and its dissemination, 
intervention by intermediaries to prevent or stop the conflict, and the 
emergence of violence. These steps provide a linear framework not only 
for the sub-concepts that have been revealed in the previous sections 
by means of Grounded Theory analysis but also for the process of the 
emergence of violence. It has become evident from my interviews that 
a discourse of violence preceded violence itself and followed the steps 
delineated above in a linear fashion. 
‘Self-defence’ is the primary element of the justification of violence 
in the discourses of Hizbullah and the groups it came into conflict with. 
The common justification used by those groups involved in violence 
is that they were forced to respond to the violence directed at them in 
order to protect themselves. For example, according to Yusuf, oppression 
by the PKK, the Turkish state, and the Rabıtacıs,51 and particularly the 
Menzil group, underlay the atmosphere of violence in the 1990s. He 
claims that Hizbullah has never changed its ‘style’ and always had tebliğ 
as its main method. For Yusuf, then, jihad ought not be rejected as it can 
be used as a method if deemed necessary.52 Necat Özdemir, the former 
vice chairman of Hüda-Par, also told me that the Cemaat has the right to 
self-defence, although no other reason can justify violence. His justifica-
tion for Hizbullah’s involvement in violent acts in the past was similarly 
the organisation’s self-defensive reflex.53
For Mücahit as well, the Vahdet group’s main purpose in engaging in 
violent clashes with Hizbullah was self-defence.54 According to Hamza 
from the Menzil group, there is no ideological difference between 
Hizbullah and Menzil, both groups view and relate to Iran and the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the same way, and the only difference between 
them is in the methods they use. Hamza claims that Fidan Güngör, the 
leader of Menzil who was kidnapped and murdered, had been against 
the use of violence from the start and the group had resolved, in their 
congress meetings, not to respond to violence in kind. However, upon 
realising that they were faced with total destruction, they had to start 
defending themselves.55
Given that more than a thousand people died in the course of a decade 
when apparently no one ‘made the first attack’ and yet everyone was 
out to ‘defend themselves’, self-defence seems to be only a justificatory 
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argument rather than the actual basis for these groups’ engagement in 
violence.
The second stage in the emergence of violence is the reinforcement 
and dissemination of the discourse justifying violence and increased 
polarisation via spatial segregation. It is clear that the disputing 
groups cooperated or were in dialogue with each other on the basis of 
strategic alliance and therefore their supporter bases had not initially 
been positioned sharply against one another. The discourse justifying 
violent action accelerated the process of segregation between different 
groups and, as a result, individuals who previously had not felt obliged 
to choose between the two groups had to declare their allegiance and 
support for a specific group. This stage corresponds to the actual onset 
of violence. Although there were concurrent attempts at preventing the 
emerging conflict, they fell short of achieving the desired goal because 
of intensifying violence. In their edited book, Deutsch et al. (2006) offer 
comprehensive information with regard to different types of conflict 
and stress that the methods of conflict resolution vary according to 
time and space. In the case of Hizbullah, conflict resolution processes 
take the form of traditional reconciliation that uses religious references. 
According to the interview data concerning processes of reconciliation, 
contrary to their discourse of self-defence, parties involved in a conflict 
are more readily prepared to attack each other. Thus, fights in schools 
and mosques, which quickly became commonplace in the area, turned 
into armed clashes resulting in mortalities, which in turn defeated the 
attempts at reconciliation. 
In the period before the conflict’s escalation into violence, the 
discourse justifying violence had become prevalent and the conflicting 
parties started to brand each other as their enemy. My informant Ahmet’s 
persistent use of the word Hizb56 to refer to Hizbullah exemplifies the 
most benign reflection of the polarisation between groups at the time.57
When we look at the way different groups refer to each other, it becomes 
clear that they do so according to specific ideological references and 
commonly in a fashion that justifies violent action against these groups. 
For example, Hizbullah refers to Menzil as the nifak (mischief-maker) 
group or the münafıks (hypocrites); the Vahdet group as the Rabıtacılar 
(Rabıta supporters) and describes them as Saudi-funded, and America 
and Israel supporters; the PKK as the mürtet organisation, and the state as 
the tağuti regime. Similarly the PKK refers to Hizbullah as Hizbulkontra58 
and describes it as a state-supported paramilitary organisation. The 
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Vahdet and Menzil groups refer to Hizbullah as Hizbuşşeytan,59 meaning 
‘the party of Satan’.
Accusations are not only exchanged between rival or opposition 
groups, they also often address secular lifestyles. In this regard, the 
conversation recounted below between İzzettin and a Hizbullah member 
is illuminating.
I mean, we know about the PKK’s intolerance. I mean, it is not 
difficult to grasp that. They’ve accumulated power; they’ve mobilised 
a struggle that could not be mobilised for a hundred years, or seventy 
or sixty years; and they may wish to make contact with another 
organisation, who they think envies the struggle or has grown on 
account of it, using the discourse of the powerful or, I don’t know, the 
authority. Well, I think that’s not the reason that Hizbullah became 
driven towards violence; they were already inclined to it. Because 
martyrdom, jihad, taking action, replacing them [the PKK], and 
becoming like them all point to the potential of violence. Having the 
intention of using violence is more important than making up the 
excuse for justifying it. You can always come up with excuses. I, for 
instance, believe that Hizbullah or its affiliated-organisations are still 
inclined towards violence. Why? Because the discourse they’ve been 
using features arguments that will justify their course of action if they 
adopt violence in the future. If you’re making such preparations, then 
you inevitably reveal your goal. You don’t necessarily need to declare 
it publicly. Well, I sometimes have conversations with young people. 
On the eve of their [Hizbullah’s] re-emergence, the public didn’t know 
about it. It was in 2003. He said, ‘they’ve established that there are so 
and so many prostitutes in X and so and so many of them are licensed 
and the rest are not’. Actually this was an old story. It’s one of those 
classic urban myths. I said to him, ‘it seems you lot are intending to 
discipline people again’. In order to be able to have that young man 
beat someone up for you, you first need to convince him that there is a 
situation, where beating someone is called for. So there is that too; ‘so, 
be prepared, you might be given a duty in the future’. However, if there 
is prostitution, then that is a problem in the system, in the regime. It is 
not the prostitutes who bring it about. There is a social order, a social 
reality. You are trying to convince someone by your ‘I will sort out this 
issue’ attitude without doing anything about the social reality. I mean, 
these may be remnants of old habits but, I believe, if someone wants to 
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interfere with it … we’re not experiencing that at the moment because 
the government is not creating any opportunity for that … but we may 
experience the same consequences if an organisation that could take 
advantage of it, such as the Ergenekon,60 gains power.61
As evident from the case İzzettin talked about, arguments justifying 
the use of violence must be developed prior to the emergence of violence. 
In that sense, lifestyle-related accusations were – and still are – used in the 
construction of a discourse justifying violence. For example, the hostile 
‘protests’62 by allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated associations and Hüda-Par 
against beauty contests, concerts,63 or conferences on homosexual-
ity indicate that Hizbullah still considers violence as a valid method, 
although it does not use it at the present time.
The text of the written interview conducted with Hizbullah officials 
via the Hüseyni Sevda website offers important information concerning 
such topics as other Islamist groups, the PKK, jihad, and violence.64
Q: Being a Cemaat that takes Islam as its reference point, how do you 
view the issue of ‘violence’?
A: We do not use armed propaganda. We have expressed our opinion 
on the matter on various occasions. To sum it up, we do not conceive 
of using brute force against anyone unless they try to prevent us from 
learning Islam, living according to it, organising people around it, 
and doing tebliğ, or unless someone attacks us posing a threat to our 
existence.
Q: What is your opinion about jihad?
A: The concept of jihad covers a broad range of meanings from 
advising to pursue davet, tebliğ, and benevolence, to refrain from 
evil, to mukatele, or in contemporary terms, armed action. If you 
are referring to mukatele when you say jihad, then we have already 
answered this question in the answer to your previous question. 
…
Q: Could the tensions with the BDP65 lead the Cemaat to engage in 
armed struggle again?
A: Despite the attacks by the PKK and their affiliates against Muslim 
people in the last ten years, we have been patient and we have done 
everything we can so that things do not go back to how they were in 
the 1990s. However, they [the PKK] have been continuing with their 
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attacks and provocations. Our position and patience are contingent 
on whether these attacks continue and, if they do, the form that they 
take. If the attacks become an obstacle for us to live our faith and pass 
it down to the next generations, then we will consider defending our 
cause and our Muslim brothers, and responding to these attacks as an 
Islamic duty and responsibility.
…
Q: Do you think the Cemaat of Hizbullah has had any faults in their 
system of thought or committed any mistakes in their actions?
A: Because Hizbullah adopted its system of thought from the Quran 
and the Sunna, we cannot talk about any mistakes. Our thinking is 
moderate [vasat] and tolerant [mutedil]. Because we take the Quran 
and Sunna as our fundamental sources of reference, we try to design 
ourselves accordingly. In terms of action, we have never knowingly or 
willingly done anything that goes against Islam. So there is nothing 
unislamic about the Cemaat’s plans or the solutions they devised. 
However, there may have been unwanted errors in their application 
by individuals and these constitute exceptional situations.
As seen from the answers give to my questions, Hizbullah does not 
reject violence as a method and agrees that it can be used for defensive 
purposes. However, it is evident that the level of the violence in the 1990s 
went far beyond what could feasibly be justified as self-defence for all the 
actors involved. Hizbullah claims that the organisation did not commit 
any deliberate wrongdoings whereas individuals within Hizbullah may 
have. This understanding appears to be an extension of the common 
practice of attributing wrongdoings to individuals while considering 
good conduct to stem from principles.
It is clear that an accusatory discourse preceded violence itself, 
subsequently leading to increased polarisation, and the atmosphere of 
polarisation and violence, in turn, rendered the potential means for 
conflict resolution ineffective. In addition, the cumulative increase in 
cases of violence was used to justify and fuel further violence.
group belonging, religious ideology, and ethnic 
identity: different forms of identity within hizbullah
The last category that emerged from my interviews is different forms of 
identity within Hizbullah. In the case of Hizbullah members, these forms 
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of identity are discussed around three main themes that are organised 
in layers, each of which features different references, components, and 
types of reasoning The first of these layers is belonging in Hizbullah, 
which substantially defines and affects the other two. The second is 
religion and the construction of religion as a transnational ideological 
form of identity. The third and last layer concerns ethnic identity and its 
justification within an Islamist ideological discourse through religious 
references.
Authority and hegemony: group belonging in Hizbullah
Zygmunt Bauman argues in his book Liquid Modernity that at the core of 
the idea of community lies the belief that everyone is the same and what 
makes allegiance to the community attractive is the feeling of comfort 
that this belief brings (2000, p. 99). Bauman’s argument confirms my 
theory of the emergence of minimal homogeneities by establishing that 
the feeling of comfort in belonging to the community reinforces group 
belonging.
My interviews revealed that for Hizbullah members, belonging in 
Hizbullah constitutes the core of their three-layered form of identity:
It was a privilege to be with them, especially for young people. Because 
they [Hizbullah] spoke to them in the religious sense and they studied 
at a state school. So it is a system that is contrary to the religious 
tradition they know.
…
Their most prominent feature is that they give you a goal. Now, because 
they give you a goal, you directly move toward that goal. For instance, 
this goal is an apparent one. I mean, it doesn’t rely on description, 
idealism, or a philosophical ideology. That’s why it can be developed 
so quickly. So, the goal is ‘we’ll change the system’. A new system. It 
doesn’t matter how it will be done and on what principles this goal 
will be achieved. This is what you learn in lectures in mosques anyway. 
After you learn the Quran, they teach you the life of the Prophet, the 
siyer.66 But alongside that, they instil this thing against the system [in 
you]. It’s not like ‘be against the system’. It’s more like the battle between 
true and false (hak and batıl). Like it is the Habil and Qabil incident:67 
these are the Habil and these are the Qabil. The child can’t help but 
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expect some imagery. ‘So who are the Habil and who are the Qabil?’ So 
they draw the lines very clearly and establish the boundaries.68
According to Sermest, being a Hizbullah member is a symbol of 
privilege, especially among the youth. Hizbullah’s attraction for the 
youth stems both from its conformity to traditional forms of religious-
ness and because being a Hizbullah member provides one with a goal. 
Moreover, being a Hizbullah member gave the individual a feeling of 
confidence and power. For example, Musab and many other informants 
told me that until Operation Beykoz, they thought the Cemaat was 
invincible. Musab thought Hizbullah had won all the ‘battles’ it fought 
against the PKK and other groups.69 Therefore, the feeling of belonging 
in the victorious group strengthened the feelings of confidence and 
power among Hizbullah members. 
In time, these feelings of power and authority originating from feelings 
of group belonging led Hizbullah members to take initiatives to ‘remedy’ 
the ‘social issues’ they encountered. For example, one informant told 
me that they fought another group in the neighbourhood for smoking 
marijuana or thieving and one person from the other group and two from 
theirs were wounded as a result. Because they carried out the operation 
without consent from the Cemaat, they subsequently received a ‘dressing 
down’ and faced serious punitive action. However, they were let off with 
a warning because they all told the truth about the incident during 
interrogation. Another informant reported that a Hizbullah member he 
knew had used violence against a woman, whom he observed ‘to dress 
half naked and often have men in her house’, without the consent of 
the Cemaat, and another informant informed me of a similar incident, 
which resulted in the murder of a woman by a Hizbullah member.
Until Operation Beykoz and Hizbullah’s ensuing break-up, feelings of 
group belonging were very strong. The operations carried out on the 
initiative of Hizbullah members were investigated within its operational 
hierarchy and punitive measures were taken accordingly. In this period, 
feelings of group belonging were furthered strengthened by lectures in 
mosques, establishing ‘alaka’ with potential recruits, carrying out various 
assignments within the Cemaat hierarchy, and by periodic reporting. 
This system, which is based on the close monitoring and control of 
individuals, resembles Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity. Durkheim 
argues that this form of solidarity, which is found predominantly in 
pre-industrial societies, features limited division of labour while such 
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concepts as solidarity, the idea of sameness, and thus a collective identity 
are prevalent. Groups displaying mechanical solidarity emerge on the 
basis of a shared value system and moral code, and thus ‘crimes’ that are 
against group values may be severely punished (Aron, 2006, pp. 296–8). 
In the case of Hizbullah, group belonging resembles the mechanical 
solidarity model of society where there is a strong commitment to shared 
values and principles, and acts of non-conformance are punished. 
The daily life practices analysed in the last section elevate group 
belonging in Hizbullah to a central place in an individual’s life, and all 
actions and understandings that contradict group belonging are pushed 
into a position of secondary importance. In that sense, the following 
extract from an interview with Azad offers important information 
concerning group belonging and the culture of dedication in Hizbullah.
For instance, there was this notion at the time. It was a famous quote 
by Ibn Taymiyyah: ‘What can my enemies do to me? For me, my 
death would be martyrdom (şehadet), my exile migration (hegira), 
and my imprisonment privacy (halvet).’ If you are in this mindset, 
your enemies cannot do anything to you. Even if they kill you, you 
become a martyr in the path of God. And naturally you have no other 
alternative. You always read about the troubles the prophet had to 
endure. You read about people who were tortured by their fathers, 
mothers, paternal uncles, maternal uncles, and other people.70
Sermest also reported that concerning matters of security and confi-
dentiality, frequent reference was made in Hizbullah circles to the secret 
meetings and worship held in Dar al-Arqam during the period of hiding 
in the formative years of Islam. However, he complained about the degree 
of emphasis put on this historical analogy, saying, ‘as if the prophet’s life 
was all about the Dar al-Arqam’.71 Considered in the light of my research 
data, it becomes evident that the issues concerning security and confi-
dentiality, which emerged as sub-themes under the theme of daily life 
practices, reinforce group identity. In fact, feelings of group belonging 
are so strong among Hizbullah members that when the conflict with 
the PKK ended and Hizbullah turned inwards to identify the alleged 
spies, infiltrators, and police informers within it, Azad claims that many 
members voluntarily surrendered to Hizbullah.
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The Cemaat had sent a message to all of its members. The message 
was ‘we have established the spies within us. Either these spies come 
and surrender to us or we will kill them. You have a month. Come and 
surrender. Those who surrender will not be harmed. We will only get 
information from them and then release them.’ Then people said that 
many surrendered within that month and told them [the Cemaat] that 
they had been pressured by the police.72
It is evident that group belonging is achieved via the design and 
close control of Hizbullah members’ daily life routines while Hizbullah 
members are taught the culture of self-sacrifice through examples from 
the early period of Islam. In that sense, ‘paying a price’, serving a prison 
sentence, or ‘becoming a martyr’ become – or rather they are made – 
desirable by Hizbullah members. According to Kamuran, in the first 
years of Hizbullah, serving a prison sentence for the Hizbullah ‘cause’ 
gained one significant kudos in society. However, staying in prison lost 
its status in the years following Operation Beykoz when thousands of 
Hizbullah members were imprisoned.73 Group belonging in Hizbullah 
does not only take place on a voluntary basis and we can talk about strict 
auto-control and self-censorship that stem from control mechanisms 
operating within the group.
Within the context of group belonging and authority in Hizbullah, my 
interviews showed that authority was centred on personal motivation 
until the early 1990s when violence began intensifying; however, 
thereafter feelings of belonging were fostered by security and confiden-
tiality principles.
The period of internal investigations that began in 1996 relied on the 
feeling of power rather than legitimate authority. Operation Beykoz was 
the point where authority collapsed and the sense of group belonging 
started to decay.
Azad – The official understanding of the Cemaat is that Hüseyin 
Velioğlu was killed in an armed clash on 17 January 2000. They did 
not heed to any speculation that was going around. To be honest, this 
information has never been testified.74 If it cannot be testified, then 
you have to consider this information to be true. But there are serious 
questions around the Beykoz Operation.
Mehmet Kurt – What kind of questions?
98 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
Azad – This kind of operation is very rare in Turkish history. I believe 
broadcasting a four-hour armed fight on live television is not very 
common anywhere in the world. I watched the operation at home on 
television from start to end.
Mehmet Kurt – How did you feel? What did you think? They say the 
police didn’t know it [who was in that house] either.
Azad – We didn’t know the operation was against Hüseyin Velioğlu. Yes, 
they say the police didn’t know that either. On the day of the operation, 
we heard they were conducting operations against high-ranking 
officials within the Cemaat. We all rushed back home and sat in front 
of the television. We watched it all and after the operation ended, 
media agencies reported that there was one fatality and two arrests. I 
think it was either on the same day or the next day that we heard that 
the fatality was Hüseyin Velioğlu. I and my supervisor were at home. I 
didn’t know Hüseyin Velioğlu was a member of the Cemaat until that 
time. I asked my supervisor who Hüseyin Velioğlu was and he said, 
‘he is probably one of the commanders of the Cemaat’. He didn’t know 
him either. That’s what I could gather from what he said. I thought, if 
he is a commander within the Cemaat, then he must be a prominent 
one, and there will be a harsh retaliation against the state for that. Of 
course the media kept saying he was the leader of the Cemaat and 
there were all these random people, who were making analyses about 
Hizbullah on television. Some were saying seriously ridiculous things. 
There were people from the intelligence, journalists …
Mehmet Kurt – What were they saying?
Azad – They were discussing especially Hizbullah’s connection with 
the state. They talked a lot about the conflict with the PKK. They were 
particularly bringing up the Gonca Kuriş issue.75 They were talking a 
lot about the assassination of Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Uğur Mumcu. 
They were claiming that radical Islamist organisations carried out 
these assassinations, which, if you ask me, is not the case. They were 
right about Gonca Kuriş. Hizbullah kidnapped and murdered her. 
But Hizbullah certainly has nothing to do with the murders of Ahmet 
Taner Kışlalı, Uğur Mumcu, and Bahriye Üçok.76 These supposed 
Hizbullah experts were claiming that Hizbullah had committed 
those murders and we were just laughing at them. Of course, we 
didn’t imagine then that Hüseyin Velioğlu could be the leader. When 
we woke up, we heard the news. It was confirmed that this Hüseyin 
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Velioğlu person, who was killed, was the leader of Hizbullah. Our 
whole world came crashing down. It was like our blood suddenly froze 
in our veins. We were horrified. I mean, we experienced some serious 
distress at that moment. Because, although we didn’t know him, it 
was a movement founded by him that made it so far … Because to 
us, the Hizbullah movement had become a serious power. They had 
fought the PKK and won. They had fought Menzil and won. They had 
fought Vahdet and won. We thought Hizbullah had become a serious 
authority in the Kurdistan region. They had brought the PKK to its 
knees when the state couldn’t do it. People talked about Hizbullah’s 
significant achievements. The movement that he created, he founded 
… For that reason, it caused us a great shock that lasted two-three 
days. At the time all that our friends talked about was that the Cemaat 
would retaliate very harshly and it would either be against the prime 
minister, or the president, or the commander of the Turkish armed 
forces, or perhaps the head of the intelligence services. There was no 
other match for him. If it will be kısas (retaliation in kind), then this 
is how it has to be. If I’m not wrong they kept Hüseyin Velioğlu’s body 
in forensics for 10–15 days. All of our friends were heading to Batman 
because his body was said to be taken there. They somehow wouldn’t 
release his body and this had caused great fury among the Cemaat. At 
the same time, Cemaat members did not have the potential to carry 
out operations on their own. They would never act on their initiative 
without orders from their superiors.77 So there was no action, only 
waiting. The waiting was the most difficult.78
For Azad and many other Hizbullah members Operation Beykoz was 
a turning point. Although, at first, the operation engendered feelings of 
rage and revenge in them, in time, this gave way to a disintegration of the 
feelings of group belonging for many. On account of their ‘unanswered 
questions’,79 the perception of security and feelings of group belonging 
were seriously weakened or completely disappeared.
The psycho-social consequences of the loss of feelings of belonging 
both on the level of the individual and the group, the forms of disen-
gagement from Hizbullah, and the trauma of disengagement have been 
discussed. To recap briefly, the decay of feelings of group belonging had 
a serious effect on other forms of belonging and, according to Kamuran, 
some ‘became atheists, abandoned their Islamic life, or became [Kurdish] 
nationalists’80 as a result.
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In the next section I will look at religious belonging and its construction 
as an ideological argument.
The ideological construction of Islamism  
and religious belonging in Hizbullah
Thinking revolution (inkılap), thinking in a revolutionary (devrimci) 
way … Actually we all had that feeling, that idea. ‘We will start a 
revolution in Turkey one day.’ ‘We will establish an Islamic republic 
in Turkey.’ Perhaps we didn’t know Turkey very well. Actually if I 
consider my case ... Because there was only one place I knew. It was 
Diyarbakır. It was Bismil. It was Silvan. It was Mardin. It was Nusaybin. 
The surrounding cities and towns …81
Being a group with religion as its main reference point, Hizbullah’s 
religious discourse is closely related to its ideology. The notion of ideology 
has a significant place in Marxist theory, where Marx defined it as ‘the 
system of ideas and designs that prevail in the mind’ of an individual 
or a social group. According to the Marxist philosopher Althusser, 
ideology is ‘a design of the imaginary relationships between individuals 
and their real circumstances’ and ideologies refer to individuals as 
subjects and render them a part of the ideology by addressing the subject 
(Althusser, 2000, pp. 47, 51, 60–71). It is not surprising that Hizbullah’s 
religious discourse displays the properties of an ideological discourse. In 
accordance with the nature of the concept of ideology, Islamism refers to 
the construction of Islam as a political fiction (Aktay, 2014).
Islamism as an ideology emerged as a response to Western colonialism 
in the historical and sociological context of the twentieth century.82 The 
Islamism of Hizbullah, as well as many other predominantly Kurdish 
Islamist groups in Turkey, had its roots in the Turkish-Islamist discourse. 
Hizbullah’s core members were acculturated in the Islamist discourse 
of the National Vision-affiliated parties, the MTTB, or the Raiders. 
Therefore, the Islamist political discourse used by Hizbullah is partially 
‘imported’ from these groups.83 For instance, according to Sinan, ‘due to 
the influence of Turkish Islamism, Hizbullah was significantly alienated 
from the issue of Kurdistan and Kurdish identity’.84
My research data show that the religious discourse used by Hizbullah 
is constructed as an ideological argument within the framework 
delineated above. In that sense, Islamism, which constitutes the second 
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layer of identity within Hizbullah, is a form of belonging that is formed 
out of transnational references. As such, the awareness of various inter-
national issues, which this form of belonging raised among Hizbullah 
members, bears the traces of the Islamist basis of this identity. For 
example, according to Yusuf, Hizbullah’s main focus is Palestine and 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Sinan argues that Hizbullah’s designation of the 
Palestine issue as its primary focus of engagement instead of the geo-
graphically, historically, and culturally more relevant Kurdish issue 
can be viewed as a reflection of ‘Islamism’s alienating effect from one’s 
cultural and historical self ’. The protests and marches organised by 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated organisations seem to confirm the validity 
of Sinan’s argument. For example, while Hizbullah actively criticises the 
anti-democratic developments and acts of violence in countries such as 
Palestine and Egypt, it remains either silent about or displays very little 
reaction to similar events taking place within the context of the Kurdish 
issue. According to Dilgeş, the Hizbullah circles, who gathered in the 
İstasyon Square in Diyarbakır ‘for flimsy reasons’, did nothing when 
‘Kurdish blood was flowing in streams in Roboski, Kobanê, or Sinjar’. 
He further argues that it is reluctance or indifference on the part of 
Hizbullah that led the PKK to believe Hizbullah was no different than 
organisations such as ISIS.85
Hizbullah’s eclectic nature as an organisation becomes evident in 
Yusuf ’s statement in which he identified Said-i Nursi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the Iranian Revolution as the three main reference 
points of Hizbullah.86 Azad talks about the influence of the Iranian 
Revolution on Islamist circles as follows:
To the Islamic world, the Iranian Revolution was like a dead soul being 
resurrected. For instance, it was clear that Islamism was something 
that the Islamic circles had lost after the collapse of the Ottomans. 
Islamism could not even keep the Ottoman Empire up in the last 
years of the empire. The Iranian Islamic Revolution rekindled that fire 
and led to great dynamism in Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, Kurdistan, 
Iraq, Syria, and naturally Iran became the centre of all Islamic circles. 
For Islamic movements, it was impossible to be indifferent to Iran. 
Because a revolution had taken place and it would not be reasonable 
to be indifferent to the revolution.87
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The excitement caused by the Iranian Revolution among Islamist 
groups in the Kurdish region of Turkey is reflected in Dilgeş’s argument 
that Hizbullah’s emergence is a class phenomenon and that it shares a 
common discourse with many Islamist groups in Turkey and around 
the world concerning Zionism, Israel, the USA and imperialism.88 
In terms of its Islamic references, however, the biggest influences on 
Hizbullah were works by the Islamist ideologues of the twentieth 
century. According to Kamuran, Hizbullah was not engaged with the 
intellectual potential of these works, but made reference to them only 
to garner intellectual backing for its own action-oriented approach. In 
fact, he noted that, in addition to theoretical discussions, Hizbullah also 
finds ‘the pursuit of worldly things unnecessary and prioritises receiving 
Allah’s blessing through engaging in cemaat affairs and fulfilling the 
obligation to do tebliğ’.89 A preference for action instead of theoretical 
analysis in performing tebliğ reveals the relationship between religious 
belonging and action in Hizbullah. According to Kamuran, Hizbullah’s 
ideological apparatus takes place on the basis of what he refers to as ‘pro-
vinciality’ (köylülük/gundîtî).
Kamuran – Hüseyin Velioğlu properly reeked of provinciality. He 
didn’t have a system of thought that was systematic in the sense that 
we understand it. There are four or five videos of him. Perhaps you’ve 
had the opportunity to see them. Just look at the kind of person he is. 
It is quite clear.
Mehmet Kurt – How do you define provinciality? For instance what 
does a villager do and what does a city person do?
Kamuran – The villager has absolute opinions. I mean, to him there is 
no consciousness in describing the world. He can only see black and 
white. Therefore the system he can come up with is a homogenising 
system. He doesn’t consider differences; he is strict; he shows no 
tolerance. But on account of his sincerity, he blends compassion and 
honesty, he characterises them.90
Kamuran’s words constitute a reference to the argument that as an 
organisation, Hizbullah is concerned most with action. In that sense, 
Hizbullah’s approach to Islamism also originates from an understanding 
prioritising action. Azad’s previous statement, ‘there was only one place 
I knew’, combined with his dreams of starting an Islamic revolution is 
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evidence of Hizbullah’s alienation from the society from which it had 
emerged. This alienation offered Hizbullah members the hope of a world 
they did not quite know, but found worth fighting for.
In conclusion, religious belonging in Hizbullah is closely related to 
the discourse around group belonging, and the principles of religious 
belonging originate from a transnational Islamist discourse that is to a 
large extent parallel to that of Turkish Islamist circles, from which the 
leading cadre of Hizbullah emerged.
‘Bijî Îslâm! Bimre Koletî!’ 91: ethnic identity and the perception  
of the Kurdish issue in Hizbullah
When I went to Sinan’s well-furnished office for the first time to meet 
him and asked whether he would agree to talk to me about Hizbullah 
for my research, the first question he asked me was whether I would 
use the name Kurdistan in my dissertation or not. According to Sinan, 
being able to use the word Kurdistan in the studies about the Kurds was 
a sign of academic freedom. Although Sinan has never been a Hizbullah 
member, he is confident that he closely knows them and, according to 
him, Hizbullah is a Kurdistanî organisation.92 My informant Mahmut, 
who identifies himself as an Islamist Kurd and, like Sinan, has never 
been a Hizbullah member, says that despite the mistakes it made in the 
past, Hizbullah is still Kurdistanî in nature.93 While Mücahit chose to 
remain in the Vahdet group when they broke off from Hizbullah and he 
subsequently left them due to their Kurdistanî perspective, he did not 
hide his sympathy for the Islamic Party of Kurdistan.94
Many informants talked about being Kurdistanî in the context of 
Hizbullah.95 But what is the exact meaning of being Kurdistanî for my 
informants who are or were Hizbullah members and those who got to 
know Hizbullah closely? My observation is that many Hizbullah members 
were personally engaged in the Kurdish issue: they had opinions about it 
and they were used to discussing it.
According to my Hizbullah member informants, most of whom speak 
fluent Kurdish and some ‘especially prefer speaking Kurdish’, Hizbullah 
has always been a ‘Kurdish and Kurdistan-centred’ organisation. For 
Hizbullah members, the three markers of Kurdishness are speaking 
Kurdish, upholding Kurdish traditions, and the religion of Islam. 
Hizbullah’s albums and recorded music series such as Mizgîn, Şehit, 
Şehitler Kervanı, Hinariya Kur’an, Seyfullah, Mizgîna İslâm, Miskîna 
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Jar, and Katliama Susa demonstrate the prominence of the Kurdish 
language within Hizbullah and offer important insights concerning the 
construction of an ethnic religious discourse within the organisation. 
Kurdish is the primary language used in Hizbullah-affiliated music 
productions as well as in daily life. Kurdish traditions, which Mahmut 
and other informants considered the second element of Kurdishness, 
become meaningful when considered together with the socio-economic 
circumstances of Hizbullah membership. Most of my informants have 
an ‘authentic’ understanding of Kurdishness. This stems from their being 
from the provinces (villages, towns, and small cities), growing up in 
religious families, and, in the case of some, upholding traditional tribal 
understandings and family relations. For example, Mahmut reported 
that ‘people who do not dress according to tradition or religion are 
referred to as Turks in small cities’ and these signs of secular life are used 
synonymously with Turkishness.96 In that sense, the cultural codes that 
are referred to as Kurdish traditions stem largely from an Islamic under-
standing and ethnic differences are established on the basis of religious 
and secular codes.
Considering that the leading cadre of Hizbullah was acculturated 
in the National Vision (Milli Görüş) movement of Islamism and 
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution, 
Hizbullah’s relation to Turkishness constitutes as important subject for 
the informants’ understanding of Kurdishness. For example, Mahmut 
worked actively in a provincial office of the National Salvation Party and 
reported that when he and some others from the party chanted Bijî Îslam! 
Bimre koletî! (Long live Islam! Death to slavery!) and Azadî İslâm’da! 
(Freedom is in Islam!) during a campaign, they were warned by party 
officials not to chant in Kurdish and not to use words like azadî97 because 
‘they are communist jargon’. According to Mahmut, being Muslim and 
being Kurdish are the only two things that are forbidden in Turkey and 
although national parties and groups have Turkish names, they have 
always been Kurdish Islamists.98
The emphasis on Kurdishness in the personal narratives of Hizbullah 
members disappears when it comes to Hizbullah’s organisational 
activities and presence in the public sphere. For example, according 
to Sermest, even the smallest reference to Kurdishness is considered 
nationalist and racist within Hizbullah and thus draws criticism.99 
Azad states that despite the prominence of Ikhwanist Kurdish authors 
in the ideology of Hizbullah, they did not even know that Said 
hizbullah as islamist organisation and social movement . 105
Hawwa was Kurdish.100 In fact, my interviews and observations show 
that Hizbullah has not adopted an ethnic discourse that prioritises 
religion, and Hizbullah members seen to adopt such discourses were 
reprimanded. When I asked Yusuf how he viewed Hizbullah’s use of the 
Kurdish language in music recordings and in daily life, he responded 
that ‘Hizbullah is a Kurdistan-centred cemaat, most of its members are 
Kurdish, and they have no problems with Kurdishness; but they operated 
from a pan-Islamist perspective’ and therefore even published recordings 
of Islamic hymns in the Arabic variety of the Mihelmi minority in the 
Midyat area.101 Furthermore, Yusuf accounted for the presence of only 
a very small number of Turks within the pan-Islamist Hizbullah by ‘the 
feeling of being the “elder brother” and an “only we can lead” attitude 
that Turkish Islamists have had since the time of the Ottoman Empire. 
Moreover, Hizbullah’s origins in Kurdistan render it difficult for Turkish 
Islamists to join Hizbullah because, even among Turkish Islamists, the 
word Kurdish connotes separatism.’102 The chief editor of the allegedly 
Hizbullah-affiliated newspaper Doğru Haber, Mehmet Göktaş, who is 
Turkish, offered the following answer to the same question:
Another point is that when you dig a bit below the surface of even the 
most radical Turkish Islamist, you find Turkish nationalism. I don’t 
mean the Ülkücüle0r103 (Idealists). Islamists are like that. When I speak, 
they say to me ‘perhaps you shouldn’t use the word Kurdistan’. They 
get upset by Kurdish hymns (ilahi) and Kurdish tunes. For instance, 
during the preparations for the Kazlıçeşme rally,104 they controlled all 
the music and removed all but two famous Kurdish hymns. Then one 
of them says, ‘if Mehmet doesn’t make Kurdistan propaganda, then 
no one would’. I believe Turkish Islamists have been greatly affected 
by racism. It is the poison of Kemalism. Also they do not want to be 
led by a Kurd. They belittle them [Kurds]. They’d rather that Kurds be 
occupied with hurafes105 and bidats.106 Turkish leftists feel that way too. 
Turkish Islamists and leftists are conformists and cannot engage with 
the people. They can’t speak to their own bases. But Kurdish Islamists 
succeeded in doing that. Even the PKK succeeded in speaking to the 
people. They managed to communicate with the people. Some Turks 
wish to take advantage of that. I believe Allah has designated the Kurds 
as the flag-bearers of Islam. Attach a Turk to a polygraph and speak 
the words Arabia, Turkistan, Turkmenistan, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan to 
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them. As soon as you say Kurdistan, the machine will show a change. 
Turks are prejudiced in this regard.107
Most of my informants, who were or still are Hizbullah members, stress 
the nationalist component in Turkish Islamism. Most Kurdish Islamist 
groups mentioned in this study broke away from Turkish Islamism in 
the 1980s. Although these groups decided to establish their own organ-
isations because they perceived themselves to be discriminated against 
on the basis of their ethnicity, they have adopted different positions 
vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. Here, we are concerned only with Hizbullah’s 
approach to Kurdish identity and the Kurdish issue. According to my 
research data, while Hizbullah does not give primary importance to 
ethnicity in reference to identity, it is de facto engaged in and connected 
with the Kurdish issue. Nevertheless, on account of Hizbullah’s inter-
pretation of various cultural codes as manifestations of nationalism, its 
relation with ethnicity is fairly measured. Moreover, Hizbullah makes 
extra effort to distance itself from PKK discourses. This attitude is 
underlain by Hizbullah’s wish not to be perceived as a Kürtçü (Kurdist 
or pro-Kurdish) organisation by the Turkish state and to refrain from 
having common ground with an ‘enemy’ organisation, as the following 
extract from the written interview I conducted with Hizbullah officials 
confirms (see Appendix):
Q: What are your views about the Kurdish question?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: Being an organisation with a predominantly Kurdish membership, 
what are your suggestions for the resolution of the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey?
A: (No answer was given)
…
Q: Do you have a programme for the resolution of the Kurdish issue?
A: (No answer was given)
…
Q: What is your opinion of the sivil cumas108?
A: If your question concerns sermons being given in Kurdish, it is 
right. The sermon is part of the Friday prayer. Friday sermons mean 
the weekly gathering of Muslims and their being given in Kurdish is 
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the right way. However, it is clear that people, who have nothing to do 
with the namaz [five-time daily prayer] and do not spend their time 
performing the namaz, are organising them for political ends.
Q: What is your view about mother tongue education?
A: It is one’s natural right to have their education in their mother 
tongue. The state ought to provide people with the opportunity to 
receive their education in their mother tongue. When demanded, 
even small ethnic groups ought to be given the opportunity by the 
state to have their education in their mother tongue.
Q: Although Hizbullah has had a pan-Islamist [ümmetçi] perspective, 
why has it not received the favour of non-Kurdish Muslims?
A: We do not agree with this statement. However, because our starting 
point is Kurdistan, it is natural that there has been more interest in 
this area [the Kurdish region of Turkey] in comparison to other areas. 
Q: What is the percentage of non-Kurdish Muslim participation in 
Hizbullah?
A: Because our understanding is not based on nationalist thinking, 
we have not been concerned about percentages. However, we have 
brothers of all ethnic origins in Turkey.109
As seen from the above, the Hizbullah official responding to my 
questions skipped those about the Kurdish issue as he had done the 
questions concerning Hizbullah’s conflicts with Menzil, Vahdet, and 
the PKK. As required within the social sciences, I had informed 
the informants that they were free to not respond to any question. 
Nevertheless, the reasons behind the silence of the Hizbullah official 
concerning questions about the Kurdish issue must be examined. On 
the one hand, as claimed by Yusuf, Hizbullah finds it futile to rehash 
past conflicts.110 On the other hand, it was evident from Hüda-Par’s party 
programme that despite Hizbullah’s efforts to devise a new discourse, 
it did not deviate much from the BDP-HDP or PKK line of politics 
when it came to making recommendations concerning the Kurdish 
issue. Issues concerning the Kurds, such as mother tongue education, 
the restoration of Kurdish place names, the designation of Kurds and 
Turks as the founding nations of Turkey, investigating the unlawful 
activities of secret organisations such as Ergenekon and JITEM in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey, and so on are either also recommended by 
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the PKK and/or would be agreeable to them. Kamuran states that he 
did not witness any such recommendations being discussed within 
Hizbullah and claims that this attitude may have emerged in the process 
of the establishment of Hüda-Par. According to him, it is the demands 
of the Hizbullah base that determine the party programme and force the 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated organisations into transformation,111 that 
is, in order to meet the expectations of its Kurdish base, Hizbullah had to 
go through change and is now developing new discourses accordingly. I 
agree with Kamuran’s statements, but it is clear that this transformation 
has not yet reached the stage where these demands are being expressed 
with the same force as the Islamist discourse. In that sense, it is important 
to quote Mahmut’s following statement: ‘Islamism was at the centre for 
us, but our Kurdishness was for jokes (şakacıktan).’112 My observations 
at the Hüda-Par rally in Bingöl before the general elections on 27 March 
2014 offer important information in this regard:
Women and men sat separately and most women wore burkas and 
most men had beards. The crowd sang along with the chorus of a song, 
which went serokê me Muhemmed e! 113 (Our leader is Muhammad!) in 
excitement prior to the commencement of the speeches. The chants, 
the tevhid114 and rabia115 hand gestures being done together, the 
enthusiastic participation in the tekbirs,116 and hundreds joining what 
is known as the Hizbullah dance (Hizbullah halayı) can all be seen as a 
product of a social psychology that leads people to demonstrate their 
existence in all its grandeur.
The announcer introduced the speeches in the Kurmanji and 
Zazaki dialects of Kurdish, and Turkish, and the campaign speeches 
started after tilavet117 (Quranic recitation). Only at the beginning of 
the campaign speeches was it stated that Hüda-Par is a follower of the 
Sheikh Said uprising (Şeyh Said kıyamı) and the rest of the speeches 
were based on a religious discourse, where great emphasis was placed 
on the ever on-going battle between true and false (hak and batıl) and 
the Moseses and Pharaohs of this world. Hüda-Par chairman Zekeriya 
Yapıcıoğlu stated in his speech that they established Hüda-Par to 
practise Islam freely in a country where 99 per cent of the population 
is Muslim. He emphasised that they view all humans in a humane 
way and that humans did not originate from apes. Moreover, he 
expressed the party’s stance against racism and gave the example of 
the companion Salman al-Farisi118 to prove his point. It was easily seen 
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from the general tone of the speech that his main reference point in 
his statements was Islam.
As Kamuran also pointed out, the allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated 
Hüda-Par’s interest in the Kurdish issue has resulted from the expectations 
of and demands by their supporter base.119 It would have been incon-
ceivable for a party with a real political agenda not to develop such a 
discourse. Taking into consideration Hüda-Par’s party programme and 
judging from the interviews she conducted with party officials, Elitsoy 
states that Hüda-Par has developed a different discourse than Hizbullah 
and justifies their attitude by saying Hüda-Par will not be able to win the 
confidence of the majority of the Kurds unless they remove the Kurds’ 
doubts about Hizbullah by confronting their past. Furthermore, Elitsoy 
rightly points out that Hüda-Par may even win the favour of some BDP 
voters should they successfully combine the Kurdish ethnic identity and 
an Islamic ideological discourse (Elitsoy, 2013, pp. 105–9). However, I 
believe that despite being featured in their party programme and official 
statements, Hüda-Par is yet to develop an ethnicity-based discourse, 
and this situation stems from the cautious attitude of Hizbullah and 
Hizbullah-affiliated circles not to be viewed as adopting a discourse 
similar to that of the PKK. Considering the prolonged conflict between 
Hizbullah and the PKK, it is clear that these Islamist groups do not hold 
a positive image of the PKK. Thus, the prevalence of Kurdishness as a 
frequent theme in my interviews was counterbalanced by informants’ 
expression of an anti-PKK discourse. As seen from the extract below 
from my interview with Azad, the main component of this discourse is 
the PKK’s perceived attitude towards Islam and Muslims:
The circles that the PKK doesn’t appeal to are often the Islamic ones. 
PKK could never appeal to the circles, which have a religious outlook. 
For instance, Öcalan refers to Sheikh Said as a traitor and a British spy 
in his interview with Yalçın Küçük. He calls Bedüizzaman [meaning 
Said-i Nursi] a traitor; he calls Idris-i Bitlisi120 a sell-out. Now if you 
curse and insult people who are highly esteemed in society, that society 
won’t support you. Because the essence of the society of Kurdistan is 
Islam. It is a society with a 1500-year-long history of Islam. If you 
curse the religious values of that society whenever you get the chance, 
that society won’t support you. The Muslim Kurds who support you 
are those without concern for religion. The individual with religious 
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knowledge in the political or intellectual sense wouldn’t give much 
support to you.
… A Hizbullah member had hit my maternal uncle’s son in the 
head with a machete as he was getting out of school and wounded 
him. He had to have 16 stitches and he also lost a finger. He lives in 
the USA at the moment. I developed rapport with him after I left 
Hizbullah; because we would often discuss the PKK’s mistakes in 
our conversations. He didn’t accept the PKK’s mistakes though. He 
would often defend the PKK’s actions as legitimate; he actually still 
does. And we’d tell him that they were not so. Because if we are talking 
about freedoms, then we also need to defend other people’s freedoms. 
Because freedoms should not only be available to the PKK and PKK 
members. As a Muslim, I don’t see myself as a PKK supporter. I won’t 
be one at any point either. Or what freedoms can a Christian, an 
Assyrian, or a Chaldean have within the PKK? I mean, won’t they have 
any rights if Kurdistan is founded?121
Azad’s statements mirror the opinion of other informants who stress 
their Kurdish identity as individuals from an Islamic point of view while 
voicing their suspicions when the PKK is concerned.
In his interview, Sinan argued that it may not be a coincidence that 
the first PKK member killed by Hizbullah was Mikail Bayro, an Assyrian 
Christian man, suggesting that Hizbullah may have deliberately not 
murdered a Kurd and instead killed an Assyrian man they thought the 
PKK would not stand by. In fact, Sinan claimed that Hizbullah murdered 
around 50 Assyrians all told.122 Taken together with the discourses of 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated organisations that target secular events,123 
it becomes evident that Azad’s anti-PKK arguments are motivated by 
strategic concerns rather than support for minority rights, as he exploits 
the issue of minority rights as a strategic pressure tactic and a counterar-
gument against the PKK.
For Hizbullah, Kurdish ethnic identity is often stressed on the level 
of the individual but is significantly lacking in the discourses of the 
allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated organisations. Although Hüda-Par’s party 
programme is an exception to this, the Kurdish issue’s broad coverage 
in the programme can be easily explained by Hüda-Par’s predominantly 
Kurdish voter base and the fact that the Kurdish issue is an undeniable 
social reality for them. However, the arguments and recommendations 
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in official documents do not feature much in Hüda-Par rallies and press 
statements, which instead focus almost exclusively on Islamic discourse.
To sum up, the forms of identity within Hizbullah, which I conceive 
as a layered structure, consist of three layers with group belonging in 
Hizbullah at the centre. The centre constitutes the densest and most 
powerful layer of this tripartite structure. The construction of Islam as an 
ideological discourse forms the second layer and is mainly determined 
by the religious acculturation and political discourse acquired within the 
first layer. Moreover, this second layer is not a theoretically based form of 
belonging and, instead, prioritises action. Lastly, ethnic identity and the 
understanding of the Kurdish issue comprise a ‘loose’ form of belonging 
that is often emphasised in individual discourses, while missing in those 
of the official institutions. It often takes the form of an ethnic discourse 
with religious references, as seen in its reference to religious historical 
figures such as Sheikh Said.
theoretical abstractions and conclusions
I have used a Grounded Theory-based approach in this study to make 
a detailed analysis of data collected in the field, drawing comparisons 
between different data, and formulating theoretical abstractions.124 The 
main purpose is to establish similarities and differences in the data in the 
form of categories and various concepts as their sub-themes (Lingard et 
al., 2008, pp. 459–60). 
Three main categories emerged: the individual and daily life; minimal 
homogeneities developing in relation to social segregation and violence; 
and feelings of belonging. 
In the first category, I investigated the dynamics of the daily life of 
a Hizbullah member. I established that membership in Hizbullah was 
highest among young, poor, and undereducated Kurdish men. Family 
membership in Hizbullah is possible but much less common than 
individual membership. I did not come across any women who became 
Hizbullah members without men in their family having also joined. In 
the period after 2000 when Hizbullah began operating legally, it was 
possible for women to join the organisation as individuals although 
there were few who did so.
Joining Hizbullah marks the beginning of a new period for members, 
and individuals and families reconstruct their lives around security 
concerns and their social relationships transform. For the individual 
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who reconstruct their life within the limited Islamist and/or Hizbullah 
social sphere, Hizbullah becomes a paradigm that eventually takes 
over life completely. On leaving Hizbullah, after years of living under 
the hegemony of such a paradigm, the individual is driven towards 
the trauma of disengagement. A large number of informants recalled 
experiencing long-term difficulty in establishing and maintaining social 
relationships; having feelings of loneliness, isolation, and without a goal 
or purpose in life; and disregarding many of their responsibilities and 
commitments, and suffering depression.
The daily life of a Hizbullah member is governed by a strict hierarchy, 
fixed routines, and concerns for security and safety. Intra-family 
tensions are commonly observed. Together with the determinative and 
transformative force of group belonging in Hizbullah, daily life practices 
constitute the main determinants of Hizbullah identity. In other words, 
group belonging in Hizbullah is achieved by the control and organisation 
of daily life. The end of group belonging, however, produces traumatic 
results as it marks a change in daily life practices and the disintegra-
tion of feelings of belonging, security, and comfort engendered by such 
practices.
The themes in the second category are ideological separation, 
spatial segregation and fluidity, break-ups as a result of the method-
ological transformation of Hizbullah, the discourse of violence, and 
the means used to justify violence. The second theme that emerged in 
the interviews concerns ideological dissociation and disengagement. 
Hizbullah, like other social movements, is in a continuous process of 
change. Most cases of change stem from disputes and conflicts in the 
process of recruitment and mobilisation as well as from differences 
in methodology. Disagreement and disengagement between groups 
contributed to the increased adoption of a discourse of violence. After 
being legitimised in discourse, violence eventually took the form of 
physical violence and steadily escalated in severity and form. 
Violence is not an unmanageable, unpredictable, and purposeless 
phenomenon in Hizbullah. On the contrary, violence follows systematic 
and strategic lines: it first emerges in the form of a discourse justifying 
violence and, following a period of reconciliatory attempts, turns into 
physical violence. Violence is employed by Hizbullah as a strategic tool, 
and if deemed the most effective means of achieving an end, it could 
start using violence again.
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The fact that Hizbullah does not employ violence at the present time 
is not because of a categorical opposition to violence. When found stra-
tegically feasible, Hizbullah may use violence as an applicable method by 
first constructing a justificatory discourse such as that of self-defence. 
The process of segregation between Hizbullah and other groups follows 
a trajectory that begins with the differentiation of their discourses, moves 
on to the emergence of ideological differences and disagreements, and 
culminates in spatial segregation. Segregation often reinforces feelings 
of group belonging while deepening lines of separation between groups. 
This, in turn, leads to the emergence of minimal homogeneities and the 
belief in the sameness of members of a group. 
In terms of revealing the main social processes in the context of 
Grounded Theory (Schreiber, 2001, pp. 71–2), minimal homogeneities 
facilitate Hizbullah’s decision-making processes in the face of strategic 
transformation. However, minimal homogeneities are affected by the 
outcomes of these transformations themselves, that is, producing new 
areas of disagreement and conflict, and causing disintegration, thus 
leading to the production of more minimal homogeneities.
The themes in the third category focus on identity, the notion of 
belonging in Hizbullah, and the main reference points of these forms 
of belonging. I identified a three-layered perception of identity and the 
relationship between the different forms of belonging.
Self-understanding of Hizbullah members develops around group 
belonging, which constitutes the core layer and the densest form of 
belonging in Hizbullah. The trauma of disengagement affects feelings 
of belonging and the individual’s understanding of themselves as well 
as their daily life practices. Put another way, when daily life practices, 
which reinforce feelings of group belonging among Hizbullah members, 
are abandoned, the individual starts experiencing a feeling of alienation 
and this affects the identity layers in question to various degrees. For 
example, the disengaged member may shift from an Islamist ideology 
to a secular lifestyle or their ethnic identity may take precedence over 
religious identity.
A stable process of division and homogenisation is an indication 
of the strength of the feelings of group belonging. When the process 
develops in accordance with security and confidentiality criteria, group 
belonging retains its strength and transformative potential. Thus, in the 
period following Hizbullah’s move to operate legally, group belonging 
114 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
in Hizbullah seems to have lost its determining power in the life of the 
individual Hizbullah member.
Identity and belonging in Hizbullah manifest as a layered, dynamic, 
and dialectic form. At the core of Hizbullah identity is group identity, 
which both contributes to the formation of the second layer, that is, 
religion as an ideological argument, and transforms the perception 
of ethnic identity through religious discourse, thus rendering it an 
acceptable form of belonging. The power and transformative effect of 
group belonging is closely related to how and to what extent daily life 
practices are organised.
3
The Construction of Social Memory  
in the Stories and Novels of Hizbullah
social memory, history, and discourse
Hizbullah became active in publishing after its move to operate legally 
and its members produced dozens of stories and novels over the years. 
These literary works are examined in this chapter and the social memory 
constructed therein analysed. Most of the Hizbullah stories and novels 
can be considered autobiographical: they constitute a reconstruction of 
actual events from the perspective of Hizbullah and even the names of 
the places and persons involved may be left unchanged. They promote 
a specific representation of the organisation’s enemies and rivals, while 
constructing a new image of Hizbullah for young members by excluding 
certain subjects such as Hizbullah violence from the content. The 
primary goal of the chapter is to analyse the main themes that emerge 
from these stories and novels.
After many years of operating underground, under a strict code of 
secrecy, Hizbullah became visible in the public sphere in the 2000s 
through its affiliate NGOs, the Hüda-Par political party, and the public 
events it began to organise. However, it still avoided discussing the past. 
The opinions expressed by Hüda-Par officials and the statements by 
Hizbullah lawyers are exceptions. In the previous chapters, I discussed 
the difficulties I experienced in making contact with Hizbullah members 
in the field, the reluctance of some to discuss particular subjects, and 
the reasons for their reluctance. Nevertheless, it should be borne in 
mind that Hizbullah has become more active in print and social media, 
the public sphere, and the new discursive space which emerged out of 
Hizbullah’s involvement in these fields calls for analysis.
While remaining reluctant to communicate with social scientists, 
the media, and the public, Hizbullah has become more open. New data 
have been published in Hizbullah’s newspapers, magazines, and other 
publications. The medium of publishing is nevertheless an indirect 
116 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
way by which Hizbullah communicates with the wider world. These 
publications are intended for those inside rather than outside Hizbullah. 
For this reason, the narrative forms used display concerns for ‘privacy’ 
(mahremiyet) and, as such, the medium of publishing constitutes an 
extension of Hizbullah’s former privacy policies. Like any ‘private’ topic 
that is whispered into the ears of those willing to listen, this narrative 
form is also performed around a certain form of discourse. Consequently, 
the form of discourse used constitutes a social language. In Paul Gee’s 
definition, social language refers to the diversity of language forming 
around a social identity and as an extension of it. In that sense, social 
languages emerge as both the totality of the things inherited culturally 
as well as a result of them. Examples are the language of literature, street 
gangs, medicine, law, or sociology (Gee, 2011 p. 156). Hizbullah’s closed 
social identity inevitably requires the construction of an idiosyncratic 
social language.
As in all fields of language and discourse, the phenomenon of social 
language is also contingent on ideology. A text or discourse, by its 
nature, cannot be independent of ideology or, in the positivist sense, 
objective. In that regard, language should be considered a field from 
which ideology and belief emerge, rather than simply an aggregate 
formed out of grammatical formulations (Paltridge, 2006 p. 45). How 
can we analyse the inherently ideological social language that Hizbullah 
has constructed? What kind of texts would offer us the most relevant 
material for this kind of analysis? Using which theoretical or methodo-
logical approach(es) can such data be analysed?
I analyse the texts published by Hizbullah-affiliated individuals and 
organisations within the framework of Grounded Theory, discourse 
analysis, and social memory studies in this chapter. Newspapers, 
magazines, novels, stories, and other published material, as well as texts 
published on websites and social media constitute the main sources 
of data; they can be regarded as the products of Hizbullah’s efforts to 
construct a social memory, to remember and reconstruct the past, and 
consequently establish/reinforce group belonging. 
In recent years, social memory studies have become more popular 
in the social sciences. Social scientists suggest that the phenomenon of 
social memory should be investigated in addition to individual memory, 
which remains within the field of cognitive psychology. Here, I will 
briefly discuss social memory studies and discourse analysis before 
analysing Hizbullah stories and novels.
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Memory itself is what creates social identity and history (Vincent, 
1916, p. 250), and social memory plays a crucial role in a nation and/
or group’s historiography (Möckel-Rieke, 1998, p. 6). The way the past 
is remembered plays a defining role in what is being done in the present 
and what will happen in the future. Although individual memory plays 
an important role in the emergence of social memory, the latter cannot 
be reduced to an aggregate of the individual memories of the members 
of a group. Many other factors, such as religion, class, and family, have 
to be taken into consideration in order to understand social memory 
(Rodriguez and Fortier, 2007, p. 8).
For many years, memory was likened to an archive in which the past 
is preserved. However, current studies show that memory is not just 
an archive and the experience of the past cannot be remembered inde-
pendently of variables pertinent to the present. Memory, which may be 
the only way to talk about experience, is itself largely contingent on how 
the present and the future is envisioned. 
Moreover, remembering is not just a personal activity: it is a result of 
social processes (Rodriguez and Fortier, 2007, p. 8). Recall is not the only 
function memory performs; it plays an important role in other cognitive 
processes such as recognition, verification, establishing relationships, 
forming combinations, and evaluation (Fentress and Wickham, 1992, p. 
26). Therefore, history itself can be defined as the way ostensibly true, 
bygone phenomena are remembered and transferred rather than an 
account of phenomena that objectively occurred (Rodriguez and Fortier, 
2007, p. 11).
As social and political creatures, humans continuously reconstruct 
the past and transfer it into the field of discourse by producing relevant 
narratives under the influence of a particular social language. Social 
language is the language used in a specific social situation, status, and 
context. We all use various social languages depending on the circum-
stances, context, and other factors and shape our daily lives accordingly. 
As a result, a memory becomes part of social memory and acquires a 
place of its own in the social field (Fentress and Wickham, 1992, p. 47). 
Therefore, narratives are a part of sociality, or as Roland Barthes puts it, 
‘there does not exist, and never has existed, a people without narratives’ 
(Barthes, 1981).
In the modern world, the media constitutes both the main means 
by which these narratives emerge and the place where social memory 
narratives are mostly found. Media and publishing can be considered the 
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main carriers and architects of social memory in modern societies. For 
that reason, the phenomena of print/visual media and social memory 
are intertwined with each other and the media embodies the primary 
tool in the construction of social memory (Möckel-Rieke, 1998, p. 8). 
In addition to individual memories, social institutions and phenomena 
also play an important role in the construction of social memory. Social 
memory changes constantly and emerges at the intersection of the past 
and the present by means of social languages. The emergent discourse is 
not absolute and unvarying, and must be investigated in the context in 
which it arose. In this sense, discourse analysis is useful in examining the 
stories and novels written by Hizbullah members.
Textual or discourse analysis contribute a great deal to social studies. 
However, it requires the support of other theoretical and methodologi-
cal tools. As Fairclough states, the textual or discourse analysis method 
should be viewed as a process rather than a self-standing and complete 
analytical framework, and should be substantiated by interdiscipli-
nary debates and theories (2003, p. 16). Therefore, in this study, I use 
the method of textual and discourse analysis in parallel with Grounded 
Theory.
Discourse analysis focuses on language and its relationship with the 
sociality encompassing it. Moreover, discourse analysts also focus on 
the process whereby discourses are constructed. Here, both speech and 
text are considered to be embedded within social and cultural practices. 
The common goal behind discourse analysis is to reveal and analyse the 
semantic world beyond actual words (Paltridge, 2006, pp. 2–19). This 
includes meanings that the narrator leaves unsaid on the assumption 
that the audience will derive the meaning in question from the speech 
or text anyway. Our own texts or discourses occasionally do not reveal 
all the embedded layers of meaning contained in them without in-depth 
analysis (Gee, 2011, pp. 8–13). 
Humans do not use language in the construction of a single 
unchanging identity. Rather, humans employ language in various ways to 
construct alternative identities to help themselves in different contexts. 
Everything can be associated with everything else through various forms 
and language constitutes the most important means for the construction 
and reconstruction of this connection for different purposes. Each word 
used in linguistic performance has a potential meaning (Gee, 2011, pp. 
110–51) and we target our performances to engender one or a few of 
these potential meanings.
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In linguistic performances, one can talk about the existence of 
established meanings and cultural models rather than an absolute 
meaning. Therefore, meaning is not fixed and unvarying but multi-layered 
in its use in different contexts. The emergence of meaning is closely 
related to the identity and social reality of the writer and audience (Gee, 
1999, p. 40). However, social reality does not have absolute authority in 
establishing meaning either. Meaning itself is not universal and is more 
locally constituted (Gee, 1999, p. 61). 
A written text is a continuation of a specific social phenomenon and 
invariably refers to other texts or meanings. The meaning in these texts 
can only be investigated by taking into account the concept of inter-
textuality. From the perspective of intertextuality, a text has a layered 
form comprising an external and an internal layer. In the external layer, 
social practices and institutions are considered the main elements that 
form the text and determine its meaning. Moreover, the relationship 
of the text with other texts and ideologies should be considered. The 
main elements within the text that need to be taken into account in the 
analysis of external textual elements are representations, actions, and 
how identities are constructed (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 26–36). What has 
been excluded from a text is as important for textual analysis as what has 
been included (Fairclough, 2003, p. 61).
Considered within the framework delineated above, a text is a product 
of social relations and phenomena and, when analysing it, it is crucial to 
remember that it has been constructed by means of a social language. 
Moreover, a text should be investigated from the perspective of inter-
textuality and attention should be paid to the elements that have been 
included and excluded from the text. In this way, the text can be analysed 
until it no longer reveals any further meaning and, thus, its hypothetical 
and situational meanings can be revealed.
In this chapter, I will analyse the stories and novels written by 
Hizbullah members from the theoretical perspective delineated above. 
Seen from that perspective, it becomes evident that no text is entirely 
fiction and even the most obviously fantastic texts, to some degree, 
constitute extensions and reflections of social reality.
Most of the texts that Hizbullah categorises as stories and novels are in 
fact reflections of real events. Yusuf insisted that the events described in 
these stories and novels are real events where only the names of people 
and places had been changed.1 Hizbullah has always been interested in 
religious fictional texts. My personal observations were that Hizbullah 
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recruited new members by using religious novels and stories in the 1990s 
when they were quite active and powerful in the İmam Hatip high schools 
in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Hizbullah student members would lend 
religious novels and stories to new students or to those they ‘considered 
worthy of tebliğ’. When the book was returned, Hizbullah student 
members would talk to potential recruits about the story in order to 
establish they had in fact read it. When rapport was established, members 
would begin to meet potential recruits during breaks who would then – 
have to – spend almost all of their time with an older Hizbullah student. 
In that way, the potential recruit would become isolated from their social 
surroundings and be introduced to a new social scene, such as invited 
to picnics, to play football, namaz, and sohbets. During this period, they 
would be given more religious storybooks and novels in order to ensure 
the formation of tefekkür2 in the potential recruit. 
Hizbullah was not involved in publishing activities at the time and 
therefore used any Islamist propaganda text, such as novels, stories, 
collections, and magazines published in Turkey in its recruitment 
efforts. In Hizbullah circles, the novels by Emine Şenlikoğlu, Hekimoğlu 
İsmail, Şule Yüksel Şenler, and Hasan Nail Canat were especially popular. 
Hüseyin, who was active in Hizbullah in the 1990s, told me that the 
potential recruits who had read these books and passed the test would 
then be introduced to other activities and given further readings. He 
stated that these readings and activities were planned according to age 
and level of prior religious knowledge, and included books about the 
lives of the Prophet and the companions (siyer) as well as ‘idea’ books 
by authors such as Ali Shariati, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Maududi, 
and Said-i Nursi. What Hüseyin referred to as ‘idea’ books were often 
reserved for older students. Apparently, there was no order in which 
books were given and in deciding on the book to give a student; the 
level of the student and the availability of the book were the main 
considerations.
As a result, the approved student would develop a kind of rapport with 
these people who looked after him. At that point, he would be offered 
to join Hizbullah and if he accepted the offer, then he would be asked 
to submit a biography. In his biography, he would be expected to give 
in-depth information about his life and his family. As a matter of fact, 
many had been taken to court or put into prison during the Hizbullah 
operations because of these biographies.3
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Both what Hüseyin told me and my own observations demonstrate 
that novels and stories played a key role in Hizbullah’s recruitment 
efforts. Naturally, not everyone who was lent books would eventually 
join Hizbullah. As Hüseyin put it, if the student who was being looked 
after for some time did not meet Hizbullah’s expectations, he would be 
left to his own devices.
I know from personal experience that Hizbullah students would attack 
the friends of potential recruits if they tried to interfere in the recruitment 
process. I personally witnessed people who were not found tebliğ or 
davet-worthy by Hizbullah being attacked simply because they wanted 
to maintain their relationships with friends that Hizbullah considered 
prospective recruits. At the time, violence was not uncommon among 
Hizbullah students who would attack anyone who did not behave as they 
said, who opposed them, or, who, in their words, ‘vagabonded about’.
The violent atmosphere of the 1990s came to an end and Hizbullah 
gradually lost its influence in schools. Meanwhile, its members started 
publishing their own novels and stories, and Hizbullah expanded its 
base in different directions, as demonstrated by members’ novels, stories, 
and ‘idea’ and history books, which were typically published by Dua 
Publishing.
As discussed earlier in this section, social memory plays a key role 
in the construction of history and identity, and the transmission of an 
identity to future generations by means of a social language. Hizbullah 
members’ increased involvement in publishing may be an indication of 
their awareness of the role of such social memory and their intention 
to construct a social memory of their own through publications. In 
this chapter, I reveal the sources that Hizbullah members use in the 
construction of social memory, the themes and events highlighted in this 
process, and identify the common features of the ‘fictional’ characters in 
these books.
uncle bekir, xalet, and others: the culture of 
devotion and the fedais4 of islam
One of the most prominent themes in the stories and novels of Hizbullah 
is that of the character who is uncompromising, faithful, devoted, and 
wishes to become a martyr for their cause. 
Mehmet Baran’s Yaşanmışların Hikâyesi (The Story of the Past, 2007) 
focuses on the life stories of Hizbullah members in Silvan, Diyarbakır 
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through a retelling of significant events between the 1990s and today 
from the perspective of Hizbullah. Although Baran’s book is presented 
as a collection of stories, as obvious from both its title and the real life 
events dealt with in the stories, it is not a work of fiction.
The first significant character in the book is Uncle Bekir (Xalê Bekir). 
In the story entitled Yiğit İhtiyar (‘The Valiant Old Man’), Uncle Bekir 
is described as an old man with beetling brows and wrinkles (Baran, 
2007, p. 72). However, when the narrative moves on to his actions, he 
is likened to the companion Amr bin Al-Jamooh, an old and wealthy 
Medinite, whose family converted to Islam. Al-Jamooh had volunteered 
to fight in the battle of Uhud despite his old age and disability, and lost 
his life in battle.5 
In Baran’s story, Uncle Bekir’s prominence stems from his behaviour. 
Security forces prevented Hizbullah members from visiting the cemetery 
in the village of Susa (Yolaç) during Eid al-Fitr in 1999.6 After three days, 
Uncle Bekir starts walking towards the cemetery in an act of defiance; 
or, as described in the story, ‘Uncle Bekir moved forward, because he 
was a soldier of Islam’ (Baran, 2007, p. 74). The police stop him and ask 
where he is headed. When he explains that he is going to the cemetery, 
the police tell him that it is forbidden and they start arguing. During the 
argument Uncle Bekir snaps at them saying, ‘Are you not Muslim? What 
religion can order you to block a road to a visit during Eid?’ The police 
officer then slaps him in the face and Uncle Bekir returns the slap, upon 
which other police officers attack the old man, and eventually take him 
to the police station. During his interrogation, he gives the police no 
information and even lies about his real name. But, as made clear in the 
book, his obstinacy is futile because the police have his ID card (Baran, 
2007, pp. 75–8). 
Uncle Bekir’s accusatory question, ‘are you not Muslim?’ reveals 
his view of the security forces and stems from the understanding that 
a Muslim would not do such a thing. In this regard, Uncle Bekir acts 
in accordance with Hizbullah’s principles concerning the form and 
performance of faith. 
The second story I investigate is Ve Xalet (‘And Xalet’), which is 
about Uncle Bekir’s ‘old lady’. We find out in this story that when Uncle 
Bekir performs his acts of defiance, his ‘old lady’, Xalet, and children are 
protesting in the field between Silvan and the village of Susa (Yolaç). 
Although the identity of Xalet is not fully disclosed, it may be easily 
surmised from the storyline that she is Uncle Bekir’s wife. She helps an 
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old man lying on the ground by tending to his bleeding nose after a stone 
hits him during the clash with the police. She then asks for help from a 
stone-throwing young woman in a burka, who comes to her assistance 
after flinging stones at the police while chanting tekbirs.7 The young 
woman throwing stones and hitting the police are compared in the story 
to Davut (David) throwing a stone at Calut (Goliath). Meanwhile, Xalet 
asks the young woman to lend her headscarf (hijab) to cover the old 
man’s wound (Baran, 2007, pp. 85–90). 
Then the young woman in burka walked up to the old woman. She 
was still chanting tekbirs.
– Auntie, I have avenged the old man.
She was panting and her eyes glowed in satisfaction. She continued.
– This man started jumping up and down in joy when he threw 
the stone and hit the old man. Then I pledged to spoil his joy. I 
approached him. I threw the stone, and my Lord hit the mark. Having 
accomplished my duty, I have come to you. I had actually heard you 
the first time you shouted to me.
– Well done, my girl. Now you remove your headscarf and let us stop 
the bleeding. You already have your burka on. (Baran, 2007, p. 86)
In the rest of the story, the old woman approaches a group of young 
men and encourages them to throw stones at the police. According to 
the author, while one might think that such incidents only occurred in 
Palestine, this one actually took place in Silvan: ‘But neither was this place 
Palestine, nor were those encountered Jews(!)’ (Baran, 2007, pp. 88–90).
The main themes that emerge from the story are courage and 
risk-taking, and heroisation, that is, the glorification or exaltation 
of a person on account of their behaviour and their reconstruction 
as a model to be followed by others. The representation of women in 
the stories and novels of Hizbullah is contrary to this image. The fact 
that the old woman is addressed as ‘Uncle Bekir’s old lady’ instead of 
by her own name points to the presence of certain patriarchal codes 
in terms of gender and gender equality. Asking the young woman to 
remove her headscarf and saying, ‘you already have your burka on’ is 
intended to show that the obligation of a woman to cover her head in 
the presence of strange men is not being disregarded. The message is 
that a young woman ought to keep her head covered even in a situation 
like this. It is an indication of the extent to which Hizbullah members 
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consider women wearing a headscarf to be an obligation. The case of 
the women depicted in the story resembles Begona Aretxaga’s arguments 
in her book Shattering Silence (1997) regarding political violence and 
gender in Ireland. Aretxaga maintains that regardless of the level of 
nationalist women’s participation in the political struggle in Ireland, 
their actions become invisible and a male-dominant understanding of 
gender prevails. Despite the active participation of women in Hizbullah 
their position is constricted within a discursive field and their actions 
are depicted in a way that conforms with gender stereotypes and based 
on masculine ideals.
The last story I will discuss in this section is entitled Başörtülü Değil 
mi? (‘She Wears a Headscarf, Doesn’t She?’). The protagonist of the story 
is a seven or eight year-old girl who ‘always wears a headscarf ’. It is set 
during the Hizbullah-PKK conflict and begins with the young girl going 
to the shop to buy bread; her father cannot leave the house for fear of 
being murdered by the PKK. In the story, some men deduce from the 
young girl’s headscarf that she is from a Hizbullah-supporting family 
and start following her. First, they verbally abuse her and then one of the 
men pulls out a gun. However, they turn around when they realise they 
are approaching her family house. After arriving home, the young girl 
tells her father of the incident, upon which he starts referring to her as 
‘my little gazi (war veteran)’. The author ends the story: ‘She was now a 
little gazi. A little gazi with a beam on her face’ (Baran, 2007, pp. 58–62).
At the end of the story, the young girl becomes a little gazi and 
receives her share of Hizbullah’s discourse of martyrdom, becoming 
a veteran, and Hegira, by which the story aims to reinforce the young 
generation’s feelings of group belonging. Leaving the house to buy bread, 
that is, legitimately entering the public space as a woman, is justified 
by her father’s inability to do so. This situation confirms my previous 
reference to Aretxega’s argument that women’s visibility in the public or 
political sphere takes place across patriarchal codes, whereby in the case 
of Hizbullah women can enter the public field only ‘for a reason that is 
legitimate from the perspective of religion’.
In addition to the stories examined here, there are many others 
where the main themes constitute the idealisation of the Hizbullahî 
protagonists, their possession of unwavering faith based on the culture 
of devotion, and extraordinary sacrifices for their faith.
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‘şehadet (martyrdom) is a call to the generations,  
to the ages’: the cult of martyrdom in the  
discourse of hizbullah
Another key element within Hizbullah’s oral and written discourse is 
martyrdom (şehadet). While the concept of martyrdom is widespread in 
Islamic terminology, Hizbullah uses the concept in very distinctive ways. 
Its discourse of martyrdom is closer to the understanding of martyrdom 
in the Shia school of Islam rather than in Sunni Islam. In Shia Islam, 
martyrdom is considered to be one of the main principles of faith. 
Likewise, in the Hizbullah stories and novels, martyrdom corresponds 
to a form of honour that one yearns for and that brings the deceased 
high status. Naturally, the concept of martyrdom is not independent 
of the social circumstances and phenomena that I have discussed in 
the previous section: it is a construction with men and masculinity at 
its centre.
The first story is Mehmet Baran’s Şehid Hanımı (‘The Martyr’s Wife’, 
2007). In the story, ‘a baby boy is born’ to a family with five girls. In 
Baran’s words, ‘at a time when Islam was a bed of nails’,8 the father lies on 
this bed and becomes a ‘perfect human’ (kamil insan). It is a time when 
the ‘enemy-of-the-faith and mürtet organisation’ (meaning the PKK) is 
active and one day the father is ‘slain’ on his way to work. Following the 
martyrdom of the father, there is no peace at home. At this point, the story 
starts to focus on one of the young girls who has the idea that ‘martyrs 
can intercede on behalf of close relatives’ and decides to marry ‘one of 
her father’s comrades to become the wife of a martyr’. In so doing, she 
thinks, she can ‘come closer to receiving Allah’s blessing and forgiveness’. 
After she marries such a man, she gives birth to a baby boy. However, for 
fear of ‘her son becoming an orphan’, she starts praying to Allah that her 
husband does not become a ‘martyr’. At the end of the story, she realises 
that the father of her child has been spared, but the idea of becoming 
the wife of a martyr remains her ultimate desire (Baran, 2007, pp. 7–11).
Melek Kardeşim (‘My Angelic Sibling’) is the story of two siblings whose 
father left them and their mother. The story is told from the perspective 
of the girl and, thematically, can be considered as the continuation of 
the previous story. After their father’s departure, the boy becomes the 
head of the household and adopts the ‘cause’. However, after a while, he 
‘becomes the target of those tyrants’, murderers’, and heathens’ bullets 
and becomes a martyr’. Early on in the story, the father and close relatives 
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blame the boy’s death on the girl wearing ‘the burka’ and ‘living in an 
Islamic way’. In an effort to escape the pressure from the family, the girl 
marries one of her brother’s ‘comrades’. Before the first anniversary of 
their marriage, the young girl’s husband is also killed and she is widowed 
when five months pregnant. She prays to Allah to give her a boy and 
resists getting remarried. According to her, ‘although she has not done 
the deeds (amel) that could carry her into heaven, she is still the sister of 
a martyr and the broken family will come together again in the afterlife 
through his intercession’ (Baran, 2007, pp. 12–18).
The story of the same girl continues in another story entitled Musibet 
(‘Calamity’). In it the widowed girl cannot cope with the pressures 
placed on her by her relatives and remarries. However, this time she has 
a peaceful and loving family, and she has two more children in her new 
marriage. The ‘mürtet organisation trouble’ is prevalent in the area. The 
young girl remembers her ‘martyred’ brother’s words, ‘the battle between 
true and false will continue as long as the world exists’. After a while, 
the ‘mürtet organisation trouble’ is over, but this time, ‘the oppression 
of the tağut’ begins, that is, the operations by the Turkish security 
forces. One day, as she is seeing her husband off, she becomes fearful 
and warns her husband to be careful. Her husband, however, chides her 
by saying, ‘do you want me to run away from martyrdom!’. After some 
time, her husband is ‘martyred by the oppressors’ as her brother had 
been. In accounting for the tragic events narrated in the story, the author 
contends that ‘the only fault of those who have been murdered is being 
Muslim’ (Baran, 2007, pp. 19–22).
I have grouped these three stories together because they share some 
common themes. The first is the fact that the honour of martyrdom is 
a status that is almost exclusive to men. This is particularly evident in 
the story The Martyr’s Wife. The girl seems to desire the martyrdom of 
the man she marries rather than her own. In the second story, it is the 
brother who dies. Close relatives, especially the absentee father, blame 
‘the burka’ and ‘Islamic life’ for the boy’s death. 
The repeated themes of ‘men’s martyrdom and women’s pain’ stem 
from the roles attributed to men and women in society. These roles 
are internalised to such a degree that women, who lose their brother, 
husband, or father, feel happy about their death and wait to be reunited 
with them in the afterlife through their intercession. It is as though 
the family, which is broken ‘for the sake of the cause’, will come back 
together as a reward for ‘becoming a martyr’. The meaning men ascribe 
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to martyrdom, however, is exemplified in the story ‘Calamity’, when 
the man scolds his wife by saying, ‘do you want me to run away from 
martyrdom!’. His wife’s concern for his safety and the wellbeing of his 
family constitute ‘running away from martyrdom’ for him. 
Another feature that emerges in the three stories is the use of a discourse 
of victimhood despite the protagonists achieving the martyrdom they 
so desire. This becomes especially evident in such expressions as ‘the 
oppression of the tağut’ and ‘the curse, trouble, and hate of the mürtet 
organisation’. The discourses of the sanctity of martyrdom and of 
oppression and victimisation go hand in hand in the stories.
mürtet, tağut, and the jew: the representation of 
hizbullah’s ‘others’ in stories and novels
Analysing how Hizbullah’s ‘other’ appears in its stories and novels is 
crucial in understanding its view of groups and ideologies.
In the stories and novels, PKK is described as mürtet. In Islamic 
terminology, mürtet refers to a person who used to be Muslim but who 
subsequently apostatised. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 
the punishment for being mürtet is death, albeit the form of death can 
vary. Some Islamic scholars, however, maintain that apostasy is not 
punishable by death (Esposito, 2003, p. 22). According to traditional 
Islamic law, a person who has never been Muslim has certain legal 
rights; unless they fight against Islam, there is no law that orders their 
killing. Nevertheless, in traditional Sharia, being mürtet is punishable by 
death. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that declaring PKK members 
and sympathisers mürtet legitimises acts of violence against them. This 
was Hizbullah’s justification for the hundreds of people they killed in 
the 1990s.
The term mürtet has been used, arguably in a deliberate and 
planned way, in many stories to refer to the PKK. For example, in The 
Story of the Past, Baran frequently refers to the PKK as mürtet: ‘the 
period of the anti-religious mürtet organisation in the area’, ‘when the 
mürtet organisation was terrorising the area’, ‘the cruel war the mürtet 
organisation waged against Muslims’ (Baran, 2007). Likewise in Naşit 
Tutar’s novel, 39. Koğuş (The 39th Ward), imprisoned PKK members are 
referred to as ‘the members of the mürtet organisation’ (Tutar, 2007a, 
pp. 222–42). Bilal Yararlı, however, prefers to use the term marksist 
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(Marxist) to refer to PKK members in his book Takip (The Chase) (2012, 
pp. 15–22).
In Naşit Tutar’s book Hakikat Yolcuları (The Travellers of Truth, 2009), 
the village imam refers to the PKK as ‘a non-Islamic organisation, which 
instils corrupt ideas in people and would do anything to prevent Islamic 
rule’. In the book, the PKK raids villages, kills people, kidnaps girls, takes 
them to the mountains, and forces them to fight alongside men.9 The 
imam tells people that although the PKK may claim to be fighting to 
free their homeland from invaders, they themselves enslave people and 
cause considerable damage to the area. According to him, the only way 
to salvation is in Islam (Tutar, 2009, pp. 43–66).
Similarly, in Mehmet Baran’s story, ‘She Wears a Headscarf, Doesn’t 
She?’, the PKK sympathiser who pursues the young girl in the headscarf 
is described as ‘the arrogant man [who] turned his gun toward the girl 
and, in a bellowing voice, he told her to stop’ (Baran, 2007, p. 61). In 
Baran’s Ahiret Gelini (‘The Bride of the Hereafter’), the PKK members 
have ‘fire … spewing out of the murderers’ eyes. Their faces looked as 
though the Satan has taken them. They looked as if they have just been 
with the Devil’ (Baran, 2007, p. 66). Hizbullah members, however, are 
depicted as poor, long-suffering, and saintly devotees of Islam in the 
context of the war between good and bad, God and Satan, or those on the 
path of Allah (Hizbullah) and those on the path of Satan (Hizbuşşeytan).
In the discourse of Hizbullah, the Turkish Republic is described as a 
tağuti system. In the Islamic literature, tağut is the common name given 
to regimes not governed by Allah’s law. In the Quran, in Surah Az-Zumar, 
verse 17, it states: ‘For those who abstain from worshipping the tağut 
and turn to Allah instead, there is the glad tiding. Give, then, this glad 
tiding to my subjects!’10 In Hizbullah’s discourse, however, the term tağut 
corresponds to the opposite of ‘truth’ and is not used as frequently as the 
term mürtet, reflecting the fact that Hizbullah ‘fought’ against the PKK 
more than the ‘tağuti’ Turkish state. 
The term tağut is used in Mehmet Baran’s ‘The Bride of the Hereafter’: 
‘just when we thought this trouble [the PKK] ended, the tağut’s oppression 
began’ (2007, pp. 20–1). In the story, the ‘tağut’ regime starts kidnapping 
and torturing Hizbullah members, and denies them basic human rights. 
According to the author, the JITEM is behind these kidnappings and they 
torture kidnapped Hizbullah members who refuse to become informers, 
occasionally even killing them (Tutar, İ., 2010). This is described in the 
novel, The 39th Ward:
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This system has had a hostile attitude toward Islam since its estab-
lishment. Did they not hang our scholars, mullahs, and sheikhs? Was 
it not this system, which banned the Quran and turned our mosques 
into army barracks and stables? Was it not this system again, which 
most ruthlessly suppressed the uprising of Sheikh Said and his friends, 
hanged them, and then banned anything related to Islam? (Tutar, 
2007a, pp. 41–60)
There are numerous other examples of the Turkish state represented as 
an enemy and oppressor in Hizbullah stories and novels. 
Hizbullah’s negative view of the Turkish state is supported by historical 
references, such as linking its historical and intellectual genealogy to 
Sheikh Said. Sheikh Said is a Kurdish sheikh who led an uprising against 
the Turkish state in 1925. Although debate is still ongoing as to whether 
the uprising had a religious or ethnic basis, Hizbullah considers the 
uprising to be religiously based and takes the uprising as a role model. 
Sheikh Said has also become a symbol for the PKK with the difference 
being that the PKK views the uprising as ethnically based rather than 
religiously motivated. Although Hizbullah and the PKK may represent 
opposing political realities, they have certain historical events and figures 
in common as their reference points. The conflict between these groups, 
however, has led them to reconstruct historical figures within their own 
ideologies in an anachronistic way.
Examples of an anti-Semitic discourse can also be found in Hizbullah’s 
discourse regarding its ‘others’. For instance, Turan’s novel Müteahhit (The 
Contractor, 2009) tells the story of Hasan who, after being fired from his 
job for participation in the ‘Islamic cause’, becomes rich as a contractor 
in Istanbul and forgets about the ‘cause’. When he justifies his resignation 
from the ‘cause’ to Ahmet, saying it is not the age of cemaat (community) 
anymore and today everyone is out for their personal interest, Ahmet, 
who later on becomes a successful contractor himself, maintains it is 
Jewish people’s doing and that they intend to destroy cultural values. 
Another kind of ‘other’ featured in Hizbullah’s discourse is that of 
the secular type. This type is not necessarily secular in the political 
sense, but includes anyone who pursues a lifestyle described as ladini 
(non-religious). Anyone who does not pursue an Islamic lifestyle and does 
not conform with any of the three types of ‘other’ (the PKK, the Turkish 
state, or the Jewish people) is considered to belong to this category. The 
best example of the secular character is featured in Bilal Yararlı’s novel, 
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Akıbet Cennet mi Cehennem mi? (Is the Fate Heaven or Hell?, 2008). In 
the novel, with the exception of Orhan, a university student described as 
Hizbullahî, and his friend Mehmet, everyone else is judged on account 
of their non-Islamic opinions and lifestyle. The Islamic perspective is so 
narrow that anyone who does not share Hizbullah’s specific viewpoint is 
presented as profane and a deviant in the novel. 
The story is most likely set in Dicle University in Diyarbakır. There 
is evident polarisation among the students and Hizbullah’s perception 
of the different groups of university students is clear from the author’s 
descriptions of the characters. The students first take philosophy and 
then history and debate the source of true knowledge. The author 
employs Orhan’s arguments to counter those of other students. While 
on an archaeological day trip for the history class all the students die 
in a car crash. Anyone who did not share Orhan’s opinions fails the 
kabir azabı11 (punishment of the grave) and as-Sirat (the bridge between 
heaven and hell), and is sent to hell. A large part of the book is dedicated 
to descriptions of the kind of torment each individual suffers, the reason 
for the kind of torment deemed appropriate for them, and the secular 
person’s regret at holding secular opinions (Yararlı, 2008).
The political orientation of Yararlı, the author, is obvious from his 
choice of character names. For example, the character named Ruşen 
is depicted, by implication, as a materialist and a PKK supporter, who 
suffers the greatest torment. Another character, who is a ‘pretend 
intellectual and holds opinions informed by Western philosophy’, is 
named Tarık. The name of the ‘nationalist Turkish’ character is Atilla, 
whose ignorance the author emphasises at every instance. 
In Tutar’s The Travellers of Truth, the Yusuf character expresses his 
disgust at the ‘half naked ladies’ he sees on campus. Yusuf is moved, 
however, by a girl who is not allowed in class with her headscarf on and, 
refusing to take it off, cannot take her exam. He is particularly offended 
by ‘ladies’ who ‘snuggled up’ with men during registration and pretended 
that it was normal. Moreover, from his first day in halls, Yusuf develops 
an aversion to the non-religious men he sees around him because they 
wear shorts and ‘speak in vulgar manner with each other’. In these 
situations, Yusuf finds refuge in the university’s mescit (prayer room) and 
his mentor is the imam from his village (Tutar, 2009).
Hizbullah’s discourse of its ‘others’ is especially evident in Bilal Yararlı 
and Naşit Tutar’s novels. In these novels, these ‘others’ are depicted as 
degenerate, morally weak, deserving of the greatest of torments due to 
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their non-Islamic lifestyle, and enslaved by their small ‘worldly’ interests. 
In contrast, a Hizbullah member is long-suffering and dedicated to the 
‘cause’, and depicted almost as a mixture of human and angel. 
In the next section I will look at the representation of Hizbullah itself 
in stories and novels.
hizbullah self-perception and  
self-representation in stories and novels
An important component of Hizbullah’s perception of its ‘others’ is its 
self-perception and self-representation in stories and novels. It is clear that 
Hizbullah uses a positive discourse in relation to itself and an analysis of 
the representation of Hizbullah in this discourse should allow us to reach 
a more detailed understanding of Hizbullah’s patterns of thinking. Here, 
I will look not only at Hizbullah’s perception of its members but also the 
characteristics of the ideal model of society according to Hizbullah. 
The first novel is İskender Tutar’s Cemal’im (My Cemal, 2010), which 
recounts the life of a Hizbullah member by the name Cemal Uçar. 
According to my informant Hüseyin, Cemal Uçar is from the town of 
Nusaybin, Mardin, and was one of the three or four people who were 
close to Hüseyin Velioğlu for many years.12 He studied mathematics at 
Dicle University, but dropped out in his third year.13 
The protagonist of the novel, Cemal, is kidnapped by alleged JITEM 
members after talking about the Turkish state’s threats, raids, and 
operations in a house where he is a guest, and kept hostage by them 
for a long time. He is invited to become an informer, but refuses and is 
tortured as a result. In the end, he is put into prison and some Hizbullah 
informers kill him during a brawl in the prison warden’s office. His body 
is taken to his cell afterwards and his murder is covered up as a suicide 
(Tutar, İ., 2010).
A prominent narrative element in the novel is exemplified by Cemal’s 
response to his father, after he tells Cemal that he will perish on this path: 
‘Father, Allah gave you wealth and children. Just try to consider me the 
zekat14 of your other children’ (Tutar, İ, 2010, pp. 59–64). The Cemal 
character is patient, resilient, and prudent, he does not compromise his 
Islamic lifestyle and principles, and he refuses to become an informer. In 
contrast to Cemal, the two Hizbullah informers are depicted as weak in 
character, morally corrupt, and treacherous (Tutar, İ., 2010).
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The Yusuf character in Naşit Tutar’s The Travellers of Truth also 
constitutes a depiction of the ideal Hizbullah member: he has devoted 
himself to Islam; he believes religion cannot be experienced on one’s own 
and thus intends to show other people the right path with the help of 
his Muslim brothers; he worked very hard to study medicine in order to 
help others; he has chosen the village imam as his mentor; and he finds 
refuge in the university’s prayer room when he sees people ‘half-naked 
and snuggled up’ on campus (Tutar, N., 2009).
The same traits are found in the character of a man who writes letters 
to his son from prison in order to show him the right path in Mehmet 
Ali Gönül’s novel, Umuda Cemre Düştü (The Blossom of Hope, 2007). 
In the beginning, the man tells his son the story of his imprisonment 
and Islamic understandings of struggle in a letter. Then he gives his son 
advice on many subjects such as neighbourhood and righteousness. The 
boy, who can only communicate with his father through letters, tries to 
observe the reflections of his father’s advice in daily life throughout the 
book and become a worthy son by following his advice (Gönül, 2007). 
Similar traits can be found in the Orhan character in Yararlı’s Is the Fate 
Heaven or Hell? (2008). The Ziya character in Mehmet Ali Gönül’s novel 
Derviş (The Dervish, 2010), however, is involved in ‘immoral’ behaviour 
until he starts participating in Hizbullah activities in mosques, where 
he finds the true path (hidayete ermek) and thus becomes an exemplary 
person. Although the police detain and interrogate him a few times 
because of his involvement in Hizbullah, he reveals nothing. Ziya tries to 
remove the television, which he believes is a source of evil, from his family 
house despite his parents’ protests. At the end of the novel Ziya is killed 
in a clash with PKK members. A PKK member is also killed. As Ziya is 
dying, he chants tekbirs and thinks about his friend Süleyman, who is 
with him at the time. In contrast, the ‘bushy-moustached commander of 
the [PKK] militia’ orders the wounded ‘PKK militant’s’ death so he does 
not slow them down (Gönül, 2010). Gönül represents Hizbullah and the 
others using two characters, one who is concerned about his friend even 
when he is about to die and another who would order the killing of his 
own friend as it benefits him.
In a similar vein to Ziya’s story, in Hazan Sabaz’s novel, Can Laleler 
Solmasın (May the Young Tulips Not Wither, 2009), the protagonist, Salih, 
is a thief and drug user before becoming involved in Hizbullah. He finds 
the true path by participating in Hizbullah’s activities in mosques and, 
in time, becomes an exemplary person. Although Salih’s family is at first 
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pleased with his transformation, after some time they start criticising 
him for some of his practices, which may at times contradict traditional 
Islamic understandings. In time, Salih gets involved in certain incidents, 
is detained, and witnesses the murder of another Hizbullah member. As 
in most Hizbullah stories, his family make great efforts to prevent their 
son from being subjected to violence by the Turkish state and become 
more religious themselves in the process (Sabaz, 2009).
As Fairclough suggests, it is important to investigate what is missing 
from these texts (2003, p. 61). What has been left unsaid in these stories 
and novels? Why are these characters depicted as superhuman, being 
fearless and having no familial or social concerns whatsoever? Why 
are the reasons for the conflicts between Hizbullah and other groups 
left unelaborated? Why is there no mention of the violence in which 
Hizbullah has been involved? Were those people really imprisoned 
‘only for being Muslim’; or were they imprisoned for involvement in a 
murder, kidnapping, or interrogation by torture; or was it just fate or 
pure coincidence? Is it because the answers would have to contradict the 
positive image of the protagonists intended for the readers? Although 
Hizbullah claims responsibility for its operations, it deliberately avoids 
discussing these issues in the stories, novels, and other historiographical 
texts which play an important role in the construction of social memory.
Male and female characters are endowed with different characteris-
tics in these Hizbullah stories and novels. For instance, most women 
in Mehmet Baran’s The Story of the Past are young women, small girls, 
wives, and mothers whose brother, father, husband, or son has been 
‘martyred’. Although these female characters also make sacrifices, their 
sacrifices differ from those made by men. For instance, women do not 
fight like men, are not subjected to interrogation or assassination, and do 
not leave the house unless they absolutely have to. The two exceptions 
to this generalisation are the young woman in the story And Xalet, who 
throws stones at the police, and the character of Ayşe in the story entitled 
Küflü Çay (‘Mouldy Tea’), who does not allow the Hizbullah members, 
who are in hiding in the house, to keep watch at night and instead keeps 
watch alongside her husband (Baran, 2007).
In May the Young Tulips Not Wither, following her husband’s 
imprisonment, the wife raises her children ‘in accordance with the 
cause’, attends religious lectures with women in the neighbourhood 
and continues her tebliğ activities (Sabaz, 2009). The same applies to 
Saliha, whose husband becomes rich through his contracting business 
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and ‘becomes morally corrupted’ as a result. Saliha is not discouraged 
by her husband’s moral corruption and continues participating in the 
lecture circle15 (ders halkası) in her neighbourhood with other women. 
She is briefly detained by the police at one point. After becoming rich, 
Saliha’s husband wants to move into a villa, but Saliha rejects the idea 
on the grounds that it would disrupt her participation in the neighbour-
hood lecture circle (Turan, 2009). In Muhammed Müfit Yaray’s novel 
Amine Sensin (You are Amine, 2011), the protagonist Amine, who is a 
successful primary school student in İzmir, is touched by the life stories 
of the Prophet and the companions, which she hears in a sohbet,16 and 
decides to start wearing the headscarf. In fact, the novel is based on 
Amine’s struggle to wear the headscarf. Again in Ömer Saruhan’s novel, 
Yeter ki Kur’an Susmasın (As Long As the Quran Does Not Go Silent, 
2007), Hizbullah’s organisation in the 1990s is described in great detail 
through women’s activities.
In comparison with male characters in Hizbullah novels and stories, 
female characters participate in the public sphere to a lesser degree and 
are more active in religious lessons taught at home, tebliğ activities, and 
child-rearing. Despite their active participation, women’s activities in 
Hizbullah are circumscribed in narratives. In contrast, male characters 
are charged with the responsibility of ‘jihad’ and they are imprisoned, 
subjected to torture, and even die for their ‘cause’.
In a similar vein, Naşit Tutar, in his novel İmana Susayan Gönüller 
(Souls Thirsty for Faith, 2007), depicts a Hizbullahî village where there 
are no blood feuds or elopements and people live in equality and peace, 
thus presenting the Hizbullahî village like living in a golden age. That the 
ideal society in the novel is a village society, instead of an urban society, 
reflects the socio-economic circumstances and class position of most 
Hizbullah members who are predominantly from rural backgrounds.
medrese-i yusufiye: the representation  
of prison and prison identity
From the early 1990s onwards, Hizbullah members were imprisoned for 
Hizbullah-related crimes. Tens of thousands of Hizbullah members were 
detained by the police between the mid 1990s and mid 2000s; 300 were 
given life sentences and around 10,000 were sentenced to four to ten 
years for involvement in Hizbullah’s mosque activities.17 But what does 
prison mean to an organisation when tens of thousands of its members 
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have been imprisoned? How is life organised and how is Hizbullah 
ideology experienced in prison? My informant Kamuran, a former 
Hizbullah member, was imprisoned for several years for his participa-
tion in mosque activities. During his sentence, he stayed in Hizbullah 
members’ wards in various prisons. According to him, there is a serious 
lack of morale, severe depression and despair among Hizbullah inmates, 
especially those who received long prison sentences and with little hope 
or expectations for the future.18
Contrary to Kamuran’s statements, in Hizbullah’s novels, prison is 
described as Medrese-i Yusufiye,19 where Hizbullah members have created 
model wards and set an example to other inmates by their behaviour. 
Considering that tens of thousands of Hizbullah members who have 
been imprisoned, some serving life sentences, it is not surprising that 
novels and stories are used to boost morale and offer hope to imprisoned 
Hizbullah members. Naşit Tutar, who is an iconic novelist in Hizbullah 
circles, writes his novels in prison.
In this section, I will focus on the representation of prison in 
Hizbullah stories and novels, and the place of prison in the construction 
of Hizbullah identity. First, I look at Naşit Tutar’s novel 39. Koğuş (The 
39th Ward, 2007a). The name of the book comes from the ward that was 
reserved exclusively for Hizbullah members in the Diyarbakır D-type 
prison. The book begins with the events leading to the imprisonment 
of Selahattin Ürük, one of the leading members of Hizbullah, and four 
other Hizbullah members. According to the author, the police captain 
of the prison is impressed by Selahattin Ürük and realises that he is 
not an ordinary inmate. According to Selahattin, ‘there is a reason for 
everything’ and therefore their imprisonment cannot be in vain. These 
Hizbullah members act in unity from the first day and their behaviour 
sets them apart. One of the characters in the novel, Fuat, for instance, 
called for prayer (ezan okumak) for the first time in ten years. Following 
the Hadith, ‘cleanliness is half the faith’, the Hizbullah members clean 
up their ward and make it ready for worship. By the fourth chapter of 
the novel, they have adapted to daily life in prison. Although this ‘small 
community of believers’ is depicted in an ideal way, the families of 
some do not visit because, as exemplified in the character Hasan, they 
do not find ‘his cause righteous’. In the fifth chapter, the Hizbullah 
members decide to keep watch at night for security reasons, reinforcing 
group belonging and identity. Keeping watch for security reasons was 
a common practice for these people before they went to prison. They 
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adopt the same practice in prison despite there being no real, that is, 
security-related, reason to do so. They believe that adopting the practice 
will reinforce feelings of group belonging. 
In the seventh chapter, Hasan is released. Because he is the first 
Hizbullah member to be released, Selahattin tells him, ‘you are our 
reflection outside prison. Therefore you need to mind your behaviour’, 
thus taking a step in building the image of prison among Hizbullah 
members outside prison. In the later chapters of the novel, many other 
Hizbullah members are imprisoned and, in parallel, the prison admin-
istration is forced to accept the authority of Hizbullah inmates. In the 
ninth chapter, the author talks about the reputation of the 39th Ward 
and how people had joined Hizbullah and committed crimes so that 
they would be put into prison and meet the Hizbullah inmates in person! 
Such exaggerated glorification of the 39th Ward is clearly intended to 
maintain high morale among imprisoned Hizbullah members and can 
be construed as an important stage in the construction of Hizbullah’s 
prison identity.
In the tenth chapter, Selahattin and his friends decide to hold a 
Hizbullah wedding (Hizbullah düğünü) every Monday and Thursday, 
when new inmates arrive. Hizbullah weddings were organised from 
Hizbullah’s establishment until the mid 1990s and feature round dances 
(halay) performed, at times, by thousands of bearded men. They are a 
show of force by Hizbullah members and serve recruitment-related 
functions. Holding Hizbullah weddings in prison, when there is in fact 
no wedding to be celebrated, may seem absurd at first sight. However, 
their morale-boosting potential rendered them an effective strategy. At 
this point in the story, Hizbullah has created its own living spaces within 
the prison by hanging posters with Quranic verses and Islamic Hadith 
on the walls in its ward.
In the ensuing chapters, Selahattin is released from prison while 
other Hizbullah members are being imprisoned as a result of the organ-
isation’s operations. The author’s focus on six Hizbullah members who 
are university students (four students doing courses at the faculty of 
education and two studying medicine) is a counterweight to the generally 
understood class composition of Hizbullah membership, suggesting that 
educated people do join Hizbullah as well as those that are less educated. 
In the twelfth chapter, the Hizbullah inmates carry out a protest in 
prison for the first time by refusing to answer roll call. Furthermore, 
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they appoint Hizbullah members to do tebliğ, albeit unsuccessfully, in 
other wards.
As the number of imprisoned Hizbullah members increases, different 
strata start forming and separate lecture groups are established for 
provincial, educated, newly imprisoned, and long-term inmates. As 
the number of Hizbullah members in prison reaches 60, the Hizbullah 
inmates start considering the idea of holding communal Friday prayers. 
According to the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam, a minimum of 40 people is 
required for communal Friday prayers; the number 60 may be evidence 
of Hizbullah’s adoption of the Sunni-Shafi’i school of thought in its 
religious practices. Tutar states in the book that after the introduction 
of communal Friday prayers, the prison turned into a place of education 
and almost became like ‘heaven with open doors’ (Tutar, 2007a). Such 
depiction of the prison is intended to motivate Hizbullah members in 
prison and offer them hope.
Naşit Tutar’s novel Yusufî Direniş (The Yusufî Resistance, 2013) 
constitutes the historical continuation of The 39th Ward. The book 
focuses on the memories of Hizbullah members who served a prison 
sentence in Bingöl Prison, telling the stories of their ‘yusufî’ resistance 
against the prison warden’s intimidatory policies. Tutar’s description of 
Bingöl Prison resembles the 39th Ward: ‘everyone knows that prison has 
become medrese-i yusufiye. Therefore, those who are released feel sorry, 
while those put into prison are happy as they know it is like going to a 
madrasa or university.’ However, for those Hizbullah members who were 
in the Bingöl Prison, it is not a place to remember with fondness. In fact, 
the warden of Bingöl Prison is reputed to have been tasked specifically to 
destroy the morale and motivation of the Hizbullah members in prison, 
revealed both in my interviews and the novel. In the book, the author 
refers to the prison cells and wards as ‘madrasas’. To sum up, the book 
tells the story of the prison warden’s oppressive policies and the resulting 
protests of imprisoned Hizbullah members, which begin as passive 
resistance, such as refusing to answer roll call, and evolving into more 
active forms of resistance, such as blocking the entrance to the wards. 
In the book, these protests are known about outside the prison and the 
relatives of imprisoned Hizbullah members discuss the issue with the 
Bingöl city governor. In the end, however, the prison personnel carry 
out an operation to end a 15-day protest and resistance by Hizbullah 
members and, afterwards, the prisoners are transferred to different 
prisons (Tutar, 2013).
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In İskender Tutar’s novel My Cemal, prison is likened to Nimrod’s fire, 
which cannot burn İbrahim (Abraham): ‘Muslims’ cannot be affected by 
prison conditions (Tutar, İ., 2010, pp. 126–44).
The following conclusions may be made with regard to Hizbullah’s 
understanding of prison. First of all, in Hizbullah’s discourse, prison is 
likened to a madrasa. Kamuran’s statements are contrary to the prison 
conditions described in the novels. I do not know whether Kamuran 
was ever sent to the 39th Ward or Bingöl Prison and so cannot confirm 
whether his experiences in prison match those described in the novels. 
However, it is clear that Hizbullah intends to create an ideal type 
concerning prison and a prisoner identity. In its ideal type, prison 
constitutes a place of education for which those outside the prison yearn, 
and imprisonment does not affect Hizbullah members’ ‘pursuit of the 
cause’ but only results in a change in their field of action. As Ruşen 
Çakır argues, such depictions of prison are not surprising considering 
that after the 2000s, so many members were imprisoned that Hizbullah 
was faced with the prospect of becoming a prison-based organisation 
(Çakır, 2011). 
Prison became a key component of the process of Hizbullah’s trans-
formation from an underground organisation to a legitimate social 
movement as tens of thousands of people were imprisoned for partici-
pating in Hizbullah activities. Hizbullah preserved and reconstructed its 
identity in the prison context by such activities as keeping watch at night 
and holding wedding celebrations without a groom or bride.
In this chapter I have carried out a discourse analysis of Hizbullah 
stories and novels in the context of the construction of social memory. 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the analysis:
1. The narratives in Hizbullah stories and novels serve to reconstruct 
the past and the transmission of social memory to new generations.
2. The characters presented in the stories and novels constitute ideal 
types and abstractions. The villains are depicted as wild, remorseless, 
and immoral people while the heroes are depicted as extraordinary 
people who are almost a mixture of human and angel. The rep-
resentation of one’s ‘others’ as a symbol of evil and brutality is not 
unique to Hizbullah. 
3. Although violence constitutes a major component of the public 
reputation of Hizbullah, this issue is hardly ever discussed in the 
stories and novels. The phenomenon of violence has been left out of 
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stories and novels arguably to facilitate the presentation of a positive 
image of Hizbullah. 
4. Prison is likened to a madrasa in Hizbullah’s representation of prison 
and the ideal society, which Hizbullah could not attain outside 
prison but claims is realised in prison. Hizbullah’s adoption of such 
a discourse is understandable considering the psycho-social state of 
the Hizbullah members who remain in prison.
Conclusion
Turkey being a country of partial confrontations, I believe the public and 
academia have not yet fully faced up to the reality of Hizbullah. The almost 
exclusive emphasis on Hizbullah violence in public opinion, whereby 
not even the motivations behind the production of such violence has 
been a subject of speculation, and the fact that the handful of academic 
studies have all been carried out in police academies and written from 
an exclusively security-oriented perspective, are examples of such partial 
confrontations in the context of Hizbullah. The few remaining studies, 
valuable though they may be, are not sufficient on their own to lead 
to a full confrontation. Moreover, these studies all suffer from a lack 
of primary data, which, given the nature of researching Hizbullah, is a 
natural consequence of the subject of inquiry. In that regard, the present 
study may help fill the lacuna in research on Hizbullah.
The reader may think that the voices of some people are missing from 
this book. This, however, stems from the nature of scientific work. For 
instance, a study that focused on the general population’s perception 
of Hizbullah in the Kurdish region of Turkey would have brought to 
light other aspects of the subject. In this study, I chose to focus on the 
narratives of Hizbullah members and that necessarily required the voices 
of a certain group of people to be heard louder than others.
Every sociological phenomenon takes place in a time and space, and 
thus calls for a historical framework for its analysis. The first chapter 
is an attempt at understanding the history of Hizbullah via personal 
testimonies, written sources, and a sociological analysis of the time 
period and the society in which Hizbullah emerged. However, the 
chapter constitutes an investigation of the social history pertaining to 
Hizbullah, rather than a chronological record of events.
In terms of its historical and ideological sources, Hizbullah can be 
defined as an eclectic organisation. The Egyptian Ikhwan (Muslim 
Brotherhood) movement and Ikhwan-related authors such as Hassan 
al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb within the movement are the primary 
influences on Hizbullah. Said Hawwa from the Syrian branch of the 
Ikhwan movement was another significant influence. The other major 
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influence on Hizbullah was the Iranian Revolution. Personalities such 
as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati played a significant role in its 
ideological development. The influence of the Iranian Revolution on 
Hizbullah was not limited to ideology but extended into military and 
ideological training through the connections established with Iran in the 
early 1980s.
The influence of Ikhwanist intellectuals on Islamist groups in Turkey 
dates back to the late 1960s, but became more widespread during the 
1970s. In the polarised political atmosphere of the 1970s, a remarkable 
number of Islamist groups were active in the Kurdish region of Turkey. 
These groups were mostly influenced by the Ikhwan movement and had 
their roots in the National Vision movement and its affiliated political 
parties. The leading cadre of Hizbullah had similarly been acculturated 
in the National Vision movement and maintained organic ties with the 
movement until the end of the 1970s.
The political dynamism generated by the Iranian Revolution 
influenced, among other Islamist organisations, Hizbullah which was 
founded in the same year as the revolution. Hizbullah received organ-
isational, ideological, and military training and support from Iran 
throughout the 1980s. In this period, many Islamist groups moved 
closer to each other and began forming strategic alliances. Hizbullah 
cooperated with the Menzil group and this cooperation lasted until 
Hizbullah broke its alliance due to inter-group rivalry and Hizbullah’s 
pragmatic approach to the expansion of its base. It must be borne in 
mind, however, that another reason for the separation of the two groups 
was Iran’s engagement with these groups on a one-to-one basis. Moreover, 
Iran demanded that the groups it supported convert to Shia Islam. It is 
known that Hizbullah showed little interest in the idea and preserved 
its Sunni and largely Shafi’i orientation, leading Iran to end its relations 
with Hizbullah and provide more support instead for the Menzil group.
Iran’s support for the Hafez al-Assad-led Baath regime in Syria during 
the Syrian military offensive against the Syrian branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1982 stirred up much debate among Islamist groups in 
the Kurdish region of Turkey. Hizbullah, however, continued its relations 
with Iran even after the Hama massacre. It is not known exactly when 
the Hizbullah–Iran relations came to an end. Given that mediators 
approached Iran asking them to intervene in the Hizbullah-PKK conflict, 
the relations between Hizbullah and Iran may have continued until the 
early 1990s.
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An important part of the discourse of Hizbullah concerns the Turkish 
state’s ‘anti-religious’ practices. The Turkish state’s secularist policies, 
which were formulated in the early years of the republic, constitute the 
main source of the anti-state discourses that many Islamist groups in 
Turkey have adopted over the years. The understanding that regimes 
which are not based on the law of Allah are not legitimate had been 
popularised in Islamist circles around the world by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Hizbullah supported this view and, therefore, the reaction 
within certain sections of the society to the Turkish state’s strict secularist 
policies and practices worked to Hizbullah’s advantage. In that sense, it 
may be claimed that Hizbullah emerged as an answer to the society’s 
religiously motivated reactions to the Turkish state. However, the pro-
gressiveness of this ‘answer’ is a matter of further debate.
That instances of religiously motivated reaction by the Kurds to the 
Turkish state had historically been, as in the case of Sheikh Said,1 based 
on ethnic-religious references, helped provide fertile soil for organisa-
tions such as Hizbullah. Considering that Kurdish society is historically 
known to be religious and conservative, it is not surprising that Hizbullah 
found support among the Kurds. Hizbullah did not propose a system 
alien to Kurdish society. On the contrary, Hizbullah reframed Islamic 
understandings and practices, which have a central place in the daily 
lives of the people of the area, using a radical Islamist discourse. In other 
words, it reconstructed the religious devoutness prevalent in Kurdish 
society through an Islamist ideology.
The sociological state that resulted from the Turkish state’s approach 
to the Kurdish issue played an important role in the development of 
Hizbullah. On the one hand, given the historical circumstances, it is 
evident that all forms of anti-state discourse can find support relatively 
easily among the Kurds. On the other hand, Turkish state violence 
created and reinforced a culture of violence in the area. Although this 
may not be the main instigator of Hizbullah violence, it clearly played an 
important role in normalising it.
Violence used by Hizbullah, which it justifies as a means of self-defence, 
constitutes a means for achieving its goals. Hizbullah utilised violence 
mainly in the context of its disputes with other groups in the area. 
As a result, Islamist groups either voluntarily dissolved, or joined 
Hizbullah, or were eliminated by Hizbullah. As a result of its aggressive 
organisational attitude and prioritisation of action over theory and argu-
mentation, Hizbullah became the most powerful Islamist organisation 
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in the Kurdish region of Turkey in the 1990s. Despite being ideologically 
an Islamist organisation, given its eclectic nature Hizbullah followed the 
same path as some left-wing organisations in terms of its action strategy.
The methods used by Hizbullah against other Islamist groups exhibit 
similarities with those used by the PKK against left-wing organisa-
tions active in the Kurdish region of Turkey at the time of the PKK’s 
emergence. The fact that these two ideologically divergent movements 
both had predominantly ethnic Kurdish following and membership 
made confrontation between them inevitable. The active violence which 
began in 1991 resulted in the death of over 500 PKK members2 and 
over 200 Hizbullah members. The five-year period between 1991 and 
1996 constitutes the darkest period in the history of Hizbullah. Acts of 
violence which were, on the one hand, justified by Hizbullah as ‘acts of 
self-defence against a threat to its existence’ and, on the other, committed 
by Hizbullah, allegedly founded or supported by the Turkish state as a 
paramilitary force to fight the PKK, resulted in an atmosphere of great 
fear and polarisation in Kurdish society.
Having been subjected to all forms of violence by the Turkish state, it is 
no surprise that the Kurds consider violence by Hizbullah another mani-
festation of state violence. However, the PKK’s understanding of religion 
and long-standing attitude towards religion led many conservative Kurds 
to take the side of Hizbullah. Eventually, violence became part of daily 
life and resulted in what may be described as social chaos.
The claim that Hizbullah was founded and/or supported by the 
Turkish state cannot be easily validated or refuted. Taking into account, 
on the one hand, individuals’ testimonies and the widespread belief 
that Hizbullah is linked to the Turkish state, and, on the other hand, 
Hüda-Par’s adamant refusal of such links and the demand in its party 
programme that investigations are carried out into organisations such 
as the JITEM and Ergenekon, it becomes evident that there is no simple 
answer to this question. What Hizbullah has acknowledged, however, is 
that it told the PKK at the mediation meetings prior to the onset of the 
conflict that a Hizbullah-PKK conflict would mainly benefit the Turkish 
state. To claim that the two groups started fighting each other without 
any external influence would again be an incomplete assessment of the 
situation. It is evident that it was not only the Turkish state that benefited 
from the conflict but Hizbullah also grew more powerful as a result of it. 
The Turkish state carried out only a paltry number of operations against 
Hizbullah in the early 1990s, when the fighting between Hizbullah and 
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the PKK was at its most intense. Further adding to these suspicions are 
the increased operations by Turkish security forces against Hizbullah in 
the late 1990s after Hizbullah almost entirely abandoned violent methods 
and the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured, and the full-scale 
crackdown on Hizbullah following the death of Hüseyin Velioğlu on 17 
January 2000. 
It must be emphasised, however, that the Turkish state is becoming 
more monolithic and authoritarian and comprises a conglomeration of, 
at times, contradictory or conflicting relationships. Bearing in mind that 
paramilitary groups and states often interact with each other in indirect 
and complex ways, it becomes evident that more research is needed into 
Hizbullah–Turkish state connections. Nevertheless, the fact that there 
is no evidence for such connections does not disprove the fact that 
Hizbullah’s operations benefited the Turkish state. It must be borne in 
mind that claims about state–Hizbullah connections are not just voiced 
by PKK supporters; former Hizbullah members also express similar 
opinions.
Hizbullah disintegrated for a few years after Operation Beykoz. 
Around 2004, it re-emerged, this time legitimately through allegedly 
Hizbullah-affiliated NGOs, dershanes,3 and platforms, and hosting rallies, 
demonstrations, and conferences. In this period, Hizbullah abandoned 
the use of violence as a method, albeit often implying that violence may 
again be resorted to if deemed necessary, and formulated a new strategy 
which entailed becoming a mass movement by means of engaging in 
legal activities, aid distribution, and organisational activities. In that 
regard, it can be claimed that, at the present time, Hizbullah commands 
a broader organisational network in comparison to the past, one that 
is held together by a weaker sense of group belonging. The organisa-
tional strategies Hizbullah employed during its move to operating legally 
can be compared to those of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the 
Ikhwan movement. Furthermore, the expansion of Hizbullah’s base can 
be accounted for by its meeting real social needs and demands, which 
the Turkish state fell short of satisfying.
The Kurdish issue, which received some coverage in Hüda-Par’s party 
programme, points to the emergence of a new field of discourse, especially 
in view of Hizbullah’s former aversion to ethnically informed opinions on 
the grounds that they constitute nationalistic thinking. The recommen-
dations in the Hüda-Par programme concerning the Kurdish issue are 
proof of the validity of the claim that a movement’s base can transform 
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the movement itself. However, the Kurdish issue is not given as much 
emphasis in the statements of party officials and Islamist references still 
prevail in Hüda-Par’s political discourse. Given that Hüda-Par won only 
around 92,000 votes in the 2014 local elections, it would be reasonable 
to claim that, in its present state, the party’s programme has not found 
widespread support among the Kurds. Nevertheless, I believe Hüda-Par 
has the potential to garner more support.
My assertion that Turkey is a country of partial confrontations similarly 
applies to Hizbullah. I believe Hizbullah could gain more support in 
the Kurdish community if it confronted the past in an open and honest 
way, and developed a more transparent discourse. Nevertheless, this 
would also depend on the degree of ‘tolerance’ Hizbullah might have 
towards different opinions that exist within the partly ‘urbanised’ and 
secularised Kurdish society. Taking into account the responsibility felt 
towards those who have been imprisoned for Hizbullah membership or 
for engagement in acts of violence and the strict character of the Islamist 
perspective adopted by Hizbullah, it is arguably very difficult for it to 
develop such tolerance.
The large attendance at Hizbullah-hosted public events and partici-
pation in legal activities of allegedly Hizbullah-affiliated organisations 
and associations indicate that Hizbullah has become a social movement. 
Although questions have been raised about Hizbullah’s legitimacy, 
especially within the PKK base, I believe this only serves to cause further 
polarisation with Kurdish society. Therefore, it must be acknowledged 
that Hizbullah has a legitimate social base and that the movement 
continues to exist in response to a need within certain sections of the 
society.
The fact that there has been only a de facto ceasefire between the PKK 
and Hizbullah, and the widespread suspicions about the legitimacy of 
the Hizbullah-affiliated organisations and associations, have created 
new tensions concerning Hüda-Par’s entrance into the political sphere. 
In fact, the growing tensions during the 2014 local elections resulted in 
various incidents such as the kidnapping of some Hüda-Par officials and 
the murder of a man claimed to be a Hüda-Par supporter. The attacks on 
Hizbullah-affiliated associations and organisations during the Kobanê 
protests on 6–8 October 2014 and the retaliation of the Hizbullah base 
raised concerns over the possibility of the tensions escalating to a full-on 
conflict as happened in the 1990s. The efforts made by the then BDP MP 
and the Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress) 
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co-president Hatip Dicle as well as representatives of NGOs, such as 
Mazlum-Der and the İHD (Human Rights Association), and Hüda-Par’s 
sensibility not to allow the situation to turn into a full-on conflict all 
contributed to the creation of a state of no conflict for the time being. 
The fragility of the situation at this time can be better appreciated if the 
then ongoing peace process and political developments in the Middle 
East are taken into consideration. The potential that a Hizbullah-PKK 
conflict has to destroy social equilibrium and the ‘peace process’ renders 
Hizbullah–PKK relations vulnerable to external provocation and 
interference. As much as there is a need for Hizbullah to confront the 
past, the PKK has to come to terms with Hizbullah’s transformation into 
a social movement. 
An analysis of Hizbullah based only on historical data would have 
been inadequate. I have therefore focused on subjects such as Hizbullah’s 
self-perception and its construction of a social memory. I established 
that group belonging constitutes the main factor in Hizbullah’s under-
standing of ethnic identity and religious discourse, and it is closely 
related to the organisation of daily life. The organisation of daily life 
practices according to security and confidentiality concerns has been 
observed to reinforce feelings of group belonging while leading to 
segregation from other groups on the levels of discourse and action. In 
the case of segregation on the discursive level, the groups in question 
have maintained a dialogue with one another to some extent. However, 
as the discourse justifying violence gained currency, segregation became 
more severe and feelings of group belonging reinforced, leading to the 
formation of minimal homogeneities. These minimal homogeneities 
resulting from disagreements and disputes for various reasons in turn 
led to polarisation and the cessation of shifts in membership between 
them. Groups that are homogenised on the basis of shared principles 
and a belief in the similarity of the group’s membership were observed to 
have increased the potential for action and persuaded their membership 
of the necessity of going through strategic transformations. This is 
because, at this stage, feelings of group belonging become powerful and 
the discourse justifying violence become widespread enough that they 
allow for the exclusion of other lifestyles.
Hizbullah violence exhibits neither an unforeseeable nor uncon-
trollable character. As established in this study, the emergence of 
active violence was preceded by various preparatory stages, the most 
important of which was the construction and subsequent dissemina-
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tion of a discourse justifying violence. In the case of Hizbullah, the main 
argument justifying violent action was the requirement for self-defence 
in the face of threats to its existence. The presence of this discourse in 
Hizbullah’s stories and novels, which are aimed at the construction of a 
social memory and its transmission to the younger generations, confirms 
this assertion. The narratives used in these literary works are based on a 
discourse where Hizbullah’s ‘others’ are depicted as evil characters in the 
form of ideal types while Hizbullah is presented as the embodiment of 
benevolence and perfection. 
In Hizbullah stories and novels, violence has been shown not to 
constitute one of the main references used in the construction of social 
memory. Instead, it is only implied by the narratives concerning the 
culture of sacrifice and martyrdom. The prominence of the culture 
of sacrifice in Hizbullah can be better grasped by taking into account 
statements such as ‘May Allah accept his martyrdom’, which is in 
widespread use in Hizbullah-affiliated written and visual media, and 
‘May Allah make you a martyr’, which is often used in conversation in 
the place of farewell expressions such as ‘goodbye’. In the context of such 
a culture of sacrifice, exile equals ‘Hegira’, prison Medrese-i Yusufiye’,4 
and death ‘martyrdom’.
With Hizbullah’s entrance into legal operations, security and confi-
dentiality concerns ceased to be the main principles around which daily 
life is organised. Although this resulted in feelings of group belonging 
becoming looser compared with the past, Hizbullah’s abandonment of 
violent methods facilitated the expansion of its base.
Group belonging constitutes the most powerful and transformative 
core of the three layers of identity among Hizbullah members. The 
second of these layers is the construction of religion as an ideological 
discourse and it is largely dependent on the discourses formulated in 
reference to group belonging. These discourses privilege action over 
theoretical debates and have more attraction among the youth.
In Hizbullah, ethnic identity accompanies daily life almost as a 
folkloric element. However, on account of the Islamist discourse 
adopted by Hizbullah, references to an ethnic identity ordinarily meet 
heavy criticism as manifestations of nationalistic thinking. There has 
been increased emphasis on Kurdish identity after Hizbullah’s entrance 
into legal operations and there is more engagement in the Kurdish 
issue after the establishment of Hüda-Par, albeit only on a discursive 
level. Kurdishness finds more coverage in the discourses of individuals 
148 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
within Hizbullah than in the official discourses of Hizbullah-affiliated 
organisations and associations.
In the discourse of Hizbullah, Kurdish identity is rendered more 
‘acceptable’ via religious references. Taking into account that ethnic 
identity is brought into the field of discourse through personalities 
such as Sheikh Said and Selahaddin Eyyubi, Hizbullah’s approach to 
ethnic identity may be described as a case of religious nationalism. In 
that regard, for Hizbullah, ethnic identity is acceptable as long as it 
does not contradict an Islamist worldview. The presence of the Kurdish 
identity on the level of discourse is possible only when it accompanies 
religious references.
Appendix: The Text of the Written 
Interview with Hizbullah Officials
Below is the text of the written interview conducted with Hizbullah 
officials via Hüseyni Sevda, the alleged official website of Hizbullah. The 
Hizbullah officials exercised their right not to provide answers to any 




First of all, it is worth saying the following: You can find the answers to 
most of your questions in the book entitled Savunmalar [The Defences], 
Hizbullah’s manifesto, Hizbullah in Its Own Words, and in the many 
published messages and interviews by the Hizbullah Rehberi5 [Hizbullah 
Guide]. There is benefit in using these publications and messages for you. 
Q: What kind of social and economic backgrounds do Hizbullah 
members generally come from?
A: The cemaat of Hizbullah embodies people from all layers of the 
society it originated from, however, it is comprised mostly of the 
oppressed [mustazaf] and the middle class members of society.
Q: What are the reasons underlying Hizbullah’s ‘success in winning 
the favour of ’ a considerable part of the Kurdish society in a short 
time?
A: It is natural for the cemaat of Hizbullah to win the favour of the 
society as Hizbullah takes its basis from the society’s beliefs, traditions, 
and dispositions. As it is known, the area, where the Hizbullahî 
movement emerged, has been blessed with Islam for the past 1400 
years. Our people are Muslim. In such a society, it is natural for the 
cemaat of Hizbullah to win the favour of the people.
Q: Being a Cemaat that takes Islam as its reference point, how do you 
view the issue of ‘violence’?
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A: We do not use armed propaganda. We have expressed our opinion 
on the matter on various occasions. To sum it up, we do not intend 
to use brute force against anyone unless they try to prevent us from 
learning Islam, living according to it, organising people around it, 
and doing tebliğ, or unless someone attacks us posing a threat to our 
existence.
Q: What is your opinion about jihad?
A: The concept of jihad has a broad range of meanings including 
advising the pursuit of davet, tebliğ, and benevolence, to refrain from 
evil, to mukatele, or in contemporary terms, to pursue armed action. 
If you are referring to mukatele when you say jihad, then we already 
answered your question in the answer to your previous question. 
Q: What were the reasons for the conflicts that emerged between 
Hizbullah and other Islamic groups in the area?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What were the reasons for the conflict with the Menzil group?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What was the source of the issues you experienced with the Vahdet 
group?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What are your views on the Zehra group and what was the reason 
for the issue [you experienced] with the Zehra group?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What are your views on the Islamic groups and movements in 
western Turkey? Do you think the cemaat of Hizbullah suffered on 
account of their opinions and actions?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What are your views on the PKK?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: How did the conflict with the PKK begin and what do you think 
the reasons for the conflict were?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What are your views on the past conflict with the PKK?
A: (No answer was given)
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Q: As an organisation, which aimed to topple the secular regime and 
found a government based on Sharia law in its place, how frequently 
did Hizbullah confront the [Turkish] state?
A: A detailed answer can be found in [the article entitled ‘The 
Methods of Subversion Used by the Police and the JITEM’ and in the 
other sources we previously mentioned.
Q: What are your views on the allegations that Hizbullah was in 
cooperation with the ‘deep state’ during the Hizbullah-PKK conflict?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What would you say concerning the allegations that Hizbullah was 
in a relationship of interest with the [Turkish] state?
A: We are not aware of any substantial claims concerning a relationship 
of interest with the state. Forward evidence to us if you possess any 
tangible information in this regard.
Q: What are your views on Iran and the Shia?
A: We consider the ehl-i kıble [People of Islam] brothers. We’d like to 
abide by the laws governing [the relationship of] brothers. For that 
reason, we believe that, instead of focusing on the differences between 
sects, dispositions, religious orders, and Islamic groups, we ought 
to unite around our commonalities and help each other in fighting 
the common enemy for our shared goals and aims. Therefore, we are 
not in favour of our differences from other Islamic movements being 
discussed publicly and in a way that leads to mischief.
Q: Has Hizbullah had intellectual and/or physical connections with 
Iran? If it has, what was the extent of these connections?
A: We have declared our ideological principles in our manifesto. In 
this context, we are in ideological unity with anyone who is ehl-i kıble. 
We are close to all Muslims on the basis of Islam. However, Hizbullah 
is an independent cemaat and it is not the extension of or established 
by any state, cemaat, organisation or movement.
Q: What are your views on the political and religious orientation of 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries?
A: Unfortunately, the governments in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
countries are not legitimate governments founded on the initiative of 
their peoples. They have largely been set up by the occupying powers, 
especially the British, based on the latter’s evaluation of the political, 
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military, and economic conditions that prevailed after the First World 
War. Instead of protecting the interests of their own people, [these 
governments] strive for their own prosperity and the interests of the 
West. 
Q: What are your views on the Ikhwanul Muslimun [Muslim 
Brotherhood]?
A: The Ikhwan is an Islamic revival movement dedicated to fostering 
Islamic unity that was established in Egypt before extending to the 
whole Islamic world. They have either been a model for the Islamic 
movements around the world or made cultural contributions to them. 
In that sense, they have also contributed to the Hizbullah movement 
by their experience and the literature they produced.
Q: Which scholarly and intellectual sources does Hizbullah use? 
Which authors and books do you take as references or consider 
especially important?
A: We try to make use of all the old and new sources contained within 
the entire corpus of Islamic texts. We do not limit ourselves to certain 
books or resources.
Q: What are your views about the Kurdish question?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: Being an organisation with a predominantly Kurdish membership, 
what are your recommendations for the resolution of the Kurdish 
issue in Turkey?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: What are your views on Syrian Kurds?
A: The Kurds in Syria have suffered a lot under the Baath regime. They 
were not allowed to have their identity and citizenship. Land mines 
and barbed wire were installed between them and their brothers on 
this side of the border. Seen from this perspective, we could claim that 
they have suffered more than their brothers on this side.
Q: What are your views on the tensions and conflicts between 
Al-Qaeda or its affiliate organisations and the Syrian Kurds?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: Did the Cemaat go into a period of self-critique after the Beykoz 
Operation?
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A: As Muslims, we believe that it is essential to engage in self-critique 
everyday asking oneself ‘what have I done for Allah today?’. We advise 
all our friends to ask themselves everyday whether they have done 
their duty towards Allah, whether they have performed their duties 
of servitude towards Allah. In that sense, we constantly reflect on the 
negative issues pertaining to what we would like to do as a Cemaat 
and what we have done. A movement reflects on all the positive and 
negative issues that they encounter, they experience. They work to 
amend any shortcomings and inadequacies that exist. They draw 
lessons from what has happened and take advantage of them as 
experiences. 
Q: Did the Cemaat go through any intellectual transformation after 
the Beykoz Operation?
A: The Cemaat did not go through an intellectual transformation in 
terms of its principles, faith, and opinions. However, it is a requirement 
of Islamic conduct and struggle that the Cemaat renews itself and 
improves their strategies according to the times and the changing cir-
cumstances.
Q: Could the tensions with the BDP lead the Cemaat to engage in 
armed struggle again?
A: Despite the attacks by the PKK and their affiliates against Muslim 
people in the last ten years, we have been patient and we have done 
everything we can, so that things do not go back to how they were in 
the 1990s. However, they [the PKK] have been continuing with their 
attacks and provocations. Our position and patience are contingent 
on whether these attacks continue and, if they do, on the form they 
take. If the attacks become an obstacle for us to live our faith and pass 
it down to the next generations, then we will consider defending our 
cause and our Muslim brothers, and responding to these attacks as an 
Islamic duty and responsibility.
Q: Do you have a programme for the resolution of the Kurdish issue?
A: (No answer was given)
Q: How many people have been tried in the Hizbullah Trial and how 
many of them received sentences?
A: In the Hizbullah Trial, tens of thousands of our people have been 
tried since 1991 on the grounds of Hizbullah membership. Some 
sources estimate this figure to be around 24,000 or 25,000.
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Q: What were those taken to court tried for?
A: Over 90 per cent of those tried in the Hizbullah Trial were tried 
for Hizbullah membership and aiding [Hizbullah]. Among the 
evidence for Hizbullah membership was forming lecture circles6 in 
a mosque and taking or giving lessons. Giving lessons in a mosque 
was considered equal to being a member of the armed organisation in 
the mountains [meaning the PKK]. The elifba [Arabic spelling books] 
and siyer 7 books found in the mosques were considered evidence for 
criminal activity and confiscated.
Q: How many Hizbullah members are in prison at the present time? 
What are their imputed crimes?
A: Currently there are around 300 people in prison who have been 
convicted of Hizbullah-related charges. Two thirds of them are 
serving life sentences. The rest were tried for Hizbullah membership 
and received prison sentences.
Q: Do you think the cemaat of Hizbullah has had any faults in their 
system of thought or committed any mistakes in their actions?
A: Because Hizbullah adopted its system of thought from the Quran 
and the Sunna, we cannot talk about any mistakes. Our thinking is 
moderate [vasat] and tolerant [mutedil]. Because we take the Quran 
and Sunna as our fundamental sources of reference, we try to design 
ourselves accordingly. In terms of action, we have never knowingly or 
willingly done anything that goes against Islam. So, there is nothing 
unislamic about the Cemaat’s plans or the solutions they devised. 
However, there may have been unwanted errors in their application 
by individuals, however, they constitute exceptional situations.
Q: If it were possible to go back in time, is there anything that Hizbullah 
would not do again?
A: As it is not possible to go back in time, there is not much point in 
dwelling on this subject.
Q: Why do you think the state has not opened the archive seized as a 
result of the Beykoz Operation to the public?
A: There is a legal and a political aspect to the state’s not making the 
archive available. From a legal point of view, it is not acceptable that 
the documents in the archive have not been sent to the courts. Tens 
of thousands of people were tried and given sentences for having 
their names mentioned in these documents. However, because these 
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documents were not incorporated into individuals’ case files or into 
the court archives, the police used these documents in a selective 
fashion as evidence. In that way, they created evidence and tampered 
with them. Because defence lawyers were not allowed to access the 
original documents, they could not look for documents that could 
be used as evidence in the defence’s favour. Because the documents 
used as evidence were not incorporated into the general case file, the 
judges decided on the sentences based on the allegations made by the 
police in their case summaries. The police, prosecutors, courts, and 
the court of appeals all joined forces and gave Hizbullah defendants 
prison sentences based on evidence that is absent from the case file. 
They seized people’s properties and businesses because their names 
were mentioned in these documents.
 The political aspect of the state’s not making the archive open 
to the public is to prevent the black propaganda they have been 
making about Hizbullah from becoming revealed. They had begun 
a big campaign to create a misperception of Hizbullah in the society 
by means of all kinds of insults, disinformation, and defamation. 
Documents and information, which will refute the accusations they 
had brought against Hizbullah, are available in that archive. In order 
to prevent that from being revealed, they have been concealing it 
[the archive] from the courts and the public in defiance of law and 
custom. There is another important reason and that is to prevent the 
information and documents in the Hizbullah archive, which could 
reveal the corruptness of the state, from becoming accessible by the 
public. There are documents in the archive, which, if made open to the 
public, would show the state’s involvement in extrajudicial kidnapping, 
killing, execution, recruitment of informers, blackmail, etc. 
Q: Do you think Hizbullah is represented in public opinion and the 
media in a way that is truthful and faithful to reality? If not, what are 
they not being truthful about?
A: The image of Hizbullah, which was promoted by the Doğu 
Perinçek-led Aydınlık group, the left-wing media, and the 
PKK-oriented media since the 1990s, is still widespread in the Turkish 
media. Because most people in the region [Kurdish region of Turkey] 
know us, they do not give credit to the slanders in the media. However, 
because we do not have the opportunity to enlighten people outside 
the region, they get to know us through the media, that are against us. 
And this leads to misconceptions about us in public opinion.
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Q: If you were to change the misconceptions about Hizbullah, which 
ones would you change and how?
A: The way to correct the misconceptions about Hizbullah is to share 
the correct information with the public. It is necessary to know people 
in the way that they describe themselves. Therefore, those who write 
and make research about us ought to work with correct evidence and 
information rather than information provided to them by those who 
hate us and bear enmity against us. People should first empathise with 
those they do not know, before they can judge them. If people abide 
by basic human and moral principles, there should not be any issues.
Q: In your opinion, what is the ideal regime for a state?
A: In the case of a regime, what is of essence is that the law and the 
source of this law must be Islamic/Quranic, that is, there must be an 
Islamic government. Our preference is for a republic in which Islam 
rules.
Q: What are your views on Islam and democracy?
A: Democracy may be the most advanced and sophisticated form of 
governance among the human systems that are available. However, 
according to our belief, it is well behind the just form of government 
that Islam brought to humanity.
Q: In your view, what are the reasons for the economic, political, and 
social problems that are experienced on a global scale at the present 
time? How can these problems be solved?
A: Although the problems within societies with different cultures, 
religions, and denominations vary, in general terms, for economic 
well-being, Allah the Compassionate has provided more rızık 
[sustenance] than necessary for his past and future subjects on earth. 
Humanity is experiencing economic, political, and social problems 
at the present time because, instead of a fair distribution [of this 
sustenance], today’s capitalist countries, which are governed by 
human systems based on interest, allocate all of it [the sustenance] 
to themselves. In our opinion, the solution to all the problems that 
are being experienced in today’s world is Islamic governance based on 
divine justice.
Q: What are your views on Turkey’s international policy?
A: Although the ‘zero problems policy’ with the whole world is good, it 
is a contradiction that, in practice, [Turkey] has problematic relations 
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with all of its neighbours. If they [Turkey] could have approached the 
Syrian issue with caution and common sense, they had had a political 
position where they could act as mediator before the civil war reached 
this point. Turkey’s relations with the USA and the EU [European 
Union] are not equal [a relationship of equals], [where Turkey is] 
independent, and do not benefit our people.
Q: What are your views on Israel’s position in the Middle East?
A: We consider Israel a Zionist, occupying, illegal, and tyrannical 
terrorist regime. They must leave the occupied Islamic lands without 
making any conditions or demanding status. These are the lands of 
Islam. Although they have acquired some strength on these lands, we 
believe that Muslims will emancipate these lands, ‘whose surroundings 
Allah has blessed’ [reference to Quran, 17: 1] from Zionists.
Q: What are your views on the Middle Eastern policies of the USA and 
European countries?
A: It is because of the USA and European countries that the Islamic 
world is experiencing problems today. In order to be able to exploit the 
Islamic world that they have had their eyes on for centuries, they have 
been setting Muslims against each other by creating artificial problems 
and chaos, and exploiting the people’s resources and suppressing their 
will by means of puppet governments.
Q: What are your views on women’s representation in social life?
A: Allah created Man from a man and a woman. They each constitute 
half of all humanity. Women can be present in any domain suited to 
their nature, provided that they abide by the criteria set out for women 
in Islam.
Q: What is the ideal position of women in terms of work life?
A: Islam defends the right to private property. Within the scope of this 
right, women can possess personal assets. Therefore, provided that 
they abide by the criteria set out in Islam, they can trade or work in 
another business.
Q: What is the ideal way to bring up a child and what should it be 
based on?
A: The answer to this question would fill up a whole book. As with 
anything, it should be based on Islamic criteria and the Prophet’s 
practices.
158 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
Q: What are your views on feminism?
A: Feminism is contrary to the nature of women. It is a movement that 
has been created by international imperialism and especially Zionism 
in order to alienate women from their essential nature and turn them 
into commodity. There are things that women can or cannot do, just 
as there are things that men can or cannot do. In that sense, forcing 
women into work that is not suited to their disposition is cruel, as 
it is similarly cruel to force men into work that is not suited to their 
disposition.
Q: Are women and men equal? Why?
A: They are equal in the eyes of the law and in terms of basic human 
rights. However, it is not within reason to claim that they are equals 
in terms of their biological nature. This is so obvious, it cannot be a 
matter of debate. The reason for their not being equals can be found in 
their creation. Allah who created both men and women bestowed on 
them different duties and attributes. There will not be any problems if 
everyone is mindful of these attributes and abide by their duties.
Q: What is your opinion on Emri Bil Ma’ruf Nehyi ‘Anil Münker 
[Enjoining good and forbidding evil]?
A: Ordering good and bewaring of evil is an obligation by Allah on 
Muslims for the betterment of society. Every Muslim individual is 
obligated to fulfil this according to their ability. However, organised 
powers such as a state or cemaats, which are like smaller versions [of 
a state], are best suited to perform it. Because individuals are limited 
in what they can do.
Q: What are your views on homosexuality?
A: Homosexuality is a perversion and a disease, which is against 
human nature, corrupts society and family life, and removes the 
[principle of the] ‘preservation of offspring’ [nesil emniyeti] protected 
by the authority of Islam. The Islamic community must take every 
precaution to preclude such perversions and disease.
Q: What is your position vis-à-vis hermaphroditism?
A: Hermaphroditism is a condition that exists beyond one’s choice 
or free will. This kind of people can be viewed as people born with 
disabilities. For hundreds of years, Islamic law has been making 
judgements in and providing solutions to issues that concern this 
kind of people. In these cases, Muslim doctors, biologists, and 
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Islamic scholars may intervene bearing scientific and technologi-
cal advancements in mind. Because patient’s circumstances may be 
different, it is not possible to make a general evaluation.
Q: Iran is one of the countries where sex-change operations are most 
common. What is your opinion concerning the fact that, in Iran, 
sex-change operations are performed with the permission of religious 
and official authorities?
A: If, by sex-change, you are referring to making a choice in the case of 
hermaphroditism, then, as stated above, it can be performed with con-
sideration of the particular patient’s situation and by permission from 
Islamic scholars and Muslim doctors. However, because changing 
one’s sex without any medical obligation would denote a change in 
the nature of the person, Islamic scholars do not permit it. We do not 
know that such operations are permissible in Iran. 
Q: What are your views on the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the 
Directorate’s understanding of religion? In that context, what is your 
opinion on the relationship between state and religion?
A: The purpose of the Directorate is not to help people live their 
religion, but to design it. Such an organisation can exist to coordinate 
the provision of services, such as making research in order to solve 
people’s Islamic legal problems, establishing religious institutions, or 
procuring the texts to be used in these institutions. However, we are 
opposed to an organisation that would be used to impose an official 
ideology or sect on Muslims.
Q: What are your views on the cemaat of Fethullah Gülen and their 
approach to Hizbullah?
A: We can easily state that cemaat of Hizbullah has suffered the most 
from the cemaat Fethullah Gülen and their members in the police and 
the judiciary. At first, they used to present themselves as a moderate 
Islamic organisation. However, after acquiring positions within state 
institutions, we noticed that they were working to change the state and 
the society according to their will. They were not willing to cooperate 
with any other Islamic organisation. They strived to neutralise any 
group, who did not serve them or whom they judged to be problematic 
for themselves, by conspiracies and defamation, and defeat them by 
using the power of the state. 
Q: What are your views on the PKK, its approach to and ideas 
concerning religion?
160 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
A: As any other Marxist-Leninist group in the world, the PKK 
[ideology] is based on materialism. Although they have developed 
an Islamic discourse for their own interest in the last few years, it is 
in essence a secular movement. In that sense, it cannot be expected 
that a Muslim approves of or tolerates a movement with a materialist 
worldview.
Q: What is your opinion of the sivil cumas [civilian Friday prayers]?
A: If your question concerns sermons being given in Kurdish, it is 
right. The sermon is part of the Friday prayer. Friday sermons mean 
the weekly gathering of Muslims and their being given in Kurdish is 
the right way. However, it is clear that people, who have nothing to do 
with the namaz [five-time daily prayer] and do not spend their time 
performing the namaz, are organising them for political ends.
Q: What is your view about mother tongue education?
A: It is one’s natural right to have one’s education in one’s mother 
tongue. The state ought to provide people with the opportunity to 
receive their education in their mother tongue. When demanded, 
even small ethnic groups ought to be given the opportunity by the 
state to have their education in their mother tongue.
Q: Although Hizbullah has had a pan-Islamist [ümmetçi] perspective, 
why has it not received the favour of non-Kurdish Muslims?
A: We do not agree with this statement. However, because our starting 
point is Kurdistan, it is natural that there has been more interest in 
this area [the Kurdish region of Turkey] in comparison to other areas. 
Q: What is the percentage of non-Kurdish Muslim participation in 
Hizbullah?
A: Because our understanding is not based on nationalist thinking, 
we have not been concerned about percentages. However, we have 
brothers of all ethnic origins in Turkey.
Q: If the Hizbullah-PKK conflict in the 1990s had not taken place, 
what kind of a social situation would we be in today?
A: Only Allah knows that. Hizbullah is not concerned with 
assumptions.
Q: How did Hizbullah ‘succeed’ in the Hizbullah-PKK conflict despite 
the PKK’s numerical advantage? What was the secret to Hizbullah’s 
victory over the PKK? Did the [Turkish] state or any unit within the 
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state provide support [to Hizbullah] during this period? Or were there 
situations where the state acted as a facilitator or turned a blind eye 
[on Hizbullah]?
A: A detailed answer to this question can be found in the sources 
discussed above.
Q: How did Hizbullah acquire weapons and obtain logistic support? 
Did any other organisation offer any support in this regard?
A: No support was received from any other organisation. They have all 
been acquired/obtained by Hizbullah’s own means.
Q: Could you define the ideal society?
A: In the ideal society, Islamic law, which is a realisation of divine 
justice, prevails, the rulers are muttaki,8 and the society is virtuous.
Notes
introduction
 1. A member or follower of Hizbullah.
 2. Personal communication with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 3. İmam Hatip is the name given to vocational high schools in which courses 
in Islam are taught in addition to the standard high school curricula. These 
schools have been a focus of dispute between secular and conservative 
political parties since the 1990s and, as a result, their curricula and 
position within the system of education (for example, the level of qualifi-
cation awarded) have been altered many times depending on the political 
party in power.
 4. Translator’s note: The original phrase used by the author is eksik 
yüzleşmeler. The word ‘confrontation’ is used here in the sense of ‘facing 
up to something’ rather than its more immediate meaning of ‘conflict’.
 5. In Sunni Islam, imam is the name given to clerics who are in charge of 
local religious activities, such as leading prayers in the mosque.
 6. Haram refers to all things and practices that are prohibited or considered 
sinful in Islam.
 7. Abbaras is the name given to arched passages, which connect streets in 
Mardin. The bottom part of the structure constitutes part of the street and 
resembles a tunnel, while the top part is often enclosed and considered 
private property.
 8. Yüksek İhtisas Eğitim Merkezi (High Specialisation Training Centre) is the 
name given to religious training centres affiliated with the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. Those who receive training in these centres can take up 
senior religious positions such as vaiz (preacher) or mufti (a legal expert 
empowered to give rulings) and have the authority to give fatwa (juristic 
ruling in Islam).
 9. Azadî is the Kurdish word for freedom.
chapter 1
 1. See, for instance, Gürtekin (2008), Yıldırım (2012), and Yurtseven (2006).
 2. The authors of these works express clearly biased opinions in their studies 
and I noticed that certain data they employed in these studies were 
consistently falsified by my informants. For these reasons, I chose not to 
use these works as resources.
 3. Operation Beykoz is the name of the operation carried out by the Turkish 
security forces against a Hizbullah safe house, where the leader of the 
notes . 163
organisation, Hüseyin Velioğlu, was killed and the Hizbullah Archive was 
seized. The operation is named after the district in Istanbul, where the safe 
house in question was located.
 4. Among the other pioneers of Islamist modernism are Hassan al-Banna, 
Ali Shariati, Jamal -ad-Din al-Afghani, Rashid Rida, and Muhammed 
Abduh.
 5. The term tağuti refers to regimes that are not based on Islamic law.
 6. A detailed analysis of the Ikhwan movement (the Muslim Brotherhood) 
is beyond the scope of this study. For a detailed analysis of the Ikhwan 
movement, see Demant (2006) and Calvert (2013).
 7. For example, in the article entitled ‘Hizballah in Turkey Revives: 
Al-Qaeda’s Bridge between Europe and Iraq?’, Soner Çağaptay and Emre 
Uslu claim that Hizbullah has become a bridge between Europe and Iraq 
and that the USA must take precautions against Hizbullah. The article is 
written from a security perspective and is based on suspicions instead of 
substantial evidence. See www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/hizballah-in-turkey-revives-al-qaedas-bridge-between-europe-and-
iraq (accessed 31/05/14).
 8. The ethno-religious uprising led by Sheikh Said, who was a Sufi-Naqsh-
bandi sheikh, against the Turkish state with the support of the Kurdish 
nationalist Azadî movement. The uprising was suppressed after a few 
months and Sheikh Said and others involved in the uprising were hanged 
in the Dağkapı square in Diyarbakır, hundreds of others who supported 
the uprising were killed, and tens of thousands of others were exiled.
 9. The Kurdish national movement that was founded under the leadership 
of Abdullah Öcalan and that has been operating mainly in Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran. Although in its early period, the PKK was a Marxist-Leninist 
organisation with the ultimate goal of establishing the Greater Kurdistan, 
after the capture of Öcalan in 1999, the PKK gave up on that idea and 
instead started pursuing the ideal of democratic autonomy (Marcus, 
2007).
 10. Batman was not administratively a city at the time.
 11. I could not establish whether Hareketa İslâmî (the successor of the 
Mealciler group) is the same as the groups Hizbi İslâmî and/or the İslâmî 
Cemaat.
 12. This group was based in Batman and bears no relation to the Fecir 
publishing in Ankara.
 13. I could not establish whether the organisation known respectively as Tevhid 
and Selam are the same as Tevhid ve Selam (Tevhid and Selam), which 
were allegedly connected to Uğur Mumcu’s assassination in 1993 and 
became the focus of media attention again in 2014 for illegal wiretapping. 
Because my informant mentioned these two organisations separately, it 
partly convinced me that these are in fact two distinct cemaats by the 
name Tevhid and Selam.
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 14. I did not make substantial studies into these groups as they remain beyond 
the scope of my research. However, it is clear that more research is required 
into Islamist groups in Kurdistan.
 15. The term tebliğ refers to the act of informing or warning Muslims by 
means of Islamic knowledge and law.
 16. Hizbullah and the PKK resemble each other on more than this common 
ground only. Hizbullah and the PKK were both founded by people who 
had previously been active in Turkish-dominated organisations. For 
instance, Hüseyin Velioğlu had played an active role within Milli Selamet 
Partisi and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) until the military coup of 
1980.
 17. Ummah is an Arabic word meaning community or nation. However, 
the common Islamic use of the word refers to the entire community of 
Muslims.
 18. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=478 (accessed 31/05/14).
 19. The Kurdish word mal, which is translated here as ‘family’, in actual fact 
refers to a patrilineage imagined to descend from the same male ancestor 
who lived a few generations back.
 20. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=479 (accessed 31/05/14).
 21. Nur Cemaats or the Nur Cemaat is the general name of those cemaats, 
which are based on the ideas expressed in Said-i Nursi’s Risale-i Nur 
corpus. These cemaats are also referred to as Nurcu (followers of Nur).
 22. The Gülen movement did not acknowledge the ideological connection 
between Aczmendis and Said-i Nursi for similar reasons.
 23. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 24. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=478 (accessed 31/05/14).
 25. Ibid.
 26. Mülkiye is another name for the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara 
University.
 27. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=478 (accessed 31/05/14).
 28. Personal interview with Mücteba, 06/10/13.
 29. Although the word sohbet is used in the meaning of conversation in daily 
speech, in this context it refers to dialogue on religious matters.
 30. Seyda is a Kurdish word used to refer to madrasa-educated religious leaders 
who have the authority to give fatwas on Islamic and social matters. The 
word is of Arabic origin and derived from the triconsonantal root s-y-d, 
thus sharing the same root as the word sayyid.
 31. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=486 (accessed 31/05/14).
 32. The information that Mele Emînê Kinik was a founding member of 
Hizbullah emerged out of the interviews I conducted with my informants. 
The year of Mele Emînê Kinik’s death is unknown.
 33. İsmail Altsoy also wrote the book Hizbullah in Its Own Words under the 
pseudonym ‘İ. Bagasi’.
 34. Personal interview with Mücteba, 06/10/13.
 35. Me vê hereketê çêkir. Me digot em ê dewletek İslâmî bînin. Me nedigot em 
ê li xelkê bixin.
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 36. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=486 (accessed 31/05/14).
 37. Ibid.
 38. Personal interview with Mücteba, 06/10/13.
 39. Translator’s note: Unless specified otherwise, the word ‘Cemaat’ will be 
written in capitals and not italicised in the remainder of this book when it 
is used to refer specifically to Hizbullah.
 40. Hizbullah is a Quranic word meaning the Party of God.
 41. Personal interview with Mahmut, 08/11/13.
 42. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=482 (accessed 31/05/14).
 43. Ibid.
 44. http://huseynisevda.biz (accessed 31/05/14).
 45. One who pretends to be a believer while actually being a heathen; a 
hypocrite.
 46. Personal interviews with Mücteba and Ahmet, 06/10/13 and 04/02/14.
 47. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 48. Personal interview with Mustafa, 13/08/13.
 49. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=489 (accessed 31/05/14).
 50. Madinah Masjid is the masjid founded following Muhammad’s migration 
from Mecca to Madina that was used not only for worship but also as 
an administrative centre. Today, Madinah Masjid survives as al-Masjid 
an-Nabawi.
 51. Personal interview with Mücteba, 06/10/13.
 52. Personal interview with Mustafa, 13/08/13.
 53. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 22/09/13.
 54. During the war between the Turkish state and the PKK, the Turkish state 
evacuated over 4000 Kurdish villages as a strategy to cut off support to the 
PKK. As a result, an estimated 2 million people have been displaced and 
even more people have been affected by the negative outcomes of forced 
migration.
 55. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=489 (accessed 01/06/14).
 56. Personal interview with Mustafa, 13/08/13.
 57. According to the information provided by Azad and some other 
informants, many people acquired literacy at these mosque events.
 58. Islamist groups such as Menzil, Selam, and Fecir, among others, which 
were active in the area in the 1980s when Hizbullah was becoming 
powerful.
 59. Personal interview with Ahmet, 04/02/14.
 60. The Ja’fari jurisprudence is a school of thought under Shia Islam.
 61. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 62. Tekfir refers to accusing someone of küfür (abandoning the religion) 
because of their actions or opinions.
 63. Personal interview with Ahmet, 04/02/14.
 64. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 65. Two important figures who had a great influence on the Islamists of 
the time were Said Hawwa, who was one of the leading members of the 
Syrian Ikhwan movement, and the Iraqi Dr Abdul Karim, who worked as 
166 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
a lecturer at the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara and the 
University of Gaziantep.
 66. According to my informant Mücahit, Hizbullah constructed a discourse in 
support of Hama. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 67. Personal interview with Mücteba, 06/10/13.
 68. Hürriyet, 06/03/01 (accessed 01/06/14).
 69. At the request of the informants who shared this information with me I 
will not disclose the names of the people or groups in question.
 70. Personal interview with Ahmet, 04/02/14.
 71. The whereabouts of Güngör’s buried body is still unknown.
 72. When Muslims were a small minority in Mecca, they would gather in the 
house of a Muslim known as Arqam. In this period, tebliğ activities and 
worship were carried out either in this house or in other secret locations. 
When the total number of Muslims went above 40, this period of secrecy 
came to an end and they started worshipping openly. Many Islamists 
describe this period as the embryo period and it is used to justify a 
movement operating underground in the initial stages of its development.
 73. The issues of why this violence was never directed to the state and 
Hizbullah’s alleged relations with the Turkish state will be dealt with later.
 74. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 75. Ibid.
 76. Personal interview with Ömer, 04/08/13.
 77. Personal interview with Mahmut, 08/11/13.
 78. Tekfiri organisations apply the tekfir criteria in all action and thought very 
strictly. Tekfiri attitudes are quite common among radical Salafi groups.
 79. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 22/09/13.
 80. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 81. For information on Velioğlu’s relocation to Mardin, Adana, Konya, 
and Istanbul, see http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=478 
(accessed 02/06/14).
 82. The book is allegedly written by İsa Altsoy, one of the top officers of 
Hizbullah, under the pseudonym İ. Bagasi.
 83. Personal interview with Ömer, 04/08/13.
 84. Ibid.
 85. Sofîk is a disparaging diminutive of the word sofu (devout) in Kurdish.
 86. Although the state officials never acknowledged the existence of JITEM, 
there is a substantial literature on the organisation and its activities. For 
example, Arif Doğan, who claims to be the founder of JITEM, offers 
detailed information about the organisation in his book (Doğan, 2011). 
Medeni Duran discusses JITEM from a historical perspective and 
investigates the place of other similar organisations within the Turkish 
state tradition (Duran, 2006).
 87. Medrese-i Yusufiye is used as a reference to the story where Prophet Yusuf 
(Joseph) is put in a dungeon but through the connections he builds there, 
and his skills and patience, he gets out of the dungeon and becomes the 
treasurer of Egypt. According to this understanding, then, prison is not 
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where one is punished; rather, it is a place of purification and learning that 
leads to success, happiness, Allah’s mercy, and heaven.
 88. My informant Aziz informed me that the Kurdish tunes in Seyfullah were 
used to introduce the broadcast of Turkish-language news on Iranian state 
radio and, being a Hizbullah member, very proud about that. According 
to Aziz, these broadcasts did not last very long. Therefore, this arguably 
corresponds to the period when Hizbullah–Iran relations were deteriorat-
ing. Personal interview with Aziz, 20/07/13.
 89. www.huzursayfasi.com/sarki-sozleri-sayfasi/1753-sehid-ata-sehitler- 
kervani-85-s1.html (accessed 02/06/14).
 90. In Aziz’s words ‘in this period the music disappeared, it was just their 
yelling left’. Personal interview with Aziz, 20/07/13.
 91. Personal interview with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 92. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 93. The number of people killed by the PKK is claimed to be around 200 while 
the number killed by Hizbullah varies between 500, 700, and over 700, 
according to the source.
 94. Personal interview with Aziz, 20/07/13.
 95. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 96. Personal interview with Gülay, 02/05/14.
 97. The full text of the written interview can be found in the Appendix.
 98. Written interview with Hizbullah officials, 03/05/13.
 99. This is a famous dictum in Turkish politics meaning when it is someone 
affiliated with the state or the state itself who commits a criminal act, they 
would make the act look as if it is in accordance with the law.
 100. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 101. I find it futile to discuss the tip-off aspect of this incident as the content 
and form of the tip-off and the credibility of the – sometimes conspiracy 
theory-like – scenarios that have been going around are largely unknown. 
However, I should mention that I have encountered wide-ranging claims, 
such as that Velioğlu is still alive or that he was killed by the Iranian 
intelligence on the Iranian border and subsequently handed over to 
the Turkish security authorities. There are various motivations behind 
making these claims. However, I will not discuss them as they do not 
directly pertain to the subject of this study.
 102. Despite the lack of statistical information, Necat Özdemir, who was one 
of the lawyers in the Hizbullah trials, estimates the number of people 
imprisoned for Hizbullah membership or involvement in Hizbullah’s 
criminal acts to be in the thousands. Personal interview with Necat 
Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 103. The amnesty was issued during the Peace Process between the Turkish 
state and the PKK. The main purpose of the amnesty was to release 
some people who had been imprisoned on PKK-related charges. But 
the amnesty benefited Hizbullah more than it did the PKK as more 
Hizbullah members were released from prison than people imprisoned on 
PKK-related charges.
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 104. Personal interview with Necat Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 105. Asking members to submit short biographies was a common practice in 
Hizbullah until the 2000s. I will discuss this practice in detail in the next 
chapter.
 106. Personal interview with Musab, 24/0/14.
 107. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 108. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 109. Ibid.
 110. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 111. I believe Hizbullah has not dissolved itself as an underground illegal 
organisation and that its being publicly exposed more specifically 
concerns the early 2000s. However, I could not gather any information on 
this matter during my field research.
 112. From here onwards, I will refer to the association as Mustazaflar. 
 113. www.dogruhaber.com.tr/Haber/Mustazaf-Derin-Kapatilmasina-Sebep- 
Oan-Suc-Neydi-34887.html (accessed 05/06/14).
 114. The term tağuti refers to regimes that are not based on Islamic law and 
dar al-harb refers to countries that are governed by non-Muslim people or 
governed by a regime that is not based on Islamic law.
 115. Gürbüz erroneously states that the word mustazaf comes from Persian. 
While the word is commonly used in Persian, it is of Arabic origin.
 116. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/2013.
 117. www.mustazafder.com/Mustazaf-der.html (accessed 05/06/14).
 118. www.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/international/europe/12denmark.html? 
r=0 (accessed 05/02/14).
 119. Although Hizbullah remained an underground organisation and chose to 
keep its operations and actions secret for a long time, it never neglected 
the message-giving aspect of its actions – that is, give a message to its 
rivals and distinguish itself from them – and showed a degree of prudent 
sensitivity in constructing its public image. It is not coincidental that its 
first operation against the PKK involved the murder of a Süryani man, 
showing that the operation ‘was not carried out against a Muslim’. Again 
it cannot be a coincidence that Hizbullah would wait for its targets in 
alleyways and execute them by shooting a single bullet in the back of the 
head. If anything, this was to promote Hizbullah as an element of fear 
and authority and to demonstrate the outcome of actions and discourses 
against Hizbullah.
 120. The association operates under the name Mustazaflar Cemiyeti 
(Mustazaflar Society) today. Their current activities can be viewed at 
www.mustazafder.com/Mustazaf-der.html (accessed 05/02/14).
 121. The association was closed down by the Diyarbakır Court of First 
Instance (Diyarbakır Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi) in 2010 and this decision 




 122. An educational facility often administered by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, where Quran is taught in Arabic and general religious education 
is given. Hizbullah-run kuran kursus are beyond the control of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, however, their operations are legitimate.
 123. Dershanes are private educational facilities in Turkey designed to prepare 
students for the university entrance exams.
 124. www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25143700/ (accessed 05/06/14).
 125. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 126. It is important to bear in mind that, as a result of the Syrian civil war, 
Salafi groups gained more power in the area, thus making violence more 
prevalent both in discourse and action.
 127. ISIS changed their name to Islamic State (IS) in July 2014.
 128. This number exceeded 100 by mid 2016.
 129. Personal interview with Fethullah, 11/08/13.
 130. Ibid.
 131. http://hudapar.org/Detay/Sayfalar/205/parti-programi.aspx (accessed 
05/06/14).
 132. Andımız (Our Oath) is the name of the oath students in primary education 
in Turkey were expected to recite en masse at the start of each school 
day. The oath text contained many Turkish nationalist themes, such as 
sacrificing oneself for the sake of the homeland. The oath had long been 
the focus of criticism on account of its negative effects on non-Turkish 
minorities in Turkey and was finally abandoned in 2013.
 133. Village guards are militia established by the Turkish state to defend 
national security against the PKK. In this way, certain groups gained 
privileges, and conflict and violence among the Kurds was exacerbated.
 134. Ergenekon is the name given to plans for a coup d’état by an ultra-secular 
and nationalist group within the Turkish army. Thousands of military 
officers were expelled from the army on the grounds of involvement in the 
plans and hundreds of officers were imprisoned for some years. 
 135. Seyit Rıza was an Alevi spiritual leader who was well known and respected 
in the Dersim area. He was executed by the Turkish state on the grounds 
that he led the Dersim uprising. 
 136. Quoted from the Hüda-Par party programme, http://hudapar.org/Detay/
Sayfalar/205/parti-progra- mi.aspx (accessed 05/06/14).
 137. Personal interview with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 138. Kamuran told me in an interview before the election that if Hüda-Par 
remained below their expectation in the elections, they would try to put it 
down to the party being newly founded.
 139. These operations are considered the precursor of the attempted military 
coup on 15 July 2016. Both incidents took place between the AK Party 
government and the Fethullah Gülen movement, which has been 
organised within the state for many years and even garnered the support 
of some state departments and political parties. The AK Party government 
held the Fethullah Gülen movement responsible for the 17–25 January 
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operations and adopted Islamist discourses with a more pronounced 
Turkish nationalist tone.
 140. Personal interview with Necat Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 141. The HDP and BDP are two closely related political parties with a predomi-
nantly Kurdish base. The two parties were formed out of the same political 
structure on the basis that the HDP would focus on the general elections 
and represent the transformation of the movement into a national political 
party in Turkey rather than a Kurdish one as the movement has been long 
recognised and the BDP was to focus on local administration. Strong 
relations and cooperation still continue between the two parties. 
 142. Hizbulkontra is a compound word made up of the words Hizbullah and 
kontrgerilla (counter-guerrilla). The word carries the implication that 
Hizbullah is a counter-guerrilla organisation that has been founded/
supported by the Turkish state against the PKK.
 143. www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/huda-pardan-bdp-ve-pkkya-uyari (accessed 
05/06/14).
 144. Kobanê protests refer to the incidents of large-scale public unrest in 
various towns and cities in the Kurdish region of Turkey in October 
2014 whereby tens of thousands of Kurds gathered in protest of the ISIS 
siege on the city of Kobanê in northern Syria and to show support for the 
people of Kobanê. More than 50 people died in clashes between the police, 
Hizbullah members, and protestors.
 145. Taziye is the name given to the practice of visiting the family of a recently 
deceased person in order to give one’s condolences.
 146. Not welcoming people on taziye visits is characteristic of blood feuds and 
carries the particular message that the death of the person in question will 
be avenged.
 147. Bahattin Temel, the vice chairman of Hüda-Par, held the gendarmerie, 
who allegedly did not interfere with the PKK militants crossing the area, 
responsible for the killing of Cengiz Tiryaki and presented the official 
report by the Karlıova Gendarmerie Station (Karlıova Jandarma Karakol 
Komutanlığı) as evidence. See www.milliyet.com.tr/huda-par-li-tiryaki-
nin-olu- muyle-gundem-1981187/ (accessed 09/12/14).
 148. The KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) was proposed by the PKK 
leader Abdullah Öcalan in his 2014 book Bir Halkı Savunmak (Defending 
a Nation) as the umbrella organisation within a system of democratic con-
federalism, which he proposed in place of a nation-state system that the 
PKK had previously strived to establish in the Kurdish context.
 149. An article published in Özgür Gündem, a newspaper close to the PKK line, 




 150. My estimation of this figure is based on the number of administrative 




 1. Sharia; Islamic canonical law.
 2. Sufi order or sect.
 3. Knowledge in Sufi thought.
 4. Truth in Sufi thought.
 5. See Chapter 1 endnote 54.
 6. When he submits (biat etmek) to a sheikh, he must first repent for his sins 
under the guidance of his sheikh by performing a ritual ablution of the 
whole body (gusül abdesti) and ask God for forgiveness for his sins, and 
resolve never to repeat them.
 7. In Islamic Sufism, haqiqa is the name given to one of the final stages in 
reaching the ultimate truth about the universe.
 8. İçtihat refers to making a judgement on a subject where there is no 
precedent for it, using the icma, that is, the consensual opinions of past 
Islamic scholars, and the Hadith.
 9. Hizbullah members would use code names of their own choosing. This 
would both protect members’ identities in the case of operations by Turkish 
security personnel and allow them to dispose of their old identities and 
symbolically mark the onset of a new life in Hizbullah.
 10. Lê ev dosya li vê dinyayê nayê vekirin. Piştî çavên X û piştî yên bi hezaran ... 
Heta em nekevin hizûra xwedê ev dosya nayê vekirin.
 11. Personal interview with Aziz, 20/0713.
 12. The dictionary meaning of the word alaka is relation or connection. The 
word is also used in Surah Al-Mu’minun, verse 14 to refer to embryo in 
the context of prenatal development. However, in Hizbullah’s usage, alaka 
embodies both the meaning of ‘relation’ as well as ‘embryo’ in that the 
Hizbullah recruit is likened to an embryo in development.
 13. Musab’s understanding that the name Mervan is not preferred by Sunni 
Muslims while being common among the Alevis is diametrically opposed 
to reality. The name of the person responsible for the murder of Hussain 
during the Battle of Kerbela is Mervan. Therefore, it is unimaginable 
among the Alevis to name a child after him. Mervan is not a common 
name among Sunni Muslims either. Perhaps it was the strangeness of the 
name that led Musab to believe it was a commonly found name among the 
Alevis.
 14. Meaning he will fight them as fiercely as he would have fought someone he 
does not know.
 15. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 16. Baggy trousers worn by men especially in the Kurdish region of Turkey.
 17. Personal interview with Fethullah, 11/08/13.
 18. www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQI9xGijSJg (accessed 15/06/14).
 19. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 22/09/13.
 20. Reports addressed to the city administration are folded very small and 
after putting the letter ‘C’, short for Cemaat, on the folded paper, delivered 
to the highest Hizbullah authorities.
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 21. Musab is referring to supporters of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan.
 22. Musab is referring to Velioğlu’s death during Operation Beykoz, Edip 
Gümüş and Cemal Tutar’s failure to destroy the Hizbullah Archive, and 
their surviving the operation unharmed.
 23. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 24. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 25. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 26. The names of these groups are not disclosed at the request of my 
informants.
 27. The Zehra group is a Nur cemaat that puts more emphasis on the 
Kurdishness of Said-i Nursi compared to others.
 28. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Hama_massacre (accessed 16/06/14).
 29. The disintegration of Islamist groups in the area over disagreements 
concerning Iran’s involvement in the Hama Massacre can be compared to 
the disputes and subsequent fragmentation of left-wing groups caused by 
the USSR’s invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
 30. Personal interview with Ömer, 04/08/13.
 31. Personal interview with Hamza, 01/02/14.
 32. Personal interview with Ömer, 04/08/13.
 33. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 34. An individual or group supporting the idea of a politically united 
nation-state of Kurdistan.
 35. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 36. Ibid.
 37. Personal interview with İzzettin, 01/02/14.
 38. Personal interview with Fethullah, 11/08/13.
 39. The tone of these accusations and allegations, and the role they played in 
the justification of violence will be investigated in the next section.
 40. Minimal homogeneity refers to two groups with minimal differences in 
action and thought moving away from each other on account of political 
violence, group belonging, or a clash of interests and the continuation of 
this process of separation until a strict homogeneity is attained within the 
group.
 41. Tağuti is the adjective form of the term tağut.
 42. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 43. I will not disclose the pseudonyms of these informants for reasons of 
security.
 44. Although it is known that there are former Hizbullah members among 
those who converted to Shia Islam, the principal converts to Shia Islam 
were from the Menzil group.
 45. Personal interview with Necat Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 46. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 47. http://huseynisevda.biz/articles.php?article_id=480 (accessed 16/06/14).
 48. Personal interview with Kamuran, 22/01/14.
 49. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
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 50. Personal interview with Mehmet Göktaş, 02/04/14.
 51. Yusuf is referring to the Vahdet group here.
 52. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 53. Personal interview with Necat Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 54. Personal interview with Mücahit, 14/02/14.
 55. Personal interview with Hamza, 23/01/14.
 56. Hizbullah is a Quranic word that means ‘the party of Allah’, however, 
Ahmet uses the word Hizb meaning clique, fraction, or party to refer to 
Hizbullah.
 57. Personal interview with Ahmet, 04/02/14.
 58. See endnote no. 142 in Chapter 1.
 59. Hizbuşşeytan is a Quranic word used to refer to those who are not from 
the party of Allah and/or are against it.
 60. Ergenekon is the name of a clique allegedly operating in the 2000s within 
the Turkish military. As the Gülen movement started being considered a 
terrorist organisation by the Turkish government in 2016, the prosecutors 
in the trials of alleged Ergenekon members were revealed to be Fethullah 
Gülen supporters and therefore the soldiers tried in the Ergenekon trials 
have been acquitted and their honour restored.
 61. Personal interview with İzzettin, 01/02/14.
 62. www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/hizbullaha_yakin_site_yazinca_escinsellik_
paneli_iptal_edildi-1187821 (accessed 17/06/14).
 63. http://muhalefet.org/haber-hizbullahtan-duman-grubuna-tehdit-19- 
6130.aspx (accessed 17/06/14).
 64. The complete interview text can be found in the Appendix.
 65. This refers to the tensions between the BDP and Hüda-Par during the 
2014 local elections. Although the BDP continued to operate as a political 
party, it became responsible for local governments. In its place, the HDP 
was founded mainly on the initiative of the Kurdish movement.
 66. Siyer is the generic name for biographies of Muhammad and his 
companions.
 67. Habil and Qabil are the two sons of Adam. According to the myth, Qabil 
kills Habil out of jealousy and this constitutes the first murder on earth.
 68. Personal interview with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 69. Personal interview with Musab, 24/01/14.
 70. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 71. Personal interview with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 72. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 73. Personal interview with Kamuran, 22/01/14.
 74. Here the informant is referring to certain speculations concerning the 
murder of Hüseyin Velioğlu and points out that Hizbullah does not take 
these speculations seriously. 
 75. Gonca Kuriş, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, and Uğur Mumcu were intellectuals 
murdered in the 1990s. Kuriş was an Islamist feminist and was murdered 
by Hizbullah. Both Kışlalı and Mumcu were journalists working for the 
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Cumhuriyet newspaper and they were assassinated in separate car-bomb 
attacks. Those behind their assassinations were never revealed.
 76. Bahriye Üçok was a professor in the Faculty of Divinity at the University 
of Ankara and was well known for her left-wing modernist interpretations 
of Islam. She was assassinated in 1990 by unknown assailants.
 77. Although Azad claims Hizbullah members could not carry out operations 
without orders from their superiors, my research data show that while this 
may be the general rule, save for a few sensational cases of assassination, 
there are numerous cases of Hizbullah members operating on their own 
initiative.
 78. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 79. These questions chiefly concern why they could not destroy the archive 
when Velioğlu was killed, how they could allow the leader of Hizbullah to 
be killed, how Edip Gümüş (the current leader of Hizbullah) and Cemal 
Tutar could survive unharmed, Hizbullah’s explanations of the violent 
acts and executions that received coverage in the media and that many 
Hizbullah members had heard rumours about, and finally, the qualities of 
the new leader.
 80. Personal interview with Kamuran, 22/01/14.
 81. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 82. This issue was dealt with in Chapter 1.
 83. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 22/09/13.
 84. Personal interview with Sinan, 30/11/13. As I will investigate the existence 
of an ethnic discourse within Hizbullah in the next subsection, Sinan’s 
emphasis on the connection with Turkish Islamism is the focus of this 
extract.
 85. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 20/10/14.
 86. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 87. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 88. Personal interview with Dilgeş, 22/09/13.
 89. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 90. Personal interview with Kamuran, 22/01/14.
 91. Long live Islam! Death to slavery!
 92. Although Sinan describes Hizbullah as a Kurdistanî organisation, later 
on during the interview he also stressed that Hizbullah had become 
indifferent to the Kurdish issue on account of the influence of Turkish 
Islamism. Personal interview with Sinan, 30/11/13.
 93. Personal interview with Mahmut, 15/11/13.
 94. The Islamic Party of Kurdistan was established in 1979 in Mecca by 
Muhammad Salih Mustafa and its founding declaration was drawn 
up by the Syrian Kurdish Ikhwanist Said Hawwa, who is a great 
influence on Hizbullah. The Islamic Party of Kurdistan has been active 
in Turkey, the USA, and Europe. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Islamic_Kurdistan_Party and www.mnyekta.com/modules.php?name= 
Content&pa=showpage&pid=1040 (accessed 18/06/14).
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 95. For example, Dilgeş left Hizbullah on account of their anti-PKK and 
anti-Kurdish discourse and engagement in violence. Another informant 
Ahmet referred to himself in recounting a past event saying, ‘we are 
Muslim, we are the people of Sharia, and we are Kurdistanî. We are 
fighting for the liberation of Kurdistan’ (personal interview with Ahmet, 
04/02/14).
 96. Personal interview with Mahmut, 08/11/13.
 97. Azadî is the Kurdish word for freedom.
 98. Personal interview with Mahmut, 08/11/13.
 99. Personal interview with Sermest, 27/10/13.
 100. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 101. The informant is claiming that they were being inclusive by pointing out 
that Hisbullah not only produced albums in Kurdish but also in Arabic for 
a small Arab minority like the Mihelmi.
 102. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 103. The youth organisation of the Turkish ultra-nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi (Nationalist Action Party).
 104. The rally the Hizbullah-affiliated Lovers of the Prophet Platform 
(Peygamber Sevdalıları Platformu) organised in the Kazlıçeşme Square in 
Istanbul. 
 105. Misbeliefs that emerged and became popular subsequent to the emergence 
of Islam.
 106. Rules and principles that emerged in Islam after the time of Muhammad 
and, are therefore considered fallacies.
 107. Personal interview with Mehmet Göktaş, 03/04/14.
 108. Sivil cuma refers to a particular type of activism whereby people were 
encouraged to perform their congregational Friday prayers in public 
squares instead of Turkish state-governed mosques. The mainstream 
Kurdish political movement spearheaded this form of activism to protest 
the state’s hostile attitude towards Kurds’ right to their mother tongue.
 109. Written interview with Hizbullah officials, 04/05/14.
 110. Personal interview with Yusuf, 23/05/14.
 111. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 112. Personal interview with Mahmut, 08/11/13.
 113. This phrase is an example of Hizbullah’s construction of Islam as an 
ideological discourse. Moreover, I believe the use of the word serok (leader) 
in the phrase is noteworthy and it may be construed as an expression of 
Hizbullah’s objection and opposition to the PKK’s use of the word in 
reference to Abdullah Öcalan.
 114. The principle of the oneness and uniqueness of Allah in Islam.
 115. The hand gesture that became popular after the overthrow of the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime in Egypt.
 116. Tekbir is the name given to an Islamic chant and an Islamic phrase 
meaning, ‘God is great’ or ‘God is the greatest’. In this context, tekbir 
specifically refers to a command-like expression, to which people respond 
by chanting ‘Allahu Ekber’.
176 . kurdish hizbullah in turkey
 117. Tilavet refers to the recitation of the Quran to a crowd according to the rules 
of Quranic recitation (tecvit). It must be emphasised that the first sections 
of the Sura al-Feth, which is concerned with preventing Muhammad and 
the companions from going from Medina to Mecca during the time of the 
peace treaty of Hudaybiyyah, is interpreted by Islamic commentators as 
the first sura where it was declared to Muhammad that Mecca would be 
conquered by Muslims. I believe the fact that the selected section depicts a 
situation which has not yet come about but is a harbinger of future success 
corresponds to Hizbullah’s discourse whereby it associates current affairs 
with the history of Islam, thus justifying them and thereby motivating the 
crowds.
 118. Salman al-Farisi was one of the Prophet Mohammed’s non-Arabic 
companions. Islamists generally refer to Salman and point to the high 
esteem he entertained in Arab society on account of his faith in order to 
emphasise Islam’s non-racially discriminating nature.
 119. The pressure on Hizbullah by its supporter base was not given a primary 
role in the organisation’s decision-making processes. This issue was dealt 
with at the end of the first chapter within the context of the figure, ‘Levels 
of Hizbullah Affiliation’.
 120. Idris-i Bitlisi (1455–1520), Kurdish scholar and feudal leader, played 
an active role in the rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Iran by 
garnering the support of a large number of Kurdish tribes for the Ottoman 
Empire.
 121. Personal interview with Azad, 28/10/13.
 122. Personal interview with Sinan, 30/11/13.
 123. Examples in this regard include preventing tango lessons from being 
taught in Batman claiming, ‘tango is the greatest indecency’, protesting and 
eventually stopping an academic talk on homosexuality, statements made 
against the concert by the Turkish rock band Duman on the grounds that 





 124. By theoretical abstraction, I am referring to the theoretical results achieved 
after the data are classified into categories and themes.
chapter 3
 1. Personal interview with Yusuf, 03/05/14.
 2. Contemplation in the Sufi tradition.
 3. Personal interview with Hüseyin, 10/11/13.
 4. Here the word fedai refers to one who sacrifices their life for a cause.
 5. www.enfal.de/ecdad84.htm (accessed 14/05/14).
 6. http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnewsmobile.aspx?id=-90062 (accessed 
14/05/14).
 7. See endnote no. 116 in Chapter 2.
notes . 177
 8. Emphasising the risks involved in engaging in Hizbullah’s Islamist 
activities at the time.
 9. According to the village imam, PKK women and men members sleep in 
the same caves. The ideological basis of the village imam’s expectation of 
women and men to sit separately in a mountain cave becomes evident 
when his statement is compared with the story And Xalet, where the young 
woman would not remove her headscarf during a clash with the police.
 10. A detailed Islamic interpretation of these verses is beyond the scope of this 
study.
 11. According to Islamic thought, after one dies a period of time is spent in the 
grave until the Day of Judgement. While those sent to heaven experience 
life in heaven during this period, those deserving of hell suffer the kabir 
azabı (punishment of the grave). This is a controversial issue and many 
non-Sunni scholars of Islam repudiate the concept of kabir azabı.
 12. The significance of My Cemal for the public is the fact that the book 
arguably constitutes a written confession of the murder of Gaffar Okkan, 
the Chief of Police for Diyarbakır, in 2001. In the book’s final chapter, the 
author reports that when Velioğlu finds out about Cemal Uçar’s suspicious 
suicide/murder in Istanbul, he personally orders the killing of Gaffar 
Okkan and the two Hizbullah informers involved in Uçar’s death and adds 
that if he does not live to see it, his order should be considered his will 
(Tutar, İ., 2010, pp. 214–15). In contrast to public knowledge, it becomes 
evident that Okkan’s assassination was decided prior to Operation Beykoz 
and executed by Hizbullah after Velioğlu’s death.
 13. Personal interview with Hüseyin, 10/11/13.
 14. Zekat is a form of Islamic charity which involves the annual giving of 
a certain percentage of one’s wealth to a designated poor individual or 
individuals. Giving zekat is an obligation on all Muslims and, as such, it 
constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.
   In the example from the book, Cemal uses the concept of zekat in 
reference to his father’s larger family. In Cemal’s usage, zekat refers to 
both dying on the true path and being sacrificed or martyred because of 
the dangers involved in being a high-ranking Hizbullah official. Cemal’s 
metaphoric use of the concept of zekat is reminiscent of the Sons of 
the Cemaat in Chapter 2, where the concept of sacrifice was explained 
through the example of Abraham.
 15. A lecture circle is a reading group that meets periodically to read and 
discuss particular subjects.
 16. See endnote no. 29 in Chapter 1.
 17. Personal interview with Necat Özdemir, 03/05/14.
 18. Personal interview with Kamuran, 29/10/13.
 19. See endnote no. 87 in Chapter 1.
conclusion
 1. Although I am aware of the ongoing debates as to whether ethnically 
based or religious motivations underlie the Sheikh Said uprising, here I 
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am making reference to Hizbullah’s incorporation of the uprising into its 
ideological discourse. My focus, therefore, has been on how Hizbullah 
carried the uprising into the domain of discourse rather than what were 
the real motivations behind the uprising, which constitute a subject of 
historical research.
 2. This figure is based on the murders which have been proved to have been 
committed by Hizbullah. With the addition of some murders committed 
by unknown perpetrators in southeastern Turkey in the 1990s, this figure 
goes up to the thousands. As I do not possess adequate information on this 
subject, I am only quoting existing figures here.
 3. See endnote no. 123 in Chapter 1.
 4. See footnote no. 87 in Chapter 1.
appendix
 1. Short for Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, ‘In the name of Allah, the All-Loving, 
the All-Merciful’.
 2. Short for Allâh Subhanehu ve Teâlâ, ‘Allah, May He be praised and exalted’.
 3. Short for El-hamdü li’llâhi Rabbi’l-Alemin, ‘All praises belong to Allah, the 
Lord of the worlds’.
 4. Short for Allahümme salli ala seyyidina Muhammedin ve ala ali seyyidina 
Muhammed, ‘May Allah deliver his infinite Blessing and Peace on 
Muhammad and the family of Muhammad’.
 5. By Hizbullah Rehberi, the Hizbullah officials are referring to Edip Gümüş, 
the present leader of Hizbullah. Hüseyin Velioğlu was also referred to as 
Hizbullah Rehberi until his death in 2000.
 6. See endnote no. 15 in Chapter 3.
 7. Books about the life of Muhammad or his companions.
 8. One who fulfils his faith-related obligations entirely and avoids acts that 
are disapproved of in Islam.
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